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In general terms, it is estimated that there are some 500 to 600 million people living 
with disabilities world-wide1 2. Some 50 million of these people are citizens o f the 
European Union . Therefore it is quite a substantial group o f people whose needs 
must to be taken into account across the policy and programme field o f the EU. 
Despite this, disability discrimination is a relatively new area in European Union law. 
Until the Treaty o f Amsterdam in 1997, disability matters lay within the sole 
responsibility o f the Member States. Article 13 o f the Treaty of Amsterdam signifies 
that for the first time the Community has a legal basis to take action against 
discrimination suffered on the ground o f disability. This has resulted in the creation of 
the Framework Employment Directive 2000/78/EC, which prohibits disability 
discrimination in the employment context. Therefore, currently at the European level 
there exists anti-discrimination legislation protecting the rights o f persons with 
disabilities solely within the employment sphere.
It is undeniable that there was a clear need for legislation in the area o f employment. 
There was and still is a general consensus throughout the EU that people with 
disabilities have a low rate of participation in the labour market. Unemployment 
levels among people with disabilities are considerably higher in comparison to people 
without disabilities3. Often, those who are employed tend to end up in low skilled and 
poorly paid jobs. This results in a vicious cycle of disadvantage that inevitably has 
serious repercussions for participation rates in other aspects of life. It cannot be 
overstated that employment is an essential element of social inclusion. It provides the 
opportunity to earn economic independence, gain personal satisfaction, form 
relationships with the outside world and live in society with dignity and self-esteem. 
Exclusion from the labour market therefore naturally inhibits an individual’s ability to 
participate fully in public, market and social life. Against this background, anti- 
discrimination legislation prohibiting discrimination in the employment sphere has
' This is a statistic quoted by the World Health Organization; see www.who.int
2 Statistic quoted by the European Disability Forum. See http://www.edf-feph.org/en/welcome.htm
3 According to data in “The Employment situation of people with disabilities in the European Union”, a 
study prepared by EIM Business and Policy Research for the European Commission Directorate 
General Employment and Social Affairs [2001] only 42% of people with disabilities are employed 
compared with almost 65% of non-disabled people and as many as 52% of people with disabilities are 
economically inactive compared with only 28% of non-disabled people.
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been a major and welcome achievement. However, the restriction to the employment 
field only has been disappointing4. The EU does not require Member States to outlaw 
disability discrimination in fields such as education, public transport and the provision 
of goods and services. Therefore, there still remains a significant amount to be done 
in order to achieve equality across all aspects o f life for people with disabilities.
In this thesis I propose to examine the effectiveness o f  the non-discrimination 
legislative framework now in place at the European level as a tool for achieving 
fairness and a  decent standard of living for people with disabilities. With this aim in 
mind, the first section of the thesis will examine what factors led the Union to frame 
its work in the promotion o f disability rights and how current anti-discrimination 
legislation emerged as a result. Section two goes on to examine the relationship 
between equality and disability and how the notion o f equality can be applied to 
disability discrimination. Section three is dedicated to an analysis of the Framework 
Directive and its effectiveness in ensuring protection and rights for people with 
disabilities in the labour market. Finally section four examines the potential o f  the 
most innovative part of the Directive for people with disabilities, the concept of 
reasonable accommodation, which has been introduced to EU law for the first time by 
Article 5 o f the Directive.
4 This is made all the more apparent by the fact that EU Directives prohibiting discrimination on the 
grounds o f sex and race have a much wider scope. For example, see Article 3 of Council Directive 
2000/43/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective o f racial or 
ethnic origin, which covers social protection, including social security and healthcare, social 
advantages, education and access to and supply of goods and services which are available to the public, 




I: TH E EMERGENCE OF DISABILITY RIGHTS IN TH E EU
The concept of ‘disability rights’ is a relatively new phenomenon to European law as 
well as to European social policy. For years people with disabilities were treated as 
invisible citizens of Europe, disability policy was a barren ground o f  a few weak 
initiatives and disability law was non-existent. However, the European Union’s 
engagement in the disability field has changed substantially in the course o f  the last 
twenty years1. In this first section, I wish to explore what factors led to disability 
rights finally becoming a pressing item on the agenda o f the European Union and 
consequently how this led to the creation o f anti-discrimination legislation in the 
shape of the Framework Employment Directive. This will involve an analysis o f how 
the perception o f disability in Europe departed from the traditional model o f viewing 
disability as a medical and welfare issue to embracing the rights based approach. I 
will trace the contemporaneous change in European disability policy; examine how 
national and international laws and policies were a major influence in instigating 
change and thus how the current European disability strategy emerged as a result.
1.1 The move from  welfare to rights
The reason why the laws in the majority o f European Member States did not prohibit 
discrimination on the grounds o f disability until recently is because legislators and 
policy makers commonly believed that people with disabilities were instead primarily 
in need of social security, care and assistance2. This is now commonly referred to as 
the ‘welfare approach’. However, there has been a noticeable change in the past ten 
years in the legal and policy responses of the Union and many European countries to 
the issue of disability. This new and still emerging response is often termed the ‘rights 
based approach’3. Let us now examine these two different approaches to disability in 
more detail, observing the rationale behind each and what factors led to the change in 
attitude and direction.
1 Hvinden; B., “The Uncertain Convergence of Disability Policies in Western Europe”, Social Policy 
and Administration (2003) Vol. 37, No. 6, pp. 609-624,618.
2 Hendriks, A., ‘Promoting Disability Equality after the Treaty o f Amsterdam: New legal Directions 
and Practical Expansion Strategies’ in Anna Lawson and Caroline Gooding (Eds.) ‘Disability Rights in 
Europe: From Theory to Practice’ Hart Publishing 2005, 187.
3 Lawson, Anna, ‘The EU rights-based Approach to Disability. Some Strategies for Shaping an
Inclusive Society’ at 1. Paper presented at the European Commission Conference on Disability, Sofia, 




1A Î The medical model o f  disability
Disability has traditionally been regarded as a welfare issue in Europe. In this context, 
disability has been presented as a social, psychological, educational or medical 
‘problem’ with the individual which has to be resolved4. The traditional legal and 
policy responses to people with disabilities in the EU were shaped by this 
understanding o f  disability, which has become known as the ‘medical’ or ‘individual’ 
model5. Unless that individual can be cured or somehow adapted, they will not be able 
to participate in the life o f  mainstream society. It is they that must change or be 
changed in order to fit within a society designed for people without disabilities6. 
Therefore, the segregation o f  people with disabilities is a  natural consequence of the 
medical model understanding o f  disability. In order to explain how anti- 
discrimination legislation for people with disabilities came into being, it is necessary 
to examine how  the welfare state based on the medical model failed to ensure a decent 
life for people with disabilities. This failure led people with disabilities to identify 
anti-discrimination legislation as a model for change and was therefore an 
instrumental factor in the eventual enactment o f such legislation.
Disability law before the anti-discrimination era often helped to construct and 
perpetuate the medical model of disability in Europe. After World War I, welfare 
legislation for disabled war veterans was introduced in most European countries. 
These welfare laws reflected society’s sense o f obligation to compensate war veterans 
through disability pensions^ rehabilitation benefits and employment quotas7. The 
introduction o f  employment quotas8, which obliged employers and/or state bodies to 
ensure that their workforce contained a certain minimum percentage of disabled
4 Baker, Lynch, Cantillon, Walsh, “Equality: From Theory to Action”. Palgrave Macmillan 2004,13
3 See Rioux, M. H. ‘Disability: The Place o f Judgement in a World o f Fact’, Journal of Intellectual 
Disability Research, 1997 Volume 41, Number 2, pp. 102-111 and Lisa Waddington, “Disability, 
Employment and the European Community”, Maklu 1995, Chapter One for a discussion o f the 
different social ‘pathologies’ of disability.
6 Lawson, A., supra note 3, I.
7 Degener T. and G Quinn , “A survey o f  International, Comparative and Regional Disability Law 
Reform”, in Chapter 1 Mary Lou Breslin & Silvia Yee, ‘Disability Rights Law and Policy- 
International and National perspectives’, (Transnational, 2002), 21,22. Degener distinguishes between 
three periods o f modem disability law at the domestic level. The first period started after World War I 
with the introduction o f welfare legislation for disabled war veterans, the second period began in the 
60’s with an extension of welfare legislation to all people with disabilities. The third period in the 90’s 
marked a departure from the previous welfare orientated policies when some European countries began 
to adopt anti-discrimination legislation for persons with disabilities.
8 For a discussion of employment quotas from a disability rights perspective, see generally Lisa 
Waddington, ‘Reassessing the Employment of People with Disabilities in Europe: From Quotas to 
Anti-Discrimination Laws’ (1996) 18 Comparative Labour Law Review 62.
employees, has since become a staple feature o f most European countries’ disability 
employment policy9. Although the intention was positive, the imposition of 
employment quotas was a tactic which basically presupposed the inability o f people 
with disabilities to compete on the open job market, thus reinforcing a negative image 
of disability10. In practice, quota enforcement mechanisms were generally not very 
effective. They were rarely used by the state and were not enforceable by people with 
disabilities themselves. A quota would be satisfied in cases where employees with 
disabilities were clustered in low status and poorly paid roles11 12. Despite these 
apparent shortcomings, employment quotas are still used by many European Member 
States today . Unfortunately it has not proved to be a successful method of achieving 
equality in practice for people with disabilities13. In the employment field generally, 
segregation has been particularly evident. Sheltered employment schemes provide 
another example o f a welfare approach, where despite good intentions, the end result 
actually perpetuates inequality and segregation. They are generally subsidised by the 
state and offer work which is usually low paid and unskilled14. This is a policy also 
developed on the assumption that people with disabilities are incapable of working in 
mainstream environments, thus serving to reinforce exclusion and disadvantage rather 
than promote integration. It is these false assumptions that people with disabilities are 
incapable, incompetent and pitiful objects, which result in the introduction o f such 
inadequate welfare measures.
1.12 The development o f  the social model
In the 60s welfare legislation was extended to cover all, not just war veterans. Laws 
were enacted in areas such as special education, medical and rehabilitation benefits,
9 The Scandinavian countries are an exception. See Waddington and Diller, ‘Tensions and Coherence |-'j
in Disability Policy: The Uneasy Relationship Between Social Welfare and Civil Rights Models of jjjj
Disability in American, European and International Employment Law’ in Mary Lou Breslin & Silvia | !
Yee, ‘Disability Rights Law and Policy- International and National perspectives’, (Transnational, 1.1
2002), 241 at 256. |;.j
10 Lawson A, supra note 3,3. \  '■;
"Ib id . L;
12 For example, Germany has a quota o f 5% for companies with at least 20 employees (paragraph 71 j : '
Abs. 1 Sozialgesetzbuch IX). If employers do not meet their quota target, they are obliged to pay a fine \
or levy. In recent years this quota system has become less effective. The combination of economic j:
difficulties and a low levy has resulted in payment taking preference for employers over the risk of ■]
employing a person with a disability. France adopted the German model and has a quota o f 6% for
companies with at least 20 employees (Article L 323-1 Code du travail). See Waddington and Diller, (T
supra note 9,258. ;
13 See generally Waddington and Diller, supra'note 9 at 256-262.
14 Lawson A, supra note 3,3.
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employment quotas and institutionalised care services, which served to introduce 
charity to a broader group of people with disabilities15. This system o f  welfare 
frequently did guarantee a basic income and essential care and assistance to people 
with disabilities but it rarely conferred enforceable legal entitlements16 *. It was also 
unpredictable and often dependent on the state of the economy and the current 
dominant political power . Therefore, despite the adoption of further welfare 
provisions, people with disabilities were often left disempowered and segregated 
under this system. This failure o f the welfare state caused an outcry among people 
with disabilities and led to serious demands for change. These demands for change led 
to a  new way o f  viewing disability, which became known as the ‘social model’. This 
model rejects the long-established idea that the obstacles to people with disabilities’ 
participation arise solely from their impairment, and focuses instead on barriers posed 
by the environment, including: inaccessible physical infrastructure; the attitudes and 
prejudices o f  society; the policies, practices and procedures of local and national 
governments and administrations; and the structure o f  the health, welfare and 
education systems. From this perspective, barriers to the participation o f people with 
disabilities must be addressed through changes to their social, physical and 
educational environment. For people with disabilities, the social model is both a 
liberating and empowering view. It advocates putting the person first rather than 
viewing her or him through a particular medical condition. According to Baker et a /18, 
“the fundamental distinction o f the social model is between impairment and disability. 
Impairments are the physical and psychological differences between persons with 
disabilities and people with ‘normal’ capabilities. By contrast disability is the process 
by which societies prevent people with impairments from realising their full potential 
and from participating as fully as possible in activities that others take for granted.” 
This ‘disabling’ o f persons with disabilities by society has grave consequences across 
all aspects o f life. It generates inequalities and discrimination, worsens their already 
disadvantageous position and above all restricts them from taking part in ‘normal’ 
community life.
The social model was largely developed by the work of various academics who at the 





Degener supra note 7,22.
Hendriks, A, supra note 2,189.
Ibid.
Baker et al, supra note 4,9.
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about disability. The notion that disability could be seen as a social and political issue 
soon began to emerge in the literature. Writers such as Finkeistein19, Oliver20 21and 
Bames , in developing the social model, helped to shift the focus from the individual, 
medical condition o f people with disabilities to the disabling structures of society22. 
By the 1990s a definite shift in the established perception of disability began to 
emerge. During this decade and the one that followed, the disabled people’s 
movement gained in strength and influence and began to revolutionise thinking on 
disability. It must be noted that the move by persons with disabilities themselves to 
form their own organisations had a major influence on the shift from the medical to 
the social model of disability. It promoted a growing consensus between them on 
what was the correct method to approach disability. In this way, it began a process of
reformulating the problems of disability, shifting the focus away from the functional 
limitations o f  impaired individuals (medical model), towards a rights-based approach 
(social model) focusing on the barriers posed by society to people with disabilities23. 
This eventually led to people with disabilities themselves identifying institutional 
discrimination as the main problem and anti-discrimination legislation as the most 
promising way o f tackling it24. During the 90s25 2678some European countries finally 
began to adopt anti-discrimination legislation for people with disabilities . This was 
achieved as a result o f intensive lobbying on the part of disabled people’s 
organisations . Another influential factor was that many countries already had sex 
and race discrimination laws in place, which further encouraged people with 
disabilities to demand similar treatment . Effective lobbying ensured that the new
19 Finkeistein Victor, “Attitudes and Disabled People: Issues for Discussion” (New York: World 
Rehabilitation Fund) 1980.
20 Oliver, Mike “The Politics of Disablement” Basingstoke: Macmillan 1990.
21 Bames, Colin, “Disabled People in Britain and Discrimination” (London: Hurst and Co.) 1991. For a 
detailed recent discussion of the social model, see Bames, Mercer (Eds.) “Implementing the Social 
Model of Disability” : Theory and Research, Leeds, The Disability Press, 2004.
22 Baker et ai, supra note 4,13
23 Bynoe, Oliver, Bames, “Equal Rights for Disabled People: The case for a new law”. IPPR 1991,11
24 Ibid at 7
25 The 1990s in particular was a banner decade for disability law. More than 40 nations enacted 
disability discrimination laws during this period. See generally Degener supra note 7.
26 Most notably the British Disability Discrimination Act 1995; the Swedish Law on the Prohibition of 
Discrimination in Working Life o f Persons with Disabilities, SFS No. 1999-132 (Official Title: Lag 
(1999:132) om forbiid mot diskriminering i arbetslivet av personer med funktionshinder) and the Irish 
Employment Equality Act 1998.
27 In the U.K for example, disability groups had fought for decades to achieve anti-discrimination 
legislation. See Doyle, Brian J. “Disability Discrimination: The New Law” (London: Jordans) 1996.
28 For example in die UK there had been anti-discrimination laws in place since the mid 70s; The Sex 




laws were based on the social model o f disability and that discrimination was finally 
recognised as a major obstacle in the lives o f people with disabilities.
According to Degener, a key element of disability discrimination legislation is the 
understanding that the exclusion and segregation o f people with disabilities does not 
follow from the impairment but from political choices based on false assumptions 
about disability . This sums up the failure o f the EU to adequately tackle disability 
discrimination until now. For too long, European disability policy was rooted in false 
assumptions about disability and for this reason it failed to bring about constructive 
changes in the lives of people with disabilities. The transformation of ideas that 
introduced the social model o f disability was an integral factor leading to the creation 
o f  rights-based disability anti-discrimination legislation in Europe.
1.2 International Influence
As well as the general disillusionment with welfare provision nationally, significant 
international developments began to influence the demand for anti-discrimination 
legislation at the European level. In particular, the disability civil rights movement in 
the United States and the adoption o f international human rights instruments in the 
field o f disability29 30 were a major influence on European policies.
1.21 Americans with Disabilities Act 1990
Civil’ rights legislation in the United States had a considerable influence on the 
welfare to rights movement in Europe. The US was the first country in the world to 
adopt anti-discrimination legislation for persons with disabilities31. The motivation for 
the enactment o f disability anti-discrimination legislation grew out of what is now 
called the ‘disability rights movement’. This movement had identified people with 
disabilities as a minority group subject to discrimination and successfully campaigned
29 Degener supra note 7,25.
j0 There are only a few treaties which specifically offer protection against disability discrimination and 
it must be noted that it is normally by way of an open-ended or ‘other status’ criterion, which is not 
very effective. See for example Article 14, the non-discriminafion provision of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, where disability is not listed as a ground but it must be interpreted as 
coming under the heading of ‘other status’. It has been more common at the international level to 
condemn disability discrimination through declarations, resolutions and recommendations, ail o f which 
do not have binding effect See Aart Hendriks, ‘Different Definition-Same Problems-One Way Out?’ in 
Breslin &Yee (Eds.) ‘Disability Rights Law and Policy- International and National perspectives, 
(Transnational, 2002) at 196.
jl See Waddington, Lisa, “Disability, Employment and the European Community” , Maklu 1995, 141- 
180 for a comprehensive overview of US Disability Discrimination legislation.
for anti-discrimination legislation, which was passed firstly in the form o f  the 
Rehabilitation Act in 197332 and later with the adoption o f the more comprehensive 
Americans with Disabilities Act in 199033, a landmark piece o f legislation which drew 
noticeably on the race discrimination model in the Civil Rights Act o f 196434 *. The
American disability rights movement was directly influenced by the civil rights
c
efforts of African Americans during the sixties . The success of the civil rights 
movement acted as a catalyst for other groups, including women and people with
I
T
disabilities, and spurred them on to demand the same equality o f treatment and
protection o f their civil rights. It is important to note the vital role played by people 
with disabilities in the introduction of anti-discrimination legislation. Public 
demonstrations, marches, vigils and constant pressure on the political actors involved 
were crucial factors which led to the eventual enactment o f legislation. The ADA was 
groundbreaking in the sense that it finally abandoned the welfare approach to 
disability and fully endorsed the civil rights approach36 *.
The ADA has welcomed in a new era o f ‘disability rights’ for people with disabilities; 
a movement which has continued to gather momentum throughout the world to the 
present day. It has had a major influential impact on the evolution o f disability 
discrimination law and policy world-wide and in Europe in particular. This thesis 
will demonstrate later on how the disability provisions o f the European Framework 
Directive were directly influenced by the ADA .
t
32 Pub.L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 357 (1973)
33 Pub.L. No. 101-336,104 Stat. 327 (1990)
34 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
j5 Two Important publications in the sixties recognised the prototype that the civil rights efforts of 
African Americans offered for individuals with disabilities. See Leonard Kriegal, ‘Uncle Tom and Tiny 
Tim: Some Reflections on the Cripple as a Negro’ 38 AM. SCHOLAR 412 (1962) where it was 
suggested that people with disabilities who were seeking equality and dignity should adopt as a model 
the approaches taken by black people in their civil rights struggles. See also Richard Allen, ‘Legal 
Rights of the Disabled and Disadvantaged’ (Washington: U.S Social and Rehabilitation Service 1969). 
Cited in Robert L. Burgdorf, ‘U.S. Anti-discrimination Law and Disability- Focus on Title 1 of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act’ at 4. Teaching Materials for the Disability Discrimination Summer 
School, NUI Galway, Ireland. 4-15 July 2005.
36 The American National Council on Disability declared that from the preamble to its final provision, 
the ADA is solely about ‘equal opportunity’. National Council on Disability, ‘Negative Media 
Portrayals of the ADA’ Paper no.5 of the ADA Policy Brief Series: Righting the ADA. Cited in Robert 
L. Burgdorf, supra note 35 at 18.
j7 This influence has been so extensive that it is claimed that the ADA has had a more profound 
external than internal impact. Currently there is a lack of consensus in US legal literature as to whether 
the ADA has been successful. See ADA Symposium Issue; “Backlash Against the ADA”, 21 Berkeley 
Journal of Employment and Labour Law (2000)




1.22 UN Standard Rules 1993
Other measures at the international level such as the early work done at the UN39 and 
the resulting Standard Rules were hugely significant in the European context40. The 
shift from welfare to rights that was so characteristic o f the ADA was explicitly 
ratified at international level in the UN Standard Rules on the Equalisation of 
Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities in 199341. The adoption o f the Standard 
Rules was the culmination o f  the increased recognition o f  the rights-based approach to 
disability internationally and regionally since the 1970s42. This was evident in the 
focus o f the Standard Rules, which was exclusively on equal opportunity and equal 
participation. Unfortunately the Rules have no binding force in law. Despite this 
apparent hindrance, they have become quite authoritative world-wide. The history of 
disability discrimination law in a number o f countries reveals that either the ADA 
and/or the Standard Rules have served as the model law for the development of 
domestic legislation43. The transformation of disability policy that is evidenced by the 
ADA and the Standard Rules has certainly influenced national and regional European 
policy over the last decade. Let us now turn in more detail to the examination of 
European disability policy itself to determine how the European Union came to frame 
its work in the promotion o f disability rights.
. . i iV. 'V
1.3 The evolution o f a rights-based disability policy in the European Union 
From a historical perspective the European Union is a peculiar source o f  law and 
policy in the context of disability44. The Union has its origin in three separate treaties
j9 E.g. 1971 Declaration on the Rights o f Mentally Retarded Persons (Proclaimed by General Assembly 
Resolution 2856 (XXVI) of 20 December 1971) which stipulates that a person with an intellectual 
impairment is accorded the same rights as any other person; 1975 Declaration on the Rights of 
Disabled Persons (Proclaimed by General Assembly Resolution 3447 (XXX) of 9 December 1975) 
which asserts the equal civil and political rights of disabled persons.
40 For an overview o f human rights instruments in the disability context, see generally Quinn, G., “The 
Human Rights o f People with Disabilities under EU law”, in P. Alston (Ed), ‘The EU and Human 
Rights’ (Oxford and New York: OUP 1999), 281-326.
41 GA Res. 48/96 (1993). A full set of the Standard Rules can be obtained from 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/dis sreOO .him or from United Nations, Division for Social Policy 
and Development. For comment see Bengt Lindqvist, ‘Standard Rules in the Disability Field-A new 
United Nations Instrument’ in Degener and Koster-Dreese (Eds.) ‘Human Rights and Disabled 
Persons: Essays and Relevant Human Rights Instruments’ (Martines Nijhoff Publishers, 1995), 63-68, 
cited in Quinn supra note 40 at 294.
42 See Quinn supra note 40 at 293-299 for a detailed overview o f relevant international and regional 
measures taken during this period.
4j See Degener supra note 7,20.
44 See Quinn supra note 7,91
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which originally created three separate ‘communities’45. The economic thrust behind 
the Union was made clear from the beginning and the concentration on economic 
integration was set out as an aim in the Preamble and in Article 246 47o f  the Treaty of 
Rome in 1957. The main objectives o f  the Union were to establish a common market, 
to promote harmonious development of economic activities throughout the 
Community, to increase stability and the standard of living and to promote closer 
relations between the Member States . This economic framework was not considered 
a suitable context for the promotion o f  civil rights and non-discrimination. Rather the 
view at that time was that the fight against discrimination at large was a question of 
human rights, to be dealt with by the Council of Europe, the European Court of 
Human Rights and the United Nations48.
1.31 The non-discrimination principle in European Union Law 
In the early years o f European integration, the introduction of laws prohibiting 
discrimination was not a pressing item on the agenda o f the European Communities. 
At the time o f drafting the Treaty o f  Rome (EEC) in 1957, there was some debate 
about whether the achievement o f human rights as such should be added to the treaties 
as an objective of the Community49. However for a variety of political reasons, the 
Member States decided to focus solely on the use o f economic means toward 
functional integration. As a result o f  this, the EEC Treaty50 concentrated solely on the
45 The Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was signed in 1951 by 
France, Germany, Italy and the three Benelux countries aiming to establish a common market in coal 
and steel. This was followed by the signing of the Treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community (EEC) and the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) 
in Rome in 1957.
46 Article 2 TEC “The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and an 
economic and monetary union and by implementing common policies or activities referred to in 
Articles 3 and 4, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious, balanced and sustainable 
development of economic activities, a high level of employment and of social protection, equality 
between men and women, sustainable and non-inflationary growth, a high degree o f competitiveness 
and convergence o f economic performance, a high level o f protection and improvement of the quality 
of the environment, the raising o f the standard of living and quality o f life, and economic and social 
cohesion and solidarity among Member States.”
47 Craig and DeBurca “EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials.” 2nd Edition. (Oxford: OUP 1998), 11. For 
a detailed historical and political background to the development o f European integration, see pp. 3-48.
48 Swiebel, J., “From Rome to Amsterdam and Beyond: Reinforcement of Protection” at 1. Paper 
delivered at the seminar “The Fight Against Discrimination: the Equal Treatment Directives o f 2000”, 
Academy of European Law. Trier 5-6 March 2004. Available at www.era.int
49 See generally Kaczorowska, Alina, “EU Law Today”, London: Old Bailey Press, 1998 cited by 
Quinn supra note 7, 92.
so The Treaty o f Maastricht (Treaty on European Union) signed in 1992 established a three pillar 
structure for what was henceforth to be called the European Union, with the Communities as the first of 








social protections necessary for- enabling a free market o f workers to come into 
existence. It focused mainly on the free movement o f workers and contained only 
those non-discrimination provisions thought to be required to achieve this end. The 
Treaty o f  Rome 1957, contained only two specific non-discrimination clauses: the ban 
on discrimination on the basis o f  nationality51 and the famous Article 1 1952, which 
provided that men and women should be entitled to equal pay for equal work53. These 
provisions were included as they were regarded as necessary social conditions to 
achieve the economic objectives o f  the Community. They were not subsumed under 
any broader or deeper equality provision and as a result no general prohibition existed 
under EC law against discrimination based on other characteristics such as age, sexual 
orientation or disability54. Therefore issues relating to discrimination on the basis of 
disability lay within the sole responsibility o f the Member States.
1.32 E U  Social Policy
Disability first registered as an issue in the context o f  EU social policy. The social 
dimension to the European Union is asserted by the founding provisions o f  the EU 
and EC treaties55. This social dimension is expressed as both additional to and 
consequent upon the economic activities and objectives which are the main focus of 
the Union56. Therefore, the original aim o f EU social policy was to create and 
complete an efficient internal market as opposed to correcting the inequalities posed 
by a free market system57. It is therefore no surprise that the very late engagement of
second pillar o f the Union is Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the third pillar is 
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA).
51 Article 6 EEC Treaty, now Article 12 EC Treaty.
52 Article 119 EEC Treaty, now Article 141 EC Treaty.
5j Article 119 was the basis for a series o f  supplementary directives prohibiting gender discrimination 
across the employment field. See Directive 75/117/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the 
Member States relating to the application o f the principle of equal pay between men and women; 
Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation o f the principle of equal treatment for men and women as 
regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion and working conditions; Directive 
79/7/EEC on the progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment between men and 
women in matters o f social security; Directive 86/378/EEC on the implementation of the principle of 
equal treatment o f men and women in occupational social security schemes; Directive 97/80/EC on the 
burden o f proof in cases o f discrimination based on sex.
54 Quinn supra note 7, 98
55 See Article 2 TEC “The Community shall have as its task...to promote throughout the 
Community...a high level of employment and social protection...” and Article B TEU “The Union 
shall set itself the following objectives: to promote economic and social progress...”
56 Hervey, Tamara “European Social Law and Policy”. European Law Series. Longman. (1998), 1
57 Ibid at 3
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EU institutions with disability rights has been attributed to a lack of legal competence 
in social policy and disability policy in particular at EU level58.
A move towards developing a stronger social policy emerged throughout the 1970’s 
and 80’s. In the context o f disability the Community started up some measures in the 
60s in the area o f employment59. These developments arose not out o f a desire to 
achieve equality o f opportunity but to improve the skills o f the labour force and were 
in accordance with the welfare approach to disability60. The first major involvement 
in disability policy by the European Community was in the area of vocational 
integration. The Council Resolution61 of 21 January 1974 called for the creation o f an 
action programme to encourage the “vocational rehabilitation of handicapped 
persons”. An Action Programme62 with this aim in mind was established by Council 
Resolution o f June 197463. Unfortunately the traditional and medical model of 
disability was underlying this initial programme, which limited its success. However, 
it was an important initial step which paved the way for future measures.
It was not until 1981, as a response to the UN International Year of Disabled Persons, 
that a renewed effort was made by the Community to encourage the vocational 
integration o f persons with disabilities. From the early 80s until the mid 90s the 
European Commission began to promote the development of a European disability 
policy through a succession of action programmes64. The first Community action 
programme65 on the Integration o f  Handicapped People was agreed in the 1980s66.
58 Hvinden, B supra note 1,618.
59 See Waddington supra note 31 for a comprehensive overview o f disability policy and initiatives in 
the Community before the adoption of the Amsterdam Treaty.
60 Gubbels, André, “The Evolution of EU Disability Policy: from Charity to Rights”, Paper presented at 
the Disability Discrimination Summer School, NUI Galway, Ireland. 4-15 July 2005.
61 Council Resolution of 21 January 1974. OJ No. C 13/1 13/2/74.
62 The Initial Community Action Programme for the Vocational Rehabilitation of Handicapped Persons 
(1974-1979)
63 Council Resolution of 27 June 1974. OJ No. C 80/30 9/7/74.
64Article 235 TEC was the basis for initiating an action programme dealing with disability in the social 
affairs field. Article 235 of the TEC allows the Council to adopt measures that fall within the broad 
objectives of the EC, but for which no specific competence has been provided elsewhere in the text of 
the treaties. Unanimity in the Council is required before it can be invoked. It is the legal basis for many 
provisions of EC Social Law. See Tamara Hervey, supra note 56,46-47.
Ss Action programmes are drawn up by the Council and the Commission on their own initiative and 
serve to put into practice the legislative programmes and general objectives laid down in the treaties. If 
a programme is specifically provided for in the treaties, the Community institutions are bound by those 
provisions when planning it. Other programmes are in practice merely regarded as general guidelines 
with no legally binding effect. They are, however, an indication of the Community institutions' 
intended actions. See the European Union website at http://europa.eu. int/eur- 
lex/en/about/abc/abc 20.html
66 First Action Programme 1983-1988; OJ 1981 C347/1. This programme was called for by the Council 
Resolution on the social integration of handicapped people [1981] OJ No C 347,31.12.1981
This action programme was expressed to be concerned with the ‘social integration’ of 
people with disabilities, but was in effect focused on economic integration especially
employment and training67 68. The first programme was followed by HELIOS I (1988-
/■&
1991) , which adopted a somewhat wider remit across social integration and 
employment69. However these programmes did not produce any real changes. Both 
had a fairly traditional social policy orientation; they promoted networking among 
professionals involved in particular disability policy sectors such as rehabilitation and 
education, they focused on special services and facilities rather than rights and equal 
opportunities and were criticised for allowing professionals to dominate rather than 
involving people with disabilities themselves70.
The design o f the third disability action programme HELIOS II (1992-1996)71 showed 
a significant development in the Commission approach. There was more o f an 
emphasis on the political mobilisation of people with disabilities. Those involved in 
European level disability policy at this time strongly desired that disability NGOs 
would have a role in consultation over policy72. This hope was realised when the 
European Disability Forum73 was set up as a consultative committee to the HELIOS II 
Programme. In the end, the most significant achievement o f the HELIOS programmes 
turned out to be the development o f a very active community o f disability activists at 
the European level. This inevitably resulted in a  growing furore for equal treatment 
and non-discrimination legislation at the EU level. Lobbying by these disability 
groups would prove to be a crucial factor in securing the inclusion o f the ground of
67 Hervey, Tamara supra note 56, 169
68 88/231/EEC: Council Decision of 18 April 1988 establishing a second Community action 
programme for disabled people (Helios) OJ L I04/38. (HELIOS 1)
69 See generally Mabbett, Deborah, “The Development o f rights -based social policy in the European 
Union: The Example of Disability Rights”, Journal o f Common Market Studies 2005 Volume 43. 
Number 1, 97-120 for a detailed discussion on the success (or lack thereof) o f early Community 
measures in the context of disability.
70 Lovelock, R and Powell, G (1994) “Disability: Britain in Europe. An Evaluation o f UK Participation 
in the HELIOS Programme (1988-1991)” Aldershot: Avebury, cited by Deborah Mabbett supra note 
69, 107.
71 HELIOS II (Third) Community Action Programme to assist disabled people (1993) OJ L56/30.
72 Mabbett supra note 69, 108
73The European Disability Forum is an umbrella organisation of European Disability Organisations, 
which exists to represent people with disabilities in dialogue with the European Union and other 
European authorities. Its mission is to promote equal opportunities for people with disabilities and to 
ensure disabled citizens’ full access to fundamental and human rights through their active involvement 
in policy development and implementation in the European Union. Its institutionalised roles include 
providing the secretariat to the Disability Intergroup o f  the European Parliament. See www.edf- 
feph.org for more Information on the work and policies o f the EDF.
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disability in Article 13 o f the Amsterdam Treaty and the eventual adoption o f  anti- 
discrimination legislation.
In addition to action programmes, resolutions74 and recommendations75 other soft law 
measures were popular with the Community as a method o f catering for people with 
disabilities throughout the 80s. The Community Charter o f Fundamental Social Rights 
of Workers was adopted in 1989 and provides a section on workers with disabilities. 
Point 26 provided that ‘all disabled workers....must be entitled to additional concrete
measures aimed at improving their social and professional integration’. The Charter 
does not confer any rights on individuals or provide a separate legal basis for the 
European Institutions to take further action but it does provide a statement of principle 
underpinning any action within Community competence76. Although soft law 
measures may potentially set standards and raise expectations77 78, they are generally not 
measures that transform existing policy. The tendency to adopt soft law instruments 
during this period illustrates the relatively cautious and non-directive role o f the EU in 
the field of disability policy. A series o f weak proposals and initiatives clearly did not
put the EU in a position to influence established policy aims and practices of Member 
States to any great extent .
The 90s, however, proved to be a decade which resulted in major advances at
European policy level. The winds o f change were evident in the Commission’s White 
Paper o f 1994 where it committed itself to finding a way to express the UN Standard 
Rules in EU policy79. It was clear that the Commission was moving towards a rights 
based approach for people with disabilities. It stated: “as a group, people with 
disabilities face a wide range o f obstacles which prevent them from achieving full 
economic and social integration. There is therefore a need to build the fundamental
74 See Council Resolution of 22 December 1986 on an action programme on employment growth OJ 
No C 340, 31. 12. 1986, p. 2 where the Council advocated special provisions in training for the 
disadvantaged and disabled.
75 See Recommendation and Guideline on the Employment of Disabled People in the EC OJ 1986 L 
225/43
76 Hervey supra note 56, 170
77 They may also have an indirect influence on the interpretation of the main ‘hard law’ instruments, 
especially in the context of national legislation. See McCrudden,,C “The New Concept of Equality”, 
Paper delivered at the Academy of European Law in the framework of the conference “Fight against 
Discrimination: The Race and Framework Employment Directives”. Trier 2-3 June 2003. Available at: 
www.era.int
78 Hvinden, B supra note 1,618.
79 White Paper: European Social Policy-A way forward for the Union, COM (94) 333 final at VI. 




right to equal opportunities into Union policies” .80 81This stance was further elaborated 
upon in the Commission’s 1996 Communication on Equality o f  Opportunity for 
People with Disabilities , which set out the new equality o f opportunity approach. 
This Communication was the most far-reaching strategic statement on disability that 
the Commission had taken up until that point. It displayed a shift in perspective by 
clearly endorsing the ‘rights-based’ equal opportunities approach to disability. The 
Commission made it clear that “the old approach is now giving way to a much 
stronger emphasis on identifying and removing the various barriers to equal 
opportunities and full participation in all aspects o f life” for people with disabilities.82 
One o f the strongest recommendations in the Communication concerned 
mainstreaming. Mainstreaming allows for the introduction o f a ‘disability perspective’ 
across a whole range o f  social programmes83. It is a tool which has major potential to 
promote the equal treatment o f  people with disabilities on a far-reaching scale. 
However in practice States only accepted mainstreaming at a general level and several 
concrete attempts to mainstream non- discrimination in national social policy have 
been rejected84 85. In fact many successful examples o f  mainstreaming are confined to 
the Commission’s own practices and services .
As we have seen, during this period up until the 90s, European level measures aimed 
at improving the situation o f people with disabilities were kept within the ambit o f the 
European social policy sphere. This resulted in mostly soft law provisions, which had 
no hard legal effect. However, these measures did contain innovative proposals and
80 White Paper: European Social Policy-A way forward for the Union, COM (94) 333 final at 51. Cited 
in Quinn supra note 7 at 85.
81 COM (96) 406 final of 30 July 1996. The Communication was adopted by Council Resolution in 
1997 (OJ 1997 C 12/1.) The Resolution was an endorsement o f the UN Standard Rules and was based 
on the respect for fundamental human rights as a general principle o f  the EU (Article F2 TEU), point 
26 o f the Community Charter and the UN General Assembly Resolution on Equal Opportunities 
(Resolution 48/46 of 20 December 1993).
82 Communication on Equality o f Opportunity for People with Disabilities COM (96) 406 final o f 30 
July 1996, Executive Summary and Policy Conclusions at 3.
83 Ibid at 19, “This entails the formulation of policy to facilitate the full participation and involvement
of people with disabilities in economic, social and other processes, while respecting personal choice.” 
See DGV Working Paper ‘Mainstreaming Disability within EU Employment and Social Policy’ 1999 
for an insight into the Commission’s strategy for mainstreaming disability into employment and social 
policy. Available online at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/emplovment social/soc-
prot/disab le/dresden/workpaperen. pdf
84 Mabbett supra note 69,109
85 Ibid.
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new ideas which laid down the theoretical groundwork for ‘hard law’, which would 
come into effect as a result o f the Amsterdam Treaty 1997.
1.33 Article 13 o f  the Amsterdam Treaty 1997
Against the background o f national welfare legislation and European soft law 
measures depicted above, the inclusion of Article 13 in the Treaty o f  Amsterdam 
heralded major changes for the treatment o f disability and non-discrimination in 
general in the EU. The addition o f  Article 13 EC extends the Community’s express 
competence to act against discrimination. It provides:
" Without prejudice to the other provisions o f  this Treaty and within the limits o f  the 
powers conferred by it upon the Community, the Council, acting unanimously on a  
proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, may 
take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic 
origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. ”
In essence the article provides a legal basis for the Community to take legislative 
action to combat discrimination on the grounds o f inter alia disability. The reasons 
that led to the enactment of the final text o f  the provision are speculative. The 
diversity of grounds on which discrimination may be combated reflects the diversity 
of the political forces, which led to the incorporation o f  Article 13 . According to 
Mabbett, the inclusion of disability, age and sexual orientation reflected the idea that a 
new generation o f civil and social rights should be developed in the course o f 
modernising and restructuring the way that European welfare states regulate the life 
courses and family arrangements o f their citizens* 87 8. There is some disagreement in the 
academic commentary as to how much the Community was motivated by economic or
0a
social integration motives and how far the future enlargement o f the Union was
important89. Indeed it is quite possible that different motives underpinned the
inclusion of different grounds of discrimination. It is also likely that the Commission
S6 Mabbett supra note 69,106
87 Ibid.
88 For commentary see Waddington, L “Testing the limits o f the EC Treaty Article on Non-
Discrim¡nation” (1999) ILJ 133-151, 134 and Fredman S. “Equality: A new Generation?” (2001) IU  
145-168,149
89 See Bell, Mark, “Article 13 EC: The European Commission’s anti-discrimination Proposals” (2000) 
29 IU  79-84, 84.
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was anxious to exploit the political opportunity it was offered to include as broad a 
range o f grounds as possible in as few directives as possible, knowing that some 
grounds would be unlikely to be accepted if  they were contained in separate
•  90instruments .
Initially the drafters were sceptical o f the need to incorporate disability into a non­
discrimination provision as many were concerned that it would undermine the 
European social welfare model90 1. It was in effect the intensive lobbying on the behalf 
o f European disability NGOs92, the European Parliament and the Commission93 that 
secured the inclusion o f disability into Article 1394. However, many groups were 
disappointed with the final result as Article 13 does not provide a basis for the judicial 
development o f principles of non-discrimination. Despite its broad scope, the article 
suffers from two major limitations. Firstly, it provides only a legal basis to take 
action. It was carefully worded so that it would not have direct effect. Therefore it 
does not oblige Member States to prohibit discrimination. Secondly, the decision­
making procedure requires that the Council has to decide unanimously and the 
Parliament only has an advisory role. This greatly reduces its potential impact. 
Therefore at the time it was thought that Article 13 would be largely symbolic95. 
Accordingly, it was a surprise to all when, despite these apparent limitations, the 
Community adopted two Directives to combat discrimination on the basis o f Article 
13 with remarkable speed. Before the year 2000 was out, the Community had adopted
90 McCrudden, C supra note 77, 15.
91 Hendriks A supra note 2 at 190; see generally O’ Hare ‘Enhancing European Equality Rights: a New 
Regional Framework’ (2001) 8 Maastricht Journal 133 for a history o f Article 13 and its Directives.
92 The joint effort of European disability organisations was a major factor in securing the ground of 
disability in Article 13 of the Amsterdam Treaty. It is imperative to underline the important role of the 
European disability movement in advancing disability rights in Europe, having taken its initiative from 
the experience in the US. The movement is made up o f various specific disability interest groups, Non- 
Govemmental Organisations representing the interests o f  people with disabilities and individuals with 
disabilities and their families. Their solidarity has led to the emergence of a fairly strong transnational 
network o f disabled people’s organisations, putting pressure on supranational bodies for the acceptance 
of stronger rights and protection against discrimination. See Hvinden supra note 1, 610. See generally 
Newman, M. ‘Democracy, Sovereignty and the European Union’, London: Hurst and Company (1997) 
and Geyer, R.R, ‘Exploring European Social Policy’, Cambridge: Polity Press. (2000)
93 Since the 90s the European Parliament and the Commission had acknowledged the need to address 
disability discrimination at a Community level and called for amendment of the Treaty to provide the 
European Community with the necessary legislative competence to act in this area. See generally 
Whittle, Richard, “Disability Discrimination and the Amsterdam Treaty”, 23 European Law Review 
February 1998, 52
94 See Mark Bell and Lisa Waddington, “The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference and the Prospects of 
a Non-discrimination Treaty Article”, 25 Industrial Law Journal 4 (1996), 320-336.
95 Mabbett supra note 69,105
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a Directive targeted at race discrimination96 and a general framework Directive97 *
covering employment discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, 
age and sexual orientation. The speed with which these directives were adopted would 
appear to demonstrate a serious commitment on behalf o f the Commission to 
combating all kinds of discrimination, including disability. The adoption of a ‘hard’ 
legal instrument to combat disability discrimination in employment is a very 
significant advancement in European disability policy. Firstly, it signifies a change in 
attitude towards disability in the European Union: people with disabilities have 
moved from being seen as objects o f welfare, health or charity to being recognized as 
subjects of legal rights . Secondly, the adoption of anti-discrimination legislation is 
also an indicator o f the new, broader disability strategy that the EU has developed and 
displays a much stronger ambition to influence the policies and practice of Member 
States with regard to disability policy.
L 4  Concluding Remarks
The progress that has been achieved in the past 20 years in European disability policy 
is considerable. We have observed how disability first emerged as a medical and 
welfare issue in Europe, which regarded people with disabilities as objects of pity and 
charity. The continuing segregation and isolation from society experienced by people 
with disabilities under this model eventually led them to reject this misconceived 
perception o f disability. This soon led to a new way o f viewing disability which 
recognized that many of the obstacles, barriers and difficulties faced by people with 
disabilities are as a result o f the ways in which society is organised and physically 
designed and not by reason o f the person’s impairment. This view, now known as the 
social model of disability, suggests that people with disabilities are being 
institutionally discriminated against on a regular basis and insists that such 
discrimination should not be tolerated. The widespread acceptance of the social model 
soon led to demands to make such discrimination illegal in the form o f  anti- 
discrimination legislation. These demands were partially realised in the form o f  the
96 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle o f equal treatment 
between persons irrespective o f racial or ethnic origin, [2000] O.J. L I80/22. For a discussion o f the 
Race Directive see Guild E, “The EC Directive on Race Discrimination: Surprises, Possibilities and 
Limitations” (2000) 29 ILJ 416.
97 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal 
treatment in employment and occupation, [2000] O.J L303/16
9* Kimber, Cliona, “Equality and Disability (2001) 6 Irish Bar Review 494 [part 1] at 494.
Framework Employment Directive in 2000 and disability is now commonly regarded 
as a human rights as well as a non-discrimination issue". Even though I have 
highlighted the failings o f the welfare approach, it should not be completely 
abandoned in this new era o f anti-discrimination legislation9 100 *. Many people with 
disabilities still rely on welfare measures as they are unable to take advantage of the 
non-discrimination norm. Therefore, either anti-discrimination legislation must 
provide for effective, enforceable positive rights or states should adopt a welfare 
system which provides for people with disabilities in a manner which does not 
segregate them from society. A reworked welfare approach developed in conjunction 
with the new anti-discrimination legislation, in a manner in which both models 
complement one another, could be an effective solution.
The next sequential step is to analyse the Framework Directive itself and determine 
what exactly it offers for people with disabilities in the EU. Is it the key to solving the 
problem o f  serious underemployment among people with disabilities? Will it create a  
more equal future? Before attempting to answer these questions, it is first necessary to 
examine how  the concepts o f equality and non-discrimination apply to the complex 
ground o f  disability. This will provide an insight into the most effective way to apply 
the principle o f equality to people with disabilities and thus aid in a critical analysis o f 
the provisions of the Framework Directive and how they relate to the ground o f 
disability.
99 Negotiations are currently under way to adopt a UN Convention on the Protection and Promotion of 
the Rights and Dignity o f Persons with Disabilities, which would be a legally binding instrument 
tailoring the application of human rights to people with disabilities. To view the draft articles and the 
current status of negotiations see http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/
100 The negative consequences o f this have been illustrated in the US where due to a unilateral focus on 
non-discrimination, equal treatment is largely dependent on the willingness and ability of individuals to
file complaints. See Hendriks, A. supra note 2,191.
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II: DISABILITY AND CONCEPTIONS OF EQUALITY
“The notion o f  Equality is closely linked to the idea o f  Justice and has perhaps 
greater resonance than any other notion in law"101
Aristotle, who was one o f the first to provide an elaborate synthesis o f the notion of 
equality considered equality and justice to be synonymous102. In Nicomachean Ethics, 
Aristotle identifies justice in general as the greatest moral virtue and asserts that 
particular justice is a sort o f equality103. The link between justice and equality may 
account for the importance attached to discrimination today. Discrimination is 
considered to be wrong or unjust because it is a breach o f the principle o f equality and 
equal treatment. The idea o f equality has been deliberated and pondered over for 
centuries104. What exactly is meant by equality? Is it desirable? Is pure equality 
between persons possible? Is it morally necessary in society? It is a basic fact that 
human beings are unequal in almost every way. They are o f different shapes, sizes, 
sexes, colours, have different physical and mental capabilities and different 
orientations. Yet it is one o f the basic principles o f almost all contemporary moral and 
political theories that humans are essentially equal and should have this ideal reflected 
in the economic, social and political structures o f society105. The reconciliation of 
human difference with the equality ideal has proved to be a consistently challenging 
task. This complexity has been particularly evident in the case of disability, as will be 
illustrated throughout this section.
Initially, the idea of equal treatment existed more as an ethical and philosophical 
notion than as a rule of law. The concept of equality entered onto the legal stage in the 
age o f enlightenment, a period during which the right to equality informed the 
political theories o f some o f the most influential thinkers o f that time such as Locke,
101 Tridimas, Takis, “The General Principles of EC Law” (Oxford: OUP, 1999), Chapter 2: The 
Principle of Equality, 40.
102 Ethica Nicomachea V.3. 1131a-1131b.
103 Pojman, Louis P. and Westmoreland, Robert (Eds.) “Equality: Selected readings” (New York, 
Oxford) Oxford University Press 1997 at 17. Aristotle’s interpretation is but one o f the many theories 
of equality. For a contemporary treatment of justice and equality, see Rawls, John, “A Theory of 
Justice” (Oxford, OUP 1971).
104 Larry S. Temkin has noted that “few moral ideals have been more widely discussed, yet less well 
understood than the notion of inequality.” See Larry S. Temkin “Inequality” in Pojman, Louis P* and 
Westmoreland, Robert (Eds.) “Equality: Selected readings”, supra note 103 at 75.





Paine and Rousseau106 107. Subsequent to the French revolution guarantees o f equality 
began to find their way into constitutional texts across Western Europe, beginning a 
process o f  entry o f concepts o f  equality into European legal systems which has 
continued to the present day . Today equality has been described as “a central 
feature o f the vision of Europe that is developing”108 and according to the European 
Commission, the principles o f equal treatment and non-discrimination are at the heart 
o f the European Social Model109. In recent years, there have been considerable 
developments at the European level with the adoption o f  measures aimed at achieving 
equality across a wide domain, as seen at the end o f the last chapter110. Despite this 
progress, however, there are still serious definitional problems associated with the 
concept o f  ‘equality’ and a general lack o f  consensus as to its meaning.
In this section I shall discuss a number o f well-established conceptions of equality in 
order to examine the application and potential o f the concept with regard to people 
with disabilities. I shall then chart the range o f ways in which equality has been 
conceptualised legally in the European Union and whether these methods can be 
applied effectively in the disability context. Based on this analysis it is hoped to 
pinpoint the most effective legal method o f  conceptualising equality in order to create 
a more equal society for people with disabilities.
2.1 The N otion o f  Equality in the Context o f  D isability Discrimination 
There are two broad concepts into which egalitarian legal theory is normally divided 
into: that o f  formal equality and that o f  substantive equality111. The ideological 
foundations o f the equality principle can be traced back to Aristotle who famously
106 Barnard, Catherine, “The Principle o f  Equality in the Community Context: P, Grant, Kalanke and 
Marshall: Four uneasy bedfellows?” (1998) CLJ 352,362
107 Barrett, Gavin, “The Concept and Principle o f Equality in European Community Law-Pouring new 
wine into old bottles?" in Costello, C and Barry, E (Eds.), “Equality in Diversity-the New Equality 
Directives” (Dublin: Irish Centre for European Law 2003) at 101,
108 McCrudden, Christopher, “Theorising European Equality Law”, in Costello C and Barry E (Eds.), 
“Equality in Diversity-the New Equality Directives”. (Dublin: Irish Centre for European Law 2003), 1.
109 European Commission Green Paper “Equality and Non-Discrimination in an enlarged European 
Union '* Luxembourg 2004,3.
110 See Directive 2000/43/EC o f 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between 
persons irrespective o f racial or ethnic origin, [2000] O.J. L I80/22 and Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 
November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation, 
[2000] O.J L303/16 which prohibits discrimination on the grounds o f disability, age, sexual orientation 
and religion or belief.
111 See generally Pojman, Louis P. and Westmoreland, Robert (Eds.) “Equality: Selected Readings” 
supra note 103, for a collection o f writings on the various concepts o f equality ranging from classical 
works to contemporary selections.
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stated: “things that are alike should be treated alike, while things that are unalike 
should be treated unalike in proportion to their unlikeness” 112. Hence, equality is 
generally made up of two parts: the formal element which is generally understood as 
the right to treat like cases alike and the substantive part which attempts to move 
beyond this basic concept o f equality to further concentrate on the relevant differences 
on which treatment is made. Let us begin with the formal and traditional model of 
equality.
2.11 The Challenge o f Formal Equality
It has been claimed that formal equality is a manifestation o f the principle o f 
consistency which means that equal treatment includes consistent treatment i.e. likes 
must be treated alike113. Therefore, in order for the principle to operate, there must be 
a general assumption of ‘sameness’ before the law. This involves a symmetrical 
approach which subjects all classifications to the same standard of review, which 
implies that men and women, disabled and non-disabled, black and white etc. are all 
equal before the law and must be treated equally114. Exceptions to this principle o f 
‘sameness’ are only allowed if there is reasonable and objective justification115. The 
formal equality principle in practice has shown that differential treatment is only 
allowed in extremely limited circumstances116.
A feature of formal equality in its legal construction is that it is normally framed in 
terms o f an individual right to equal treatment. It aims to resolve individual instances 
of discrimination and thus focuses on improving the situation of the individual victim 
of discrimination rather than the group to which he or she may belong. Therefore, 
formal equality in a legal format generally aims to ensure that the external 
characteristics o f the person, such as gender, race or disability, will be ignored in 
decision making processes (for example a job interview) in order to treat individuals 
the ‘same’. In practice however, such a consistent approach tends to favour the
112 Ethica Nicomachea V.3. 1131 a-1131 b.
113 Barnard C and Hepple B, “Substantive Equality” (2000) 59 CLJ 562, 562
1,4 Wentholt, K., “Formal and Substantive Equal Treatment: the Limitations and the Potential o f the 
Legal Concept o f Equality” in Loenen, T. and Rodrigues, P.R., “Non Discrimination Law: 
Comparative Perspectives” Kluwer Law International 1999, 53 at 54.
115 It was Cicero who first enunciated this principle even though it is usually attributed to the Roman 
jurist Ulpian. See Schwarze J, “European Administrative Law” (Sweet and Maxwell, 1992), 545 and 
cited by Barrett supra note 107 at 104.
116 The formal equality principle in practice can be observed in the prohibition of direct discrimination. 
See further Section III: 3.11.
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dominant norm. Treating two people alike when one comes to the situation already 
burdened with disadvantage will clearly not achieve equality in any real sense117. The 
operation o f  formal equality in practice then shifts the emphasis from the external 
characteristics o f a person to others such as efficiency, ‘merit’ and achievement118. 
Consequently, it is unlikely that this type o f approach will improve the employment 
possibilities o f a black person/female/person with a disability that was deprived o f 
educational opportunities as a result o f systemic and structural disadvantage. Formal 
equality does not recognise that individuals may lack the capabilities to achieve a 
relevant standard because of entrenched social disadvantage119. Hence this approach 
may well serve to solve isolated instances o f  clear discrimination but it will not 
challenge the traditional and dominant structures in society which bring about 
disadvantage for certain groups, including people with disabilities.
It is commonly accepted that formal rather than substantive equality has exerted 
considerable influence on European Community law up to now120. The tendency 
towards formal equality is reflected in the prohibition o f direct discrimination121 12and 
can also be found in the European Court o f Justice’s interpretation o f Community 
legislation . This penchant towards formal equality can be explained by examining 
the economic rationale o f  the Community. It is an established fact that the European
117 Fredman, S., “Disability Equality: A Challenge to the existing Anti-Discrimination Paradigm?” in 
Anna Lawson and Caroline Gooding (Eds.) “Disability Rights in Europe: From Theory to Practice” 
Hart Publishing 2005 pp. 199-218 at 203.
118 McCrudden C, supra note 108,21
119 Fredman supra note 117,204.
120 See Barnard C, “Article 13: through the looking glass of Union citizenship”, in D. O’ Keefe, P. 
Twomey (Eds.), “Legal Issues of the Amsterdam Treaty”, Hart Publishing, Oxford-Portland Oregon, 
1999, 387; Barnard C and Hepple B, “Substantive Equality” (2000) 59 CLJ 562; Mark Bell, “Equality 
and the European Constitution” 33 Industrial Law Journal No.3 September 2004,242 at 245.
121 See Directive 75/117/EEC on the approximation of the laws o f the Member States relating to the 
application o f the principle o f equal pay between men and women; Article 2 (1) of Directive 
76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards 
access to employment, vocational training and promotion and working conditions; Article 2(2)(a) of 
Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle o f equal treatment between persons 
irrespective of racial or ethnic origin; Article 2(2)(a) o f Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 
establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation. See further 
Section III: 3.11
122 See for example Case C-399/92, Helmig [1994] ECR 1-5727 where the ECJ used a formal approach 
of equality in coming to their decision. It disregarded the concept of indirect discrimination when it 
ruled that there was no discrimination when part-timers, who were predominantly women, did not 
receive overtime rates for hours worked over their normal contractual hours but less than full-time 
hours. The mechanisms in society which result in part-time workers being mostly female was not 
considered a determining factor. See Wentholt, supra note 114 at 63.
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Community was originally established for economic purposes123. Formal equality in 
its legal construction serves the purposes o f a capitalist, market oriented society 
because in order to have free play o f market forces, individuals must be treated as 
equivalent factors o f production, comparable in all relevant respects124. Formal 
equality serves this purpose with its emphasis on ‘sameness* and by the fact that it 
only takes into account the personal qualities o f individuals that may have an impact 
on their position on the market i.e. merit, efficiency and achievement. In addition the 
limited degree o f intervention permitted by the formal equality principle preserves 
and possibly enhances the operation o f the market125 126. In light of these characteristics, 
it has been readily adopted by the EU in order to safeguard the economic goals o f  the 
Union.
Formal equality is subject to a number o f serious limitations. As I have stated above, 
the assumption that all subjects are the same before the law appears to be the starting 
point for an assessment o f formal equality. Therefore, in order for the formal equality 
principle to operate, there must be an initial test o f  comparability of the situation and 
of the persons. This is a complex process. It is obviously not feasible for the law to 
pedantically take into account every similarity and difference that exists between 
persons. The issue o f finding a suitable comparator is particularly problematic in 
relation to disability. How effective is it to compare a person with a disability to a 
person without a disability? A relevant comparison will depend on many intangible 
factors such as the nature and severity o f the disability, environmental factors and 
accommodations made by the employer. The role o f the comparator has proved 
critical for the operation o f the formal equality principle and it has been suggested 
that if  a suitable comparator cannot be found then its very application will be 
prevented127. As a  result o f  the difficulties in finding a suitable comparator, it is
,2j See Craig P and DeBurca G, “EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials ” 2nd Edition. (Oxford: OUP 
1998), 11
124 Apostolopoulou, Z., “Equal Treatment o f people with disabilities in the EC: What does “Equal” 
mean?” Jean Monnet Working Paper 09/04 NYU School o f Law at 9. Available online at: 
http://www.csmb.unimo.it/adapt/bdoc/01 05/apostolou.Ddf
125 McCrudden supra note 108,21
126 See Case C-249/96 Grant v South West Trains [1998] ECR 1-621 which illustrates the importance 
of finding an appropriate comparator in sex discrimination cases.
127 Barrett, supra note 107,105.
submitted that laws embodying the principle o f formal equality will not be very 
effective in the specific context o f disability discrimination128.
A second limitation to the principle is that it “is no more than a relative concept: it is 
satisfied as long as likes are treated alike”129. This means that once persons are treated 
the same, regardless o f whether they are treated equally well or equally badly, 
equality in the formal strict sense has been achieved. Therefore the application of 
formal equality does not in any way guarantee a satisfactory outcome in terms of 
correcting the discriminatory situation. Equality in this sense embodies a notion of 
procedural justice130; Barnard and Hepple refer to this system as a process whereby 
equal treatment can be satisfied by depriving both the persons compared o f a 
particular benefit (levelling down) as well as by conferring the benefit on them both 
(levelling up)131. Therefore there is no violation o f this principle if an employer treats 
disabled and non-disabled employees equally badly. This is obviously not the solution 
sought by the affected parties in a discriminatory situation.
Thirdly, as I have mentioned above formal equality is characterised by the individual 
justice model. Fredman has highlighted an important criticism in relation to the 
individualistic nature o f  formal equality. She claims that the emphasis on the 
individual will produce negative effects because “each person’s affinity, sense of 
history and identity, mode of reasoning and expression o f feelings is constituted by 
group affinities” 132 13. Even though everyone has attributes that are independent of 
group identities it is unavoidable that they will also have group attributes. Therefore it 
is unrealistic and ineffective not to take this into account. According to Fredman, it 
will result in disparaging effects on the real value to the individual o f his or her own 
group identity and create strong pressures to conform to the dominant thinking in
• Hisociety .
For a general opposing view see Michael Banton, “Discrimination Entails Comparison” in Loenen, 
T. and Rodrigues, P.R., “Non Discrimination Law: Comparative Perspectives” Kluwer Law 
International 1999, where the author argues that the process of comparison is crucial to both the 
enactment and the application o f laws against discrimination.
129 Fredman, Sandra “Combating Racism with Human Rights: the Right to Equality” in Fredman (Ed)
‘Discrimination and Human Rights-the Case of Racism’, (Oxford University Press) 2001,18 
Apostolopouiou, Zoe supra note 124 at 11.
ljI Barnard C and Hepple B supra note 113, 563




It is clear from the arguments above that the concept of formal equality has limited 
potential for people with disabilities. Under this model, people with disabilities and 
non-disabled people alike are considered as comparable in all respects and therefore 
entitled to equal treatment. This is a very unrealistic test. By its initial requirement of 
“sameness”, it refuses to recognise the high improbability that a person with a 
disability will be in a comparable situation to a non-disabled person due to historical 
discrimination and disadvantage. Formal equality has been criticised as advocating 
only a superficial view of equality as individual and societal differences as a result o f 
which people find themselves differently situated are ignored134. For example, 
unequal access to education and skills development is often due to class division, 
status differences and wealth inequalities. In this way formal equality does nothing to 
combat the more hidden, structural and institutional types o f discrimination, which 
stem from the way society is constructed. Therefore we can conclude that the 
principle o f formal equality alone is not enough to provide equal treatment for people 
with disabilities. Something more effective is needed, which may be found in the 
form of substantive equality measures.
2.12 The Potential o f Substantive Equality
The limitations outlined above have resulted in challenges to the theory and operation 
o f formal equality. These challenges have consequently produced alternative theories 
to formal equality that aim to improve and complement the traditional principle of 
equal treatment. The alternative or counterpart to formal equality has been
i «
conceptualised in the form of substantive equality . This notion of equality places 
greater emphasis on ensuring equality in practice and is willing to depart from the 
supposed neutrality of decision making to achieve this . The key distinction lies in 
the recognition o f difference, which requires differences to be taken into account and
Waddington, Lisa, “Disability, Employment and the European Community”, supra note 31,61 
1,s There is no commonly accepted definition of substantive equality but Advocate General Tesauro 
gave a good description in the Opinion to Kalanke v. Freie Hartsestadt Bremen (Case C-450/93) [1995] 
ECR 1-3051, Para. 16. “The principle of substantive equality refers to a positive concept by basing 
itself precisely on the relevance of those different factors themselves in order to legitimise an unequal 
right, which is to be used in order to achieve equality as between persons who are regarded not as 
neutral but having regard to their differences.”
Ij6 Bell, M “The Concept of Equality” at 1. Paper given at the conference, “The Fight against 
Discrimination: the Equal Treatment Directives of 2000”. Academy o f European Law, Trier 1-2 Oct 
2004. Available at: www.era.int
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dealt with accordingly137. In addition substantive equality is based on a group justice 
model,138 139 which starts from the recognition that discrimination is based on the 
characteristics o f a group o f persons and results in collective disadvantage . This can 
be illustrated, for example, in the prohibition o f indirect discrimination,140 which 
involves prohibiting practices that have the effect of disproportionately 
disadvantaging a particular group141. From the outset it is apparent that a model of 
equality which recognises ‘difference’ and aims to ensure equality across a much 
wider scale will be more beneficial to people with disabilities, given the particular 
nature o f disability discrimination.
Within the broad model o f substantive equality, different, overlapping approaches 
have been identified142. The most significant o f these are equality o f opportunity and 
equality o f results. Equality of opportunity is more oriented towards individual merit 
in the sense that it aims for equality in the opportunities o f individuals to perform in 
accordance with their abilities143. Therefore in relation to people with disabilities, it 
would be most beneficial to those whose impairment has a limited impact on their 
abilities and as a result suffer less from stigma and stereotypical attitudes. Equality of 
results on the other hand envisages a more redistributive approach coupled with
137 For an ambitious treatment o f the importance o f recognising difference in achieving equality, see 
Rawl’s ‘difference principle’ which states that “social and economic inequalities” should work “to the 
greatest benefit o f the least advantaged” members o f society. See Rawls “A Theory o f Justice” 
(Oxford: OUP 1971), S3. Cited in Baker, Lynch, Cantillon, Walsh, “Equality: From Theory to Action” 
supra note 4, 25.
,J* In addition to the individual and group justice models o f equality, McCrudden has identified two 
other possible interpretations o f equality; equality as protecting and enhancing identity and equality as 
participation. Equality as recognition o f diverse identities realises the failure to accord due importance 
to different identities as a form o f oppression and inequality in itself. Equality as participation views 
claims by minority groups for equality as a claim for political participation in a broad sense. For a more 
detailed discussion o f these ideas, see McCrudden, C, supra note 108 pp. 28-33
139 Bell, M supra note 136 at 4.
140 See for example Article 2(2) (b) o f Council Directive 2000/43/EC; Article 2(2) (b) of Council 
Directive 2000/78/EC; Article 2(2) of Council Directive 2002/73/EC.
141 See further Section III: 3.12 for a detailed examination o f the concept indirect discrimination in EU 
law.
142 Fredman has identified four different yet interconnected approaches to substantive equality; equality 
of results, equality of opportunity, equality as auxiliary to substantive rights and finally “a broad value 
driven approach". See Fredman, S, “A Critical Review of the Concept of Equality in UK Anti- 
Discrimination Law”, Independent Review o f the Enforcement of UK Anti-Discrimination Legislation, 
Working Paper No. 3, (Cambridge Centre for Public Law and Judge Institute of Management Studies, 
November 1999), paras. 3.7-3.19.
14j Brunei University, “Definitions of Disability in Europe: A Comparative Analysis”, (London: Brunei 
University, 2002), 67.
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positive action. This is a more radical model which would encompass a wider group 
of people with disabilities, especially those with a more substantial impairment144.
2.121 Equality o f  opportunity
Equality o f opportunity is a notion o f  equality which holds that individuals should 
have equal chances in life145. It calls for compensation for those who have had less 
fortune early in life to bring them to the level of those who had advantages. 
Fredman146 147has employed the metaphor o f the race to describe the concept: “It is 
maintained that true equality cannot be achieved if individuals begin the race at 
different starting points. An equal opportunities approach therefore aims to equalise 
the starting point, accepting that this might necessitate special measures for the 
disadvantaged group.”
Although this approach does endorse the use o f positive action programmes and other 
compensatory policies, it is only allowed to a certain extent. When the starting point 
has been equalised there is no further assistance or intervention allowed under this 
model. This creates a problem for people with disabilities as disability can create a 
disadvantage which needs to be continually countered . As a result o f  the limited 
space for the use o f positive action measures, Barnard and Hepple have noted that it is 
not clear whether the promotion o f equality of opportunity is a narrow procedural 
obligation or a broader substantive one148. The procedural view o f equal opportunities 
involves the sole removal o f  obstacles or barriers to participation whereas a broader 
substantive approach complements this with a range o f other special measures to 
realise equality in practice. A procedural approach will technically offer equal 
opportunities in the sense that it offers the right to compete. However the mere right 
to compete does not does confer equal opportunities in the real sense o f the term. A 
person with a disability and a non-disabled person can have equal opportunities in this 
sense even if one o f  them has no real prospect of achieving anything149. Seen in this 
way, the equality o f opportunity model appears to embody elements o f both formal
:
144 Ibid.
,4i See generally Roemer, John E., “Equality o f Opportunity”, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 
1998)
146 Fredman S., “Affirmative action and the Court o f Justice: A Critical Analysis” in (Ed) Jo Shaw, 
‘Social Law and Policy in an Evolving European Union’ Hart Publishing Oxford Portland 2000, 182- 
186 and cited in Barrett supra note 107 at 110.
147 Waddington, L supra note 31 ,62
148 Barnard and Hepple supra note 113, 566
149 See Baker, Lynch, Cantillon, Walsh, supra note 4,33.
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and substantive equality. With regard to people with disabilities, the removal o f  
barriers alone is not enough to counter discrimination; therefore an equal opportunity 
model with a broad substantive approach is recommended to achieve equality in 
practice for persons with disabilities.
The equal opportunity model is currently the dominant approach to disability in the 
EU 150. It has also been reflected in EC gender equality legislation151 and in the case 
law interpreting that legislation152. At the national level, it has also been endorsed and 
can be seen in s. 75 o f  the Northern Ireland Act 1998, which imposes a duty on 
specified public authorities to have ‘due regard to the need to promote equality o f  
opportunity’ across all the protected grounds including disability in carrying out their 
public functions153. Reasons for the appeal o f the equality of opportunity model in the 
EU are related to the fact that it fits in relatively well with the market. The dominant 
use o f negative anti-discrimination legislation and the limited role o f positive action, 
which are characteristic o f  equality o f opportunity, are more favourable to market 
dynamics154.
2.122 Equality o f  Results
A n alternative but not dissim ilar model o f substantive equality is equality o f  results, 
which involves a redistributive approach to equal treatment155. This is a clear example 
o f  the substantive model at work. Under this model it is not the procedure that is 
considered but the actual distribution o f resources and rights. It aims to actively 
overcome under-representation o f disadvantaged groups and to achieve fair, 
proportionate and full participation in the workplace and in access to education, goods 
and services for these groups156. Under this model, if  the outcome o f supposed equal 
and “consistent” treatment is unequal then the goal o f substantive equality has been
150 See Equal Opportunities fo r  People with Disabilities: A European Action Plan COM (2003) 650 
final o f 30 October 2003. See also the Commission’s 1996 Communication on Equality of Opportunity 
for People with Disabilities and the White Paper of 1994. See further Section I at p i3/14.
151 See Article 2(4) of Council Directive 76/207/EEC
152 See Case C-450/93 Kalanke v. Freie und Hansestadt Bremen [1995] E.C.R. 1-3051, para. 23
13j O’ Cinneide, Colm ‘A New Generation o f Equality Legislation? Positive Duties and Disability 
Rights’ in Anna Lawson and Caroline Gooding (Eds.) ‘Disability Rights in Europe: From Theory to 
Practice’ Hart Publishing 2005, 230.
154Quinn, G., “The Human Rights of People with Disabilities under EU law”, in P. Alston (Ed), ‘The 
EU and Human Rights’ supra note 40 at 292.
155 See generally Rawls “A Theory of Justice” (Oxford: OUP 1971) and R. Dworkin, “Sovereign 
Virtue. The Theory and Practice o f Equality”, Cambridge: Harvard University Press 2000, pp.65-119.
156 Barrett supra note 107,108.
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infringed. In order to achieve its goal, equality o f results will generally involve special 
measures to overcome historical disadvantage that affects particular groups, for 
example; a quota requirement that equal numbers of disabled and non-disabled, men 
and women, Catholics and Protestants etc. are employed in the workplace. However, 
the emphasis on positive action measures has been criticised as being too radical and 
deeply inconsistent with the formal equality principle. The active promotion o f  one 
group over another would seem to directly contradict the very principle o f equal 
treatment that this model is supposed to advance157. Is it “equal” to actively 
discriminate in favour of one group over another? Yet in the context of disability, this 
model o f equality has the potential to be a very powerful tool. People with disabilities 
often find themselves trapped in a cycle of disadvantage as a result of the way society 
is arranged. They may not have the same standard o f education and skills as non­
disabled people as a result o f  segregated schools, physical and environmental barriers 
to major activities in society and attitudinal barriers resulting from the stigma 
surrounding disability. These factors result in low self-esteem, an inability to secure 
employment and consequently low income or poverty. As a result o f this vicious 
cycle, people with disabilities often find themselves in a position where the structures 
in society will not allow them to have the same opportunities as non-disabled persons. 
Therefore in order to break this cycle, active measures are needed to catapult people 
with disabilities to the same position as non-disabled people.
The equality o f results model is not yet widely used throughout the EU. It can be 
observed in Sweden, Germany and the U.K where it has been pursued as a legislative 
objective158. At EU level, hard measures aimed at securing equality of results have 
been rejected but a greater degree o f  tolerance than expected has been exhibited in 
certain areas o f Community law159.
157 Fredman, S ‘Combating Racism with Human Rights’ supra note 129, 19
158 In the UK see for example the temporary provisions concerning composition of the police force in s.
46 of the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000. In Sweden, note the legislative background to Case C- 
407/98 Abrahamsson and Andersson v Fogelqvist [2000] ECR 1-5539. In Germany note the legislative 
background to Case C-450/93 Kalanke v Bremen [1995] ECR 1-3051; Case 158/97 Marschall v Land 
Nordrhein-Westfalen /’1997] ECR 1-6363 and Case 407/98 Badeck v Hessischer Ministerpräsident
[2000] ECR 1-1875. Cited in Barrett supra note 107, 108
159 Especially in relation to national policies in the field o f gender equality; see Barrett supra note 107, 
109. The concept o f positive action has also been cautiously endorsed at EU level; the three core 
directives on discrimination in the labour market all permit Member States to allow positive action. See 
Article 5 of Council Directive 2000/43/EC; Article 7of Council Directive 2000/78/EC; Article 2(8) of 
Council Directive 2002/73/EC.
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Both the equality o f opportunity and the equality o f results approach are similar in 
nature. Both recognise the importance of difference, the value of diversity and have 
similar aims. Both seek to correct disadvantages and discrimination arising from 
societal and institutional barriers. Arguments in favour of the equal opportunity 
approach claim that it seems capable of achieving more than the mere application o f 
consistent treatment while not presenting the same ethical dilemmas as equality o f 
results160. However, it is submitted that the equality o f results approach is more likely 
to achieve equality in practice for people with disabilities. With its focus on equality 
o f outcome and positive action measures, it attempts to eliminate the disadvantages 
that are generated by society and at the same time compensate for inherent 
disadvantages161 162. Also, in contrast to the equal opportunity model, which discontinues 
operating once the initial starting point has been equalised, equality o f  results 
continues to provide assistance until equality in practice is achieved.
In addition to the conceptions discussed above, Baker et a lm  have proposed a more 
sweeping equality strategy in the form of equality o f condition, which contains 
elements o f  both equality o f  opportunity and equality o f  results but is more ambitious. 
The objective o f this notion of equality is to eliminate inequalities altogether. The key 
to achieving this lies in the recognition that inequality is rooted in social structures, 
particularly structures o f  domination and oppression. Therefore, as opposed to 
adjusting unequal structures in society through the use of positive measures and 
accommodations, equality o f condition argues for institutional and structural change. 
It goes further than equality of opportunity by demanding a society where people will 
have real choices among real options, not just equality of opportunity in the 
procedural sense. With this objective in mind, it emphasises the rights and advantages 
o f individuals as well as groups, it focuses on the power relations that exist between 
people and it pays particular attention to the influence o f social factors on people’s 
choices and actions163. Equality o f  condition aims to achieve equality for all groups 
within a broad model and in this sense it embodies a universalist notion. The actual 
realisation o f  this goal will prove extremely difficult as it requires the complete 
transformation o f capitalist society and the elimination o f  racism, patriarchy, privilege
160 Barrett supra note 107,110
161 Waddington, L supra note 31, 64
162 See Baker et al supra note 4,33
163 Ibid.
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and other systems of oppression which have been existent in human society for a 
significant period o f history164.
2 A  23 Conclusion
It is proposed that equality for people with disabilities cannot be achieved without 
substantive measures. Firstly and essentially substantive equality takes an asymmetric 
approach to equality: it recognises diversity and demands that differences be taken 
into account and accommodated accordingly. This is crucial for people with 
disabilities, as disability by its nature does mark a person as different to the existing 
non-disabled ‘norm’. Within existing societal structures, it will be difficult for a 
person with a disability to be in the same position as a person without a disability, 
therefore the sole application of equal treatment in the traditional Aristotelian manner 
will be problematic. Thus far, the solution to this problem of ‘difference’ can be found 
in substantive equality measures such as positive action, the prohibition of indirect 
discrimination and reasonable accommodation165. Without such positive measures, the 
right to formal equality for people with disabilities would be empty. These measures 
help to level the playing field and provide the most realistic possibility for people with 
disabilities to enjoy real equality in present-day society. Certainly, substantive 
equality is not totally unproblematic. The issues o f positive action and 
accommodation are controversial. As already noted, is difficult to reconcile positive 
action with the concept o f equality and the traditional non-discrimination framework. 
I have also commended the substantive approach for its emphasis on difference, yet it 
is not specified how exactly differences should be taken into account and dealt with. 
On what basis does one differentiate between groups? Then, how far does one 
accommodate? If one takes into account all the differences between individuals and 
groups, accommodation could go on endlessly166. It is obvious that limits and 
parameters will have to be drawn in order to have a workable and effective model o f 
substantive equality.
It is apparent from this brief discussion that equality is not a simple idea. There are 
many conceptions o f equality which are overlapping, controversial and unworkable. I 
propose that one conception of equality does not fit all. While I have endorsed the
164 Ibid.
165 See further Section VI: Article 5 o f the Framework Directive: The Concept of Reasonable
Accommodation.
166 Wentholt, K., supra note 114, 58.
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necessity o f substantive equality measures to combat discrimination, formal equality 
cannot be abandoned; it is the founding principle o f basic equal treatment and is 
therefore a necessary basis and starting point for all equality provisions. However, this 
does not mean that it is enough. It needs to be complemented and supported by 
additional measures which actually take differences into account. This is especially 
required in the case of disability discrimination as has been demonstrated. In practice, 
a flexible model of equality of opportunity which encompasses measures such as a 
prohibition on indirect discrimination, an obligation to provide reasonable 
accommodation and positive action to promote equality could offer a good model of 
equality for people with disabilities167.
2.2 Equality as a legal rule in European Union Law
Internationally the right to equality before the law and protection against 
discrimination is recognised by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
United Nations Convention on the Elimination o f  All Forms o f Discrimination against 
Women, the International Convention on the Elimination o f All Forms o f  Racial 
Discrimination, the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the European Convention for the Protection 
o f Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. All Member States o f the European 
Union are signatories to the European Convention on Human Rights and the basic 
principle o f equality enshrined in the above mentioned international instruments has 
been adopted by all Member States which have Constitutions. Bearing this in mind, 
let us examine how equality has been conceptualised as a legal rule thus far in 
European Union law. I will analyse the importance that has been attached to the 
principle o f  equal treatment at EU level and the potential o f the relevant instruments 
in the field o f  disability discrimination.
2.21 Equality as a \general principle *
Firstly, I shall address the status o f  equality as a  “general principle” o f  European law. 
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has developed a jurisprudence that subjects the 
exercise o f Community competence to the requirement that it complies with ‘general
167 Barnard and Hepple have recommended a model of substantive equality in the form o f a flexible 
concept of indirect discrimination coupled with an obligation to make reasonable accommodation. See 




principles’ . General principies are unwritten principies o f  law extrapolated from the 
laws of the Member States by a process similar to that of the development of common 
law by the English Courts168 69. Equality has this status o f a general principle o f law in 
the Community legal order, the requirements of which have been left to the Court of 
Justice to determine. In its case law, the Court has referred to “the general principle of 
equality which is one of the fundamental principles of Community law.”170 The Court 
has decided that the general principle o f equality means that comparable situations are 
not to be treated differently and different situations not to be treated in the same way, 
unless that treatment is objectively justified171. This is the standard methodology used 
by the ECJ and the net effect is that there should be no arbitrary treatment without 
justification. It is clear from the Court’s interpretation that equality as a general 
principle is normally conceptualised in terms of formal equality. The rationale for the 
development o f a general principle o f equality is ambiguous as there were already 
provisions in the EC Treaty that provided a legal basis for equal treatment with regard 
to specific matters172. Tridimas173 has suggested that the Treaty provisions that were 
in place did not guarantee equal treatment in all cases so the development of a general 
principle was necessary to cover the lacunae left in the law. He goes on to speculate 
that the real reason may have been one of principle rather than practical necessity in 
which the principle o f equality was seen as a democratic guarantee preventing the
168 See generally Takis Tridimas, “The General Principles o f EC Law” (OUP, 1999) and McCrudden, 
C. “The New Concept o f Equality”, Paper delivered at the Academy of European Law in the 
framework of the conference “Fight against Discrimination: The Race and Framework Employment 
Directives”. Trier 2-3 June 2003. Available at: www.era.int
169 Tridimas, T supra note 168 at 4.
170 See Joined cases 117/76 and 16/77 Ruckdeschel [1977] ECR 1753, paragraph 7 and Case C-309/96 
Annibaldi [1997] ECR 1-7493, paragraph 18.
171 See for example Case C-l 89/01 Jippes and Others [2001] ECR 1-5689, Paragraph 129 and and Case 
C-149/96 Portugal v Council [1999] ECR 1-8395, paragraph 91.
172 The key provisions are Article 6 EC (non-discrimination on grounds of nationality), Article 40 (3) 
EC (non-discrimination as between producers and consumers in the context of the Common 
Agricultural Policy), Article 48 EC (non-discrimination as between workers who are nationals o f the 
host state and those who are nationals of another Member State), Article 52 EC (equal treatment 
between as between nationals and non-nationals who are established in a self-employed capacity in a 
Member State), Articles 59-60 EC (equal treatment for providers of services who are not established in 
the Member State in question), Article 95 EC (non-discrimination in the field o f taxation as between 
domestic and imported goods) and Article 119 EC (equal pay as between men and women). Cited in 
Grainne de Bûrca, “The role o f Equality in European Community Law” in Dashwood and O’ Leary 
(Eds.) “The principle of Equal Treatment in EC Law” Sweet and Maxwell 1997,20.
173 Tridimas, Takis, “The Application o f the Principle of Equality to Community Measures”, in (Eds.) 




Community and national authorities from imposing differential treatment without 
good reason174.
Another way in which equality comes under the auspices o f a general principle is 
through the protection o f fundamental rights175. The protection of fundamental rights 
is one o f the general principles o f  Community law and particular elements o f equality 
have been recognised among these fundamental rights. Religious equality176 and the 
prohibition o f  sex discrimination177 have been acknowledged as fundamental rights 
and the Court has also held that fundamental rights include the general principle o f 
‘equality and non-discrimination’178. In the case of P  v S  and Cornwall119 180, the Court 
held that sex equality was a fundamental human right and therefore the scope of the 
Equal Treatment Directive could not be restricted based on the fact that a person is 
o f  one or other sex. In this decision the general principle of equality was seen to 
transcend the provisions o f Community legislation,181 which signified a greater 
potential for the use o f general principles in EU law. However the Court has since 
declined to take this approach any further182 183and has been cautious in its application 
since. It can therefore be deduced that equality as an element of the general principle 
o f fundamental rights has a somewhat limited and uncertain role in EC law and cannot 
be relied upon as a solid basis to make a claim.
In conclusion, equality as a gênerai principle is quite a restricted legal tool in terms o f 
basing a claim in EC law. Certain limitations derive from its very status as a general 
principle because such principles only apply when a question of Community law is 
involved . Where no question o f Community law arises the general principles are o f
174 Ibid.
175 McCmdden C supra note 168 at 3.
176 Case 130/75 Prais v Council [1976] ECR 1589
177 Defrenne v Sabena, G149/77, [1978] ECR 1-1365 at paragraphs 26,27.
178 See Ángel Rodriguez Cabellero v Fondo de Garantía Salarial (Fogosa), Case C-442/00, European 
Court Reports 2002 paragraph 32.
179 Case C-13/94 [1996] ECR 1-2143. The issue at the centre o f this case was whether discrimination on 
the grounds o f having undergone transgender surgery amounted to discrimination on the grounds of 
sex.
180 Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation o f equal treatment for men and women as 
regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion and working conditions [1976] O.J. 
L39/40.
181 McCrudden, C “The New Concept o f Equality”, supra note 168 at 4.
182 See Case C-249/96, Grant v South West Trains Ltd. [1998] ECR 1-621
183 Barrett supra note 107, 119
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no relevance184. Secondly, even within the context of Community law, the reach o f 
the general principles is limited; they apply only to legislative and administrative 
Acts. With regard to measures taken by Member States, general principles such as the 
principle of equality only apply in limited circumstances, namely where the Member 
State implements Community law185. As a result o f these limitations, the general 
principle o f equality is not a free standing basis for legal action by individuals186; it is 
not a positive and enforceable right and is not directly effective per se187. Therefore 
challenges to the applicability of national legislation have to be on the foot of some 
rule o f Community law other than a general principle such as a Directive, an article of 
an EC Treaty or some other equivalent such measure188. It is therefore clear that 
equality as a general principle, standing alone, is not a solid instrument to combat 
inequality in practice. A series of additional and complementary legal instruments, 
concepts and methods would be needed in order for it to succeed.
2.22 Treaty Provisions and Legislation
As I mentioned earlier, there are several EC Treaty provisions which are specific 
manifestations o f the general principle of equality . The original rationale behind 
these provisions was economic rather than social. Commentators have noted that the 
principle of equal treatment in the EU has been employed as an instrument for the 
attainment of specific Community aims, for example, the eradication of obstacles to 
the completion o f the single market190. It was not until the emergence of measures to 
combat gender discrimination in employment that the Community began to take more 
o f an interest in equality as a social issue as opposed to an economic one. The gender 
equality experience has been instrumental in shaping current European anti- 
discrimination law. Articles 2 191 and 3(2)192 of the EC Treaty impose the task of
184 Ibid.
185 Ibid. See Case 230/78 Eridania v Minister for Agriculture and Forestry [1979] ECR2749
186 Hepple, B., ‘The Principle of Equal Treatment in Article 119 EC and the Possibilities for Reform’ in 
Dash wood and O’ Leary (Eds.) “The Principle of Equal Treatment in EC Law” Sweet and Maxwell 
1997 at 142 and cited in Barrett supra note 107, 120
187 Ellis, E., ‘The Principle of Equality o f Opportunity irrespective o f Sex: some Reflections on the 
present state of European Community Law and its Future Development’ in Dashwood and O’ Leary 
(Eds.) “The principle of Equal Treatment in EC Law” Sweet and Maxwell 1997 at 190 and cited in 
Barrett supra note 107, 120.
188 Barrett supra note 107, 120
189 The key Treaty provisions have been outlined above, see supra note 172.
190 See De Burca, Grainne “The role of Equality in European Community Law” in Dashwood and O’ 
Leary (Eds.) “The principle of Equal Treatment in EC Law” Sweet and Maxwell 1997 at 2.16.
191 Article 2 “The Community shall have as its task.....equality between men and women”
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promoting equality between men and women in the Community. The original motive 
for the insertion of Article 119 EEC192 93 in the Treaty o f  Rome demanding equal pay 
between men and women was to protect those states that had equal pay legislation at 
the time o f  the formation of the Community from being undercut by those without 
such legislation194. However as a result of the growing women’s rights movement 
throughout Europe in the 1970’s and the ground breaking decisions by the ECJ in the 
D efrenne195 cases, the original economic objective was supplemented by an aim of 
ensuring greater equality between men and women in employment, for reasons of 
greater fairness in the labour market and of individual fulfilment196. Throughout the 
70’s a number o f important Directives were adopted on the basis of Article 141, 
including the Equal Pay Directive197 and the Equal Treatment Directive198. A number 
o f concepts that have since proved crucial to the operation o f European anti- 
discrimination law were developed during the gender equality experience. For 
example, the concepts o f  indirect discrimination199 and positive action200 201were 
recognised by the European Court o f  Justice as necessary to combat structural and 
institutional forms of discrimination. These concepts have now been applied to a vast 
new range o f relationships and situations by the Equal Treatment Directives of 
2000 . Thus far the success o f gender discrimination case-law has shown that 
reliance on anti-discrimination legislation has proved to be the most successful way of 
implementing the principle o f equal treatment.
192 Article 3(2) “In all the activities referred to in this Article, the Community shall aim to eliminate 
inequalities, and to promote equality, between men and women.”
193 Now Article 141 EC; “Each Member State shall ensure that the principle of equal pay for male and 
female workers for equal work or work of equal value is applied.”
194 McCmdden supra note 108,4
195 Case 80/70 Defrenne v Sabena [1971] ECR 445; Case 43/75 Defrenne v Sabena (No. 2) [1976] ECR 
455 and Case 149/77 Defrenne v Sabena (No.3) [1978] ECR 1365 where the right to equal pay as laid 
down by Article 1I9EEC (now Article 141 EC) was held to be an enforceable individual right.
196 McCrudden supra note 108,4,
197 Council Directive 75/117/EEC of 10 February 1975 on the approximation of the laws o f the member 
states relating to the application o f the principle of equal pay for men and women [1975] OJ L 45/19.
198 Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle o f equal 
treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion 
[1976] OJ 39/40. See also Parliament and Council Directive 2002/73/EC of 23 September 2002 
amending Council Directive 76/207/EEC [2002] OJ L269/15.
199 Case 170/84 Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v Weber von Harzt [1986] ECR 1607
200 Case C-450/93 Kalanke v Freie und Hansestadt Bremen [1995] ECR 1-3051.
201 See supra note 110
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2.23 Charter o f  Fundamental Rights
Another source o f  the principle of equality in EU law is the European Charter o f  
Fundamental Rights202 which was adopted at Nice in December 2000. This document 
sets out the fundamental rights already considered by the ECJ as arising from the 
general principles o f Community law203. The Charter contains a chapter headed 
“Equality”, which includes a  provision that everyone is equal before the law204. 
Article 21 o f the Charter sets out a wider catalogue o f rights than ever before, 
prohibiting discrimination expressly on the grounds of sex, race, colour, ethnic or 
social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other 
opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age and sexual 
orientation205. There is also a  special article on the rights o f persons with disabilities 
to benefit from measures designed to ensure their independence, social and 
occupational integration and participation in the life of the community206. The 
strength o f this provision lies in the implicit mandate for positive measures to assist 
the integration o f people with disabilities207. It refers to the ‘right’ o f people with 
disabilities to such positive action, which clearly reflects a substantive model o f  
equality208 209. Therefore this provision could have real implications for the promotion o f 
equal treatment o f people with disabilities, especially if used in conjunction with 
measures that were adopted under the Framework Directive such as the obligation to
•SAQ
provide reasonable accommodation and the article on positive action . However, the 
Charter was adopted without any binding effect which unfortunately reduces its 
potential as a hard legal instrument. It applies throughout the scope o f EU law but 
does not generate autonomous rights to non-discrimination210. Even though it is more
202 1 8 December 2000, [2000] OJ C 364/1
203 McCrudden C “The New Concept of Equality” supra note 168,8.
204 Chapter III, Article 20
205 Chapter III, Article 21 (1). Discrimination on the grounds of nationality is prohibited separately in 
Article 21 (2).
206 Article 26 “The Union recognises the right of persons with disabilities to benefit from measures 
designed to ensure their independence, social and occupational integration and participation in the life 
of the community.”
207 Bell, M. ‘The Right to Equality and Non-Discrimination* in Hervey, T and J Kenner (Eds.) 
“Economic and Social Rights under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights-a Legal Perspective” 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003) pp.91-110 at 103.
208 Ibid.
209 Article 5 and Article 7 of Council Directive 2000/78/EC respectively. These provisions are 
discussed in more detail in Section IV and Section III: 3.24
210 Bell, M. “Walking in the same direction? The contribution of the European Social Charter and the 
European Union to combating discrimination”, Paper completed during a Jean Monnet Fellowship at 
the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced studies, European University Institute, Florence 2004.
explicit than the general principle o f equality, they are comparable in terms o f limited 
effect211. Despite its limitations, the Charter has become an important reference 
document for the ECJ in its interpretation o f Community law212. It has been 
acknowledged that “the Charter o f Fundamental Rights o f  the European Union has not 
been recognised as having genuine legislative scope in the strict sense..... [However] 
in proceedings concerned with the nature o f a fundamental right, the relevant 
statements cannot be ignored”213. This jurisprudence signifies that the fundamental 
rights enshrined in the Charter could therefore be influential when the Court comes to 
examine anti-discrimination legislation such as the Framework Employment 
Directive.
The Charter was incorporated into the Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe214, adopted in June 2004, which if  ratified would elevate the legal status o f the 
Charter to give it binding force. All the rights in the Charter will be governed by the 
key principles o f Community law, including the primacy principle, which means that 
the Charter will prevail over all the law o f  the Member States and their 
Constitutions215. The equality chapter o f the Charter was retained intact during 
incorporation. This signifies a major step forward for the recognition of fundamental 
rights and the principle o f equality in the EU216. It indicates that the Charter will no 
longer be considered as a mere political declaration but as a catalogue of enforceable 
rights which can be potentially relied upon before the European Court of Justice and 
national courts217. In addition to the incorporation o f  the Charter, the new Treaty
211 ibid.
212 European Commission. Green Paper “Equality and non- discrimination in an enlarged European 
Union', Luxembourg 2004 at 15. See Case C-245/01 -RTL Television GmbH v Niedersâchsische 
Landesmedienanstali fur privaten Rundfunk ECR [2003] 0000.
21j Case C-173/99 BECTU v Secretary o f  State for Trade and Industry [2001] ECR 1-4881, Opinion o f 
Advocate General Tizzano
214 See European Constitution Part II; The Charter o f Fundamental Rights o f the Union. Title III 
Equality, Article II-81 on Non-discrimination corresponding to Article 21 of the Charter and in relation 
to people with disabilities, see Article 11-86 corresponding to Article 26 of the Charter. A consolidated 
version of the Constitutional Treaty can be found on the website o f the European Union at the 
following address: http://europa.eu.int/constitution/
215 Ortega, Luis, ‘Fundamental Rights in the European Constitution’, Volume 11 Issue 3 European 
Public Law 2005,363 at 366.
216 See generally Mark Bell, ‘Equality and the European Constitution’ 33 Industrial Law Journal No.3 
September 2004,242 for a discussion of how equality has been dealt with in the Constitutional Treaty. 
He concludes that there is no settled vision or concept o f equality running though the Constitution but 
instead various points of reference which are inconsistent. With regard to the Charter, he notes that it 
was awkwardly inserted and overlaps with other elements o f the Constitution, see p259.
217 See ‘Brief Summary of the EU Constitution from a Disability Perspective’ at http://www.edf- 
feph.org/Constimtion/content_summarv en.htm
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emphasises the promotion o f equality and non-discrimination in all the activities o f 
the Union218.
However the Constitutional Treaty can only enter into force and be effective if  it is 
adopted by each o f the signatory countries219 but thus far the text has been rejected by 
France and the Netherlands220. These rejections have naturally resulted in a setback to 
the ratification procedure and it is now uncertain whether the Constitution in its 
current form will be ratified221. As a result, the extent to which the equality provisions 
o f the Charter will give rise to a legally enforceable principle o f  equality remains to 
be seen.
2.3 Concluding Remarks
Having examined the various ways in which the Union has conceptualised the concept 
of equality up until now, it is submitted that due to the lack o f legal effect o f  the 
general principle o f equality, the uncertain ratification o f the Constitutional Treaty 
and the success o f anti-discrimination legislation in the field o f gender equality; anti- 
discrimination legislation is currently most effective way to achieve equal treatment 
for people with disabilities. In the next section, I will concentrate on the Framework 
Employment Directive, the sole piece of anti-discrimination legislation at the 
European level which prohibits discrimination on the ground o f  disability and analyse 
its strength and possibilities in combating disability discrimination.
218 See European Constitution Part III: The Policies and Functioning o f the Union. Title I: Provisions of 
General Application. Article III-I18 which states “In defining and implementing the policies and 
activities referred to in this Part, the Union shall aim to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or 
ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.” See also Part III, Title II: Non- 
Discrimination and Citizenship. Article III-124 (1) which stipulates “Without prejudice to the other 
provisions of the Constitution and within the limits of the powers assigned by it to the Union, a 
European law or framework law of the Council may establish the measures needed to combat 
discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual 
orientation. The Council shall act unanimously after obtaining the consent o f the European 
Parliament.”
219 Once ratified, the Treaty stipulates that the Constitution may enter into force from 1 November 
2006.
220 In the referendums of the 29 May and 1 June 2005 respectively.
221 The results of the referendums in France and the Netherlands led the Council to declare the date o f 1 
November 2006 as no longer tenable for the entry into force of the Constitution. For updates o f the 
ratification process, see the European Union website at 
http://europa.eu.int/constitution/referendum en.htm
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Ill: THE FRAMEWORK EMPLOYMENT DIRECTIVE 2000/78/EC
The Framework Employment Directive 2000/78/EC222 establishes a general 
framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation on the grounds of 
religion or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation223. The purpose o f the 
Directive is to set minimum common standards in the laws against discrimination in 
force in EU Member States on the above mentioned grounds224. The aim is to create a 
general legal framework for combating discrimination thus putting into effect the 
principle o f equal treatment225. W ith the Framework Directive, the EU has expanded 
the concepts, standards and protections that are already in place with regard to anti- 
discrimination law on the grounds o f gender, to include new definitions and 
understandings o f the concept o f  discrimination226. The Directive contains a new 
definition o f  indirect discrimination and it legally recognises new forms o f 
discrimination, such as harassment and a  failure to make a reasonable 
accommodation.
The scope o f  the Directive is limited to employment and occupation; it does not 
require Member States to outlaw disability discrimination in fields such as education, 
public transport and the provision o f goods and services. However, it does have a 
wide-ranging scope within the employment sphere. Hence, discrimination on the 
grounds o f inter alia disability is outlawed with regard to access to employment, self- 
employment or an occupation, including selection criteria and recruitment; access to 
all types o f vocational training and guidance, including practical work experience; 
employment and working conditions, including dismissals and pay; and membership 
o f or involvement in trade unions and other worker organisations, employers’
222 [2000] O J  L303/16
223 The deadline for transposition o f the Directive was the 2 December 2003. In relation to the grounds 
of age and disability, Member States were allowed to ask for up to an additional 3 years for 
implementation. France and thè UK decided to use the additional 3 years in relation to disability and 
Denmark chose to use 1 year. See Article 18 of Council Directive 2000/78/EC.
224 European Commission. Equality and Non-Discrimination Annual Report 2005 at 7.
225 Ibid. Article 1 of Council Directive 2000/78/EC lays down its purpose: “The purpose of this 
Directive is to lay down a general framework for combating discrimination on the grounds o f religion 
or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation as regards employment and occupation, with a view to 
putting into effect in the Member States the principal o f equal treatment.”
226 Waddington, L and Bell, M “More Equal than Others: Distinguishing European Union Equality 
Directives” C.L.M.R 38 2001, 587-611, 588
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associations and professional bodies . It can therefore be reasonably deduced that 
the purpose o f the Directive is to increase the participation in the labour market o f 
certain groups, including people with disabilities and to reduce or eliminate adverse 
treatment that these groups are susceptible to.
This Directive is the first piece o f  anti-discrimination legislation at EU level 
prohibiting discrimination on the ground of disability. As we have seen from the 
previous chapters, anti-discrimination laws are currently regarded as the leading legal 
tool to achieve equality. However, commentators have pointed out some serious flaws 
in current forms o f anti-discrimination legislation. Baker et al27 28 note that 
contemporary anti-discrimination laws tend to exhibit several interconnected features. 
First they are subordinate to the operation of market based economies. This is 
certainly the case with EU anti-discrimination legislation as it was originally created 
as a mechanism to further the economic aims o f the Community229 230. Secondly, as a 
result o f roots in formal equality, they tend to focus on individual justice rather than 
group relations and the reliance on the use o f a comparator limits their application to 
many disadvantaged groups, including people with disabilities. The formal 
assumption that justice requires ignoring certain socially prominent differences means 
that positive action is treated as exceptional and open to challenge. As a result of these 
features, it has been argued that contemporary anti-discrimination laws cannot effect
m 7̂ 0 4
radical change in the workplace .
Bearing these criticisms in mind I propose to analyse the Framework Employment 
Directive from a disability rights perspective. I will consider the concepts o f 
discrimination that are provided for in the Directive and their application to the 
ground o f disability. I will then examine the exceptions to the principle o f equal 
treatment and how they relate to disability illustrating that some of these exceptions 
have the potential to be quite damaging if  not interpreted strictly. Finally I will 
discuss the limitations of the Directive in the context o f disability and suggest 
modifications that could greatly improve the protection offered on the ground o f 
disability.
227 See Article 3(1) of Council Directive 2000/78/EC.
228 Baker, Lynch, Cantillon, Walsh, “Equality: From Theory to Action” supra note 4 at 125.
729 See Section 1 :1.3.
230 Baker et al, supra note 4 at 125.
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3.1 The prohibition o f D iscrim ination on the ground o f  disability 
The broad definition of discrimination in Article 2 o f  the Framework Employment 
Directive is broken down into four separate definitions o f discrimination: Direct 
Discrimination, Indirect Discrimination, Harassment and an Instruction to 
discriminate. I shall briefly outline these provisions and examine to what extent they 
can offer protection against discrimination on the ground o f disability.
3.11 The prohibition o f Direct Discrimination
The European Court o f Justice began to distinguish between direct and indirect 
discrimination from the 1970s onwards231. They are now well-established concepts 
that have been developed by case law dealing predominantly with sex 
discrimination232. The Framework Directive provides that the principle o f equal 
treatment shall mean that there shall be no direct or indirect discrimination on the 
ground o f  inter alia disability233 234.
Direct Discrimination on the grounds o f inter alia disability is defined under Article 
2(2) (a) as occurring where “one person is treated less favourably than another is, has 
been or would be treated in a comparable situation”. This is a classic definition of 
plain and clear discrimination. It implies that discrimination occurs when individuals 
that are fundamentally the same are treated differently for illegitimate reasons. Direct 
discrimination is often intentional and motivated by prejudice. In the case o f  disability 
this type o f  discrimination often occurs as a result o f myths and stereotypes associated 
with the abilities and capacities o f  people with disabilities. For example, an employer 
who refuses to hire a cosmetically disfigured person on the basis that it would upset 
other employees or considers a  person with a physical impairment to be mentally 
incapable o f  performing the functions o f the job. Policies prohibiting direct 
discrimination normally take the form o f a blanket ban in which the employer must
231 See Case 152/73 Sotgiu [1974] ECR 153 (with respect to nationality) and Case 170/84 Bilka 
Kaufhaus [1986] ECR 1607 (with respect to sex)
232 In relation to direct discrimination see Case 129/79 Macarthys v. Smith [1980] ECR 1275 and Case 
C-279/93 Finanzamt Koeln-Altstadt v Schumacher [1995] ECR 1-225 at paragraph 30, “ It is also
settled law that discrimination can arise only through the application of different rules to comparable 
situations or the application o f the same rule to different situations. This was upheld in Case 342/93 
Gillespie & ors v. Northern Health and Social Services Board & ors [1996] ECR 225 at paragraph 16. 
23,> Article 2(1) Council Directive 2000/78/EC
234 Karlan & Rutherglen, ‘Disabilities, Discrimination and Reasonable Accommodation’ 46 Duke Law 
Journal 1 (1996), 10.
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ignore the irrelevant characteristic (whether it be disability, sex, race, religion etc.) 
and treat every employee the same.
Direct discrimination is a clear example of the formal equality principle at work. The 
principle can be seen running through the definition with its emphasis on individual 
litigation (“one person”) and the requirement to identify a  suitable comparator. A 
suitable comparator is normally a person in the same situation who received more 
favourable treatment. This approach therefore implicitly endorses a  notion o f equality 
as sameness. The identification o f a “comparable situation” and a suitable 
‘comparator’ are crucial for the application of direct discrimination yet there is no 
legislative guidance given on this matter235. The issue o f  finding a  suitable comparator 
is particularly contentious in the case o f  disability. As a result o f  the multitude o f  
barriers (physical, attitudinal and systemic) that people with disabilities face on entry 
to the labour market it is difficult that they will be in a “comparable situation” to a 
non-disabled person236 *. Therefore it is important that the concept of “reasonable 
accommodation” will be taken into account when making this comparison . 
Whittle238 has pointed out that the definition of direct discrimination also allows an 
additional level o f comparison between individuals with different disabilities by 
simply referring to the comparator as ‘another’. This could be an alternative to a 
comparison with a non-disabled person. However the huge variety of disabilities and 
the innumerable differences in relation to the nature, type and duration of impairment 
could give rise to further difficulties during comparison. An employee with a mental 
illness will certainly experience different types o f disadvantage compared to a 
wheelchair bound employee, for example, therefore it may be problematic proving 
that they are in a ‘comparable situation’ for the purposes of the definition. It has also
235 Waddington and Bell supra note 226, 591. See Case 129/79 MacCarthys v Smith [1980] ECR 1275 
with regard to how the ECJ defined a comparator for the purposes o f gender discrimination.
236 In the UK, courts and tribunals found it difficult from early on to identify an appropriate non­
disabled norm to function as the comparator under the Disability Discrimination Act 1995. See Clark v 
Novacold [1999] 2 ALL ER 977 where the Court attempted to minimise the role of the comparator in 
order to focus simply on the unlawfulness of subjecting a person to discrimination on the grounds o f 
their disability. See Sandra Fredman, ‘Disability Equality: A Challenge to the Existing Anti- 
Discrimination Paradigm?’ supra note 117 at 211.
2j7 Article 5 of the Framework Directive provides for the obligation on employers to provide 
reasonable accommodation for people with disabilities. This duty on employers has the potential to put 
persons with disabilities on an equal footing with non-disabled people by making adaptations to the 
workplace. Therefore it could be a determining factor in identifying a “comparable situation” for the 
purposes o f the definition. See Section IV of this thesis for a detailed examination of Article 5.
238 Whittle, Richard “The Framework Directive for Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation 
an Analysis from a Disability Rights Perspective” (2002) 27 European Law Review 303, 306 / o '
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been put forward that the wording “„.where one person is treated less favourably than 
another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation” suggests that 
references to past and hypothetical comparators are allowed239. This allows for a 
much broader category o f  comparators; it allows for a comparison to be drawn with 
someone who was previously in the same situation and received better treatment or 
someone who would have received better treatment if  they were in that situation. Due 
to the difficulties involved in comparing actual comparators, the use o f  a hypothetical 
comparator would probably be the most effective means o f identifying a situation 
comparable to that of a particular individual with a  disability. However, it will 
eventually depend on how strictly the definition o f comparator is construed by the 
ECJ.
As direct discrimination applies to clear, straightforward cases of discrimination and 
has serious implications for the employer, it may be necessary to demonstrate intent in 
order to prove a prim a facie  case o f  discrimination. In gender discrimination case law, 
however, it has been held that it is enough that the effect o f the measure is 
discriminatory240. It relation to justifiable defences, the prohibition on direct 
discrimination is absolute and no defence is prescribed. The ECJ’s consistent 
approach has been that direct discrimination can only be justified where there is an 
‘express exception in the Treaty or secondary legislation’ to be relied on241. Therefore 
it is safe to presume that direct discrimination on the ground of disability will only be 
permitted by those exceptions outlined in the Directive itself242.
3.12 The prohibition o f Indirect D iscrimination
As well as direct discrimination, the directive also prohibits indirect discrimination, 
which “shall be taken to occur where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or 
practice would p u t persons having inter alia a particular disability at a particular
239 Waddington and Bell supra note 226, 592
240 Case 69/80 Worringham v. Lloyd’s Bank [1981] ECR 767. See Barnard C, “EC Employment Law”, 
(Oxford: OUP, 2000) at 209.
241 See Case 222/84 Johnston v UK [1986] ECR 1651 in the gender equality context and further 
Hervey, T., “Justification for Sex Discrimination in Employment” Butterworths 1993, cited in Quinn, 
Gerard and Quinlivan, Shivaun, “Disability Discrimination: the need to amend the Employment 
Equality Act 1998 in light of the EU Framework Directive on Employment” in Costello C and Barry E 
(Eds.), “Equality in Diversity-the New Equality Directives”. Irish Centre for European Law 2003, 234
242 Articles 2(5), 3(4), 4 and 7; See further Section 3.2 of this Chapter.
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disadvantage compared with other persons”243 24. The addition o f indirect 
discrimination significantly broadens the scope of the traditional formal concept o f  
non-discrimination and moves it in a significantly more substantive direction. There is 
less reliance on individual litigation and as is evident from the definition (“persons 
having a particular disability”), there appears to be significant potential to accrue 
group benefits. Indirect discrimination need not be motivated by intent or malice on 
the part o f  the discriminator but the outcome is considered just as damaging as the 
effects o f  direct discrimination. A simple example o f an indirectly discriminatory 
measure would be an employer who puts a blanket ban on dogs entering the building, 
which then prevents blind employees from bringing their guide dogs. Indirect 
discrimination has far reaching implications for anti-discrimination law as it 
acknowledges that intentional discrimination is not the only source o f the basic 
problem and recognises that the larger problem stems from more subtle and 
unintentional mechanisms which work to the disadvantage and exclusion o f certain
244groups
The concept of indirect discrimination grew out o f European sex-discrimination law  
in the landmark case of Bilka Kauftiaus245 246. In this case, it was held that part-time 
female workers were being indirectly discriminated against and the ECJ formulated a 
test for indirect discrimination based on sex. It was held that once adverse effect has 
been established it can only be justified if  it can be proven that “the exclusion is based 
on objectively justified factors unrelated to any discrimination on grounds o f sex . 
Since then, the Court has continued to elaborate on and formulate the definition and 
test for indirect discrimination. This definition developed by the courts heavily 
influenced the subsequent legislative definition which first appeared in the Burden o f  
Proof Directive I997247. This definition requires strict statistical evidence to prove a
24j Article 2(2)(b) Council Directive 2000/78/EC
244 Loenen, Tita, “Indirect Discrimination: Oscillating Between Containment and Revolution” in 
Loenen, Rodriguez “Non Discrimination Law: Comparative Perspectives” . Kluwer, 1999,201
245 Case 170/84 Bilka-Kaujhaus GmbH v Weber von Harzt [1986] ECR 1607. This case concerned the 
exclusion o f part-time workers from the pension scheme of a large department store. Although this 
policy applied to both men and women, it adversely affected more women than men as the majority o f 
the part-time workers were female. The exclusion of part-time workers from this scheme was 
challenged as contrary to the right to equal pay for men and women enshrined in EC law.
246 Ibid at paragraph 31.
247 Article 2 (2) Council Directive 97/80/EC [1998] O.J. L14/6 provides that “indirect discrimination 
shall exist where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice disadvantages a substantially
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case of indirect discrimination in the sense that it is required- to prove that a 
“substantially higher portion ” o f one sex was disadvantaged. The use of statistical 
data normally makes it very difficult for the plaintiff to establish a case o f indirect 
discrimination as most o f the information will not be available to him or will have to 
be provided by the defendant248. The definition of indirect discrimination in the 
Framework Directive differs however as it does not require evidence of statistical 
information. Therefore the burden o f proof is now simpler to meet. Even though 
statistical evidence is not expressly required, Recital 15 allows Member States to 
continue to rely on statistical evidence if  they so wish249 250. There is a danger that if 
Member States continue to require statistical evidence in order to prove indirect 
discrimination, this could be a potential pit-fall for people with disabilities. The 
production o f statistical evidence is already a difficult requirement to fulfil in the field 
o f sex discrimination where statistics are readily available but on the ground of 
disability it would be a burdensome task as the statistical data is unlikely to be 
available . The new definition also allows for the use of actual, past and 
hypothetical comparators as is the case with direct discrimination251. However, as 
with direct discrimination there may be problems identifying a comparator. Whilst 
traditional grounds of discrimination such as sex and race can be clearly divided into 
homogenous groups, this is not the case with disability as a result o f the vast variety 
o f impairments. Therefore it may be difficult to form a group o f people with 
disabilities that have all experienced disadvantage in the same manner due to an 
‘apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice’.
i ■
The prohibition o f indirect discrimination is o f  tremendous value in the disability 
context as it is capable o f reaching more subtle forms o f  discrimination which are not
higher proportion o f the members of one sex, unless that provision, criterion or practice is appropriate 
and necessary and can be justified by objective factors unrelated to sex.”
248 Loenen supra note 244,207
249 Recital 15 o f  Council Directive 2000/78/EC provides “The appreciation of the facts from which it 
may be inferred that there has been direct or indirect discrimination is a matter for national judicial or 
other competent bodies, in accordance with rules of national law or practice. Such rules may provide, 
in particular, for indirect discrimination to be established by any means including on the basis of 
statistical evidence.”
250 Whittle, supra note 238 at 309.
251 Apostolopoulou, Zoe, “Equal Treatment of people with disabilities in the EC: What does “Equal” 
mean?” supra note 124 at 32.
46
normally covered by the prohibition against direct discrimination252. Much of the 
discrimination which arises on the ground of disability is as a result o f long 
established practices and structures, which may not intentionally discriminate against 
people with disabilities but by their nature and structure result in inequitable 
treatment. Sheltered employment and segregated schools for example have the 
intention to ‘help’ people with disabilities but the end result is often increased 
separation and isolation from society. This segregation then further reinforces the 
stereotypical view o f  disability as abnormal and strange. Indirect discrimination may 
also be motivated by intentional intolerance, for example discriminatory policies such 
as refusing to provide an elevator or physical access to a building. The concept o f  
indirect discrimination outlined in Article 2 (2) (b) of the Directive clearly covers 
both intentional and unintentional forms o f indirect discrimination and it does not 
appear to require plaintiffs to prove a discriminatory intent253. Unfortunately the 
potential o f the prohibition against indirect discrimination is weakened by its 
defences. The defence o f occupational requirements and the specific derogation in 
relation to the duty to provide reasonable accommodation could result in preserving 
discriminatory practices if not interpreted strictly.
3.121 Defences to a claim o f Indirect Discrimination
Under Article 2(2) (b) o f the Directive, there are two possible defences available to 
the employer when subject to a charge o f indirect discrimination. The first defence is 
o f general application to all grounds including disability. It purports that the employer 
will not breach the principle o f equal treatment if the offending neutral rule or practice 
is “objectively ju stified  by a legitimate aim and the means o f  achieving that aim are 
proportionate and necessary“254. The objective criterion must be unconnected with 
anything remotely discriminatory. For example if an employer refuses to hire a blind 
person for a job as a bus driver, this can be objectively justified on the basis that as
252 The Canadian Supreme Court recently recognised indirect discrimination as the major form of 
disability discrimination. See Eldridge v British Columbia (1997) 3 SCR 624
253 EU Network o f Independent Experts on Disability Discrimination, Baseline study: Disability 
Discrimination Law in EU Member States. November 2004, 14. Available online at: 
http://europa.eu.int/coimn/emplovment social/fundamental rights/public/pubsg^ en.htm#Disabi1itv 
This is already apparent from the case law dealing with indirect discrimination on the ground o f sex. 
See Case 96/80 Jenkins v. Kingsgate [1981] ER 911 where the Court looked at the intention o f the 
employer and Case 170/84 Bilka-Kaujhaus GmbH v Weber von Harzt [1986] ECR 1607 where 
unintentional indirect discrimination was recognised.
254 Article 2(2)(bXi) Council Directive 2000/78/EC
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driving constitutes an essential function of the job, then to hire somebody who is 
incapable o f performing this function would be a danger to public safety255. The 
question o f whether a practice which is discriminatory in relation to disability can be 
justified by this defence will depend on the particular circumstances o f each case and 
how strictly the provision will be interpreted by the courts. We can draw guidance 
from the experience of the European Court of Justice in developing the concept of 
objective justification with regard to gender discrimination law256. The ECJ has 
recently displayed a tendency to be lenient despite the strict wording o f the objective 
justification test in sex discrimination law257. Observers attribute this leniency to the 
major financial impact the case law dealing with indirect discrimination has had on 
Member States and as a result the Court is now under political pressure to be more 
restrained258. Three broad areas o f  potentially acceptable justifiable factors may be 
identified in the case law o f  the domestic courts and the ECJ; personal factors, factors 
arising out o f the internal organisation259 and factors operating at the level o f the 
labour market260. Personal factors may include the greater seniority of a  given 
individual, superior qualifications for the job or greater productivity261 26. Criteria taken 
into account by the Court involve both economic and social factors . As well as job 
and enterprise related reasons, public interest and the social policy o f  the Member 
State are taken into consideration263 264. In a disability context it is important that the 
assessment will be based on purely objective criteria and to remain alert to the 
susceptibility o f  subjective elements creeping into an assessment. This is a realistic 
danger as disability discrimination by its very nature is often the result o f  fear,
A/i
prejudice and misconception .
255 Whittle supra note 238 at 308.
254 See the following cases: Case 170/84 Bilka-Kaufhaus ECR 1986, 1607 and Case 149/77 Rinner- 
Kuehn ECR 1989,2743.
257 Article 2(2) Council Directive 97/80/EC [1998] O.J. L I4/6 on the burden of proof in cases of 
discrimination based on sex, “indirect discrimination shall exist [...] unless that provision, criterion or 
practice is appropriate and necessary and can be justified by objective factors unrelated to sex.”
k® See Loenen, Tita supra note 244,210
259 See Case 170/84 Bilka-Kaufhaus ECR 1986,1607
260 See Case C-127/92 Enderby v Frenchqy Health Authority [1993] ECR 1-5535 where it was accepted 
that the labour market situation was a justification for a difference in pay between male and female 
workers.
261 Barnard, Catherine, “Where Social Policy meets the Internal Market: A New Balance?” Lecture 
Series given at the Academy o f European Law 6th Session, European University Institute, Florence 4- 
15 July 2005. Course Materials, 19
262 See Asscher-Vonk, Irene P, “Towards one Concept o f Objective Justification” in Loenen & 
Rodrigues “Non Discrimination Law: Comparative Perspectives”. Kluwer, 1999 at 45.
263 Ibid at 44, 45.
264 See Whittle, supra note 238,308
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The second defence deals specifically with the concept of indirect discrimination in 
the context o f  disability. It provides that indirect discrimination shall be taken to occur 
unless “as regards persons with a particular disability, the employer [....] is obliged, 
under national legislation, to take appropriate measures in line with the principles 
contained in Article 5 in order to eliminate disadvantages entailed by such provision, 
criterion or practice” . In essence this means that the offending measure will not 
breach the principle o f equal treatment if the employer is providing some sort o f 
reasonable accommodation as obliged by Article 5 o f the Directive . This defence is 
providing the employer with another opportunity, as well as the objective justification 
clause, to retain the disputed provision that is causing an adverse impact on persons 
with a disability. To illustrate the impact of this provision, Whittle gives the 
example o f an employment scenario in which being able to drive is advantageous to 
the job but not an essential function. If  the employer imposes a  requirement o f a 
driving licence, then a blind person who may be able to perform the essential 
functions o f the job will not be hired on the basis that he/she does not have a driving 
licence. In this situation the employer may be able to escape a claim o f indirect 
discrimination if  he accommodates the potential employee by reorganising work tasks 
or providing a driver on the relevant occasions. The provision of reasonable 
accommodation will then allow the employer to retain the disputed requirement o f a 
driving licence. Therefore the root cause of indirect discrimination is not addressed, 
but rather cleverly bypassed. This example illustrates that this defence may actually 
allow for the continuance of some instances of indirect discrimination against people 
with disabilities, thus providing a lower degree o f protection for the group265 768. 
Furthermore, this second ‘let-out’ clause for employers is problematic as it makes a 
number o f questionable assumptions. First it assumes that national legislation actually 
provides for the obligation to reasonably accommodate, that such legislation is in
265 Article 2(2)(b)(ii) Council Directive 2000/78/EC
266 The insertion of this clause was as a result o f demands by the UK government during the drafting o f 
the Directive. The UK Disability Discrimination Act 1995 did not contain an express prohibition on 
indirect discrimination but did however contain an obligation to provide ‘reasonable adjustments’ and 
defined a failure to do so as discrimination. During Council negotiations, it was felt that the provision 
o f  ‘reasonable accommodation’ was a sufficient answer to a charge of ‘indirect discrimination’ since 
many of the obstacles that arise through indirect discrimination can be removed by invoking an 
obligation o f reasonable accommodation on the employer, therefore Article 2(2)(b)(ii) was retained. 
See EU Network of Independent Experts on Disability Discrimination, Baseline study, supra note 253 
at 14.
267 Whittle, supra note 238,310.
264 Waddington and Bell supra note 226,595
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accordance with the requirements o f the Framework Directive and that it has been 
complied with . Secondly, it appears to assume that the only available response to 
indirect discrimination on the ground o f disability is the provision o f reasonable 
accommodation . This assumption is quite dubious as there are significant 
differences between the two concepts, due essentially to the individualised nature of 
reasonable accommodation. Once an individual with a disability can be 
accommodated in a situation where there is an indirectly discriminatory measure in 
operation, then the reasonable accommodation duty is satisfied. This means that the 
offending measure will be allowed to continue to the detriment o f people with 
disabilities as a  group. This would appear to contradict the very purpose of indirect 
discrimination which is to eliminate subtle forms of discrimination which affect a 
wider group o f people with disabilities269 7071 27.
3.13 The prohibition o f Harassment and an Instruction to discriminate on the ground 
o f disability
The Directive marks a significant breakthrough with regard to the prohibition of 
harassment on the grounds o f  inter alia  disability. For the first time in European law 
the notion o f  harassment is defined and prohibited. It is another indication o f the 
move towards a more substantive notion o f  equality in European anti-discrimination 
law. This is evidenced by the fact that a comparator is not required and the definition 
itself is quite broad . In Article 2(3) harassment is defined as ‘unwanted conduct* 
which would create a negative work environment. In the disability context harassment 
could include a situation where attitudes to a person’s disability are the cause o f the 
negative work environment273. The effectiveness o f  the provision could be limited as
269 EU Network o f Independent Experts on Disability Discrimination, Baseline study, supra note 253 at 
15.
270 Ibid.
271 Despite these negative aspects, Whittle points out that there are also practical benefits for both 
employers and people with disabilities. There is the possibility that it will encourage employers to 
think more in terms o f accommodating the needs o f workers with disabilities in order to avoid a claim 
of indirect discrimination. Therefore employees with disabilities may end up with a greater chance of 
being accommodated. See Whittle supra note 238 at 311.
272 See Article 2(3) Council Directive 2000/78/EC which states “Harassment shall be deemed to be a
form of discrimination within the meaning o f paragraph 1, when unwanted conduct..... takes place with
the purpose or effect o f violating the dignity o f a person and o f creating an intimidating, hostile, 
degrading, humiliating or offensive environment. In this context, the concept o f harassment may be 
defined in accordance with the national laws and practice o f the Member States.”
273 Quinn, Gerard and Quinlivan, Shivaun, “Disability Discrimination: the Need to Amend the 
Employment Equality Act 1998 in light o f  the EU Framework Directive on Employment” supra note 
241 at 236.
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a result o f the considerable discretion allowed to Member States in defining it. This 
discretion is conveyed through the definition of harassment in Article 2(3) with its 
explicit reference to national codes and practices and the vague formulation of its 
terms274. The prohibition o f an instruction to discriminate is located in Article 2(4) 
and in the context o f  disability, it seeks to prevent an employer from discriminating 
on the ground of disability through an intermediary e.g. an employment agency. In 
this way it is hoping to prevent employers using employment agencies as a means o f 
limiting the number o f  people with disabilities who could be eligible for consideration 
as potential employees275.
3.14 The Burden o f  P roof
If  a case of discrimination goes before the courts, the Directive allows for a sharing o f 
the burden o f proof. This means that once a prima facie  case o f discrimination has 
been established by the complainant, it shall be for the respondent to prove that there 
has been no breach o f the principle o f equal treatment276. This applies to both direct 
and indirect discrimination. The rationale for the lower level o f proof required from 
the alleged victim in discrimination cases is based on the fact that instances o f 
discrimination are inherently difficult to prove277 2789. Despite this acknowledgement, the 
Framework Directive and anti-discrimination laws in general function by firstly 
requiring the alleged victim to prove a prim a facie  case o f discrimination. Therefore 
m order to begin operating, they are reliant on finding an objectionable practice . 
This could be a hindrance to the effective implementation o f the Directive as it will be 
dependent on the will (financially and emotionally) and the ability of an individual to 
take a case.
If  the plaintiff is successful in finding such an objectionable practice and subsequently 
proving a prima facie  case o f discrimination, a remedy must be provided. The 
Framework Directive allows Member States discretion in ensuring that violations o f 
the principle of equal treatment are satisfactorily remedied. However, it insists that 
sanctions must be “effective, proportionate and dissuasive” . These terms are not
274 Apostolopoulou, Zoe supra note 124 at 34.
275 Whittle supra note 23 8 at 316
276 See Article 10 Council Directive 2000/78/EC.
277 European Commission. Equality and Non-Discrimination Annual Report 2005 at 9.
278 Baker, Lynch, Cantillon, Walsh, supra note 4 at 129.
279 Article 17 of Council Directive 2000/78/EC provides that “Member States shall lay down the rules 
on sanctions applicable to infringements of the national provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive
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defined in the Directive but according to the Commission, the remedy in the majority 
o f cases will involve individual monetary compensation . The extent o f such 
monetary compensation is also unclear but guidance from the European Court of 
Justice in gender discrimination cases would suggest that purely nominal sums would 
not satisfy the Directive’s requirements of ‘effective and dissuasive* sanctions280 81. 
Individual monetary compensation may result in justice for the individual victim of 
discrimination but this type of sanction will not transform existing structures to 
prevent such patterns of discrimination and inequality arising again. Other possible 
sanctions which involve the prevention o f future instances o f discrimination would 
certainly be more “effective and dissuasive”, for example, the imposition o f an 
obligation on the discriminator to prevent or reduce such discrimination occurring 
again or the adoption of anti-discriminatory codes of practice. Italy provides a good 
example o f the effective use o f sanctions, where enterprises found guilty of 
discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin, religion or nationality can 
have tenders, supply contracts or financial assistance from public bodies 
withdrawn282.
3.2 Exem ptions to the non-discrimination principle in the context o f disability 
There are a number of derogations to the principle o f  equal treatment in the Directive. 
I intend to examine what exceptions are relevant in the context of disability and what 
implications these have for claims o f  discrimination on the ground of disability, ft is 
worth noting that in the context o f  gender discrimination, exceptions to the equal 
treatment principle have been interpreted quite strictly by the ECJ.
and shall take all measures necessary to ensure that they are applied. The sanctions, which may 
comprise the payment o f compensation to the victim, must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.” 
It is still too early to assess whether or not the various sanctions available in the various Member States 
meet this requirement. See European Commission Equality and Non-Discrimination Annual Report 
2005 at 21.
280 Ibid.
281 For example see Case C-27I/91 Marshall v. Southampton and South West Hampshire Area Health 
Authority (Teaching) (No. 2) [1993] ECR 1-4367 where the UK upper limit on compensation was held 
not to constitute a proper remedy. Hence, it would appear that Member States may not put an upper 
limit on the amount o f compensation paid to victims o f discrimination. See European Commission 
Equality and Discrimination Annual Report 2005 at 9.
282 See European Commission Equality and Discrimination Annual Report 2005 at 21.
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3.21 Article 2(5) Exceptions necessary in a democratic society 
The first exception, located in Article 2(5) is commonly referred to as exceptions 
necessary in a democratic society283. It states that “this directive shall be without 
prejudice to measures laid down by national law which in a democratic society, are 
necessary fo r  public security, fo r  the maintenance o f public order and the prevention 
o f  criminal offences, fo r  the protection o f  health and fo r  the protection o f the rights 
and freedom s o f o thers''. Whittle284 has highlighted two important concerns for 
people with disabilities based on this provision. Firstly, in relation to the “protection 
o f  health”, there is a  possibility that employers may use this to the disadvantage o f 
people with disabilities by claiming that an individual could pose a health and safety 
risk to themselves or work colleagues. Secondly, the reference to the “protection o f 
the rights and freedoms o f others” is also open to exploitation by employers especially 
in relation to the obligation to provide reasonable accommodation enshrined in Article 
5. This has been recently illustrated in an Irish case which successfully invoked the 
right to property as a means o f refuting equality legislation. In Re: Article 26 and the 
Employment Equality B ill (1998)285 the Supreme Court o f Ireland decided that the 
obligation placed on employers in the draft employment equality Bill to provide 
“reasonable accommodation” to employees with disabilities violated the employer’s 
right to private property and was therefore void286. This case highlights the potential 
risks associated with such a provision which protects the “rights and freedoms o f 
others”. Unfortunately, the interests o*f public security, public order and public health 
have often been used as tools to justify the exclusion o f people with disabilities and 
other sensitive groups from the labour market287. Therefore this provision must be 
construed strictly in order to prevent similar occurrences in other Member States.
283 It is worth noting that this provision is unique in EU law and is closely modelled on Article 8(2) of 
the European Convention on Human Rights. See Mark Bell, “Sexual Orientation in Employment: An 
Evolving Role for the European Union” in R. Wintemute and M. Andenaes (Eds.) “Legal Recognition 
o f Same-Sex Partnerships”, Oxford: Hart 2001,674
284 Whittle supra note 238 at 318.
285 (1997J 2 I.R. 321
286 The final provision that appeared in the Employment Equality Act o f 1998 contained the obligation 
to provide reasonable accommodation but subjected it to a very low financial cap of a ‘nominal cost’. 
This unfortunately reduced considerably the effectiveness o f the reasonable accommodation provision 
in Irish law. This has now been changed to a limit of ‘disproportionate burden’ in order to implement 
the provisions of Article 5 of the Framework Directive. See further Section IV: Article 5 of the 
Framework Directive: The Concept of Reasonable Accommodation.
287 Apostolopoulou, Zoe, supra note 124 at 27.
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3.22 Article 3(4) The Armed Forces
Secondly, Article 3(4) provides that Member States may, at their discretion, not apply 
the non-discrimination principle outlined in the Directive to the armed forces on the 
ground of disability. The rationale for this exception is explained by Recitals 18 and 
19. Recital 18 states that the armed forces are not under a  requirement to employ 
persons who do not have the ‘required capacity ’ to carry out the range of functions 
that will be necessary. It is presumed that the term ‘required capacity’ relates to the 
essential functions o f the job  and therefore would surely include the possibility of 
reasonable accommodation. Taking into account the possibility o f  reasonable 
accommodation, it is submitted that a  blanket ban on people with disabilities joining 
the armed forces is unnecessary. There are many varied aspects of work in the armed 
forces, in fields such as administration, legal and management, which do not involve 
physical activity; therefore with reasonable accommodation it should be feasible to 
employ certain qualified persons with a disability, depending o f course on the nature 
of the impairment, the essential functions of the job etc. It is unfortunate that this 
exemption is so exclusionary in nature that it completely rejects the possibility o f an 
assessment o f the specificities o f each case. The Directive justifies this ban by 
acknowledging the need o f  Member States to safeguard the combat effectiveness of 
their armed forces288. This type o f  provision clearly does not actively discourage the 
segregation and exclusion o f  people with disabilities from the labour market.
3.23 Article 4 Occupational Requirements
The third exception can be found in Article 4 o f the Directive which allows an 
exception for occupational requirements o f the job289. It allows difference in treatment 
based on the fact that a person has a disability “where by reason o f the nature o f  the 
particular occupational activities concerned or o f  the context in which they are 
carried out, such a characteristic constitutes a genuine and determining occupational 
requirement; provided that the objective is legitimate and the requirement is 
p r o p o r tio n a te This provision could be used by employers as a basis for not 
employing a person with a disability by claiming that not having a disability is an
288 See Recital 19 o f Council Directive 2000/78/EC
289 The text is based upon the general exception which was first introduced by Article 2(2) o f Council 
Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle o f equal treatment for men and women as 
regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion and working conditions.
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occupational requirement o f the job290. Here we can use again the example o f a blind 
person not being hired for a job as a bus driver. Obviously the ability to see is an 
essential function o f the job and therefore an occupational requirement, hence it is not 
discriminatory to refuse to employ a blind person to perform this type o f work. The 
occupational requirement must however always be proven to be legitimate and
*501
proportionate . The identification of the ‘essential functions’ o f  the job will play an 
important role in determining what amounts to an occupational requirement. It is 
important that this provision will be interpreted strictly in order to avoid 
segregationist tendencies o f employers292 as it could be all too easy to claim that not 
having a disability is an occupational requirement in order to avoid employing a 
person with a disability or to circumvent the obligation to provide reasonable 
accommodation. The ECJ will therefore have the task o f  clearly defining the jobs for 
which disability and the other ‘ grounds under the Directive are essential and 
determinant conditions.
3.24 Article 7 Positive Action
Finally, there is the exception contained in Article 7 which refers to the controversial 
issue of positive action. This provision recognises that the principle o f equal treatment 
alone may not be enough to achieve real equality in practice, therefore it provides in 
Article 7(1) that Member States are not prevented from "maintaining or adopting 
specific measures to prevent or compensate fo r  disadvantages linked to inter alia 
disability It is obvious from the wording o f the provision that there is an inherent 
recognition that inequality can be a direct result of historical disadvantage associated 
with a particular group. The inclusion of an explicit article on positive action in the 
Directive has been controversial in the sense that it is difficult to reconcile with the
290 It has been claimed that this provision can also be applied vice versa in the context of disability. It 
could allow an employer to discriminate in favour of people with disabilities where he can show that 
having a disability constitutes a genuine and determining occupational requirement, for example a job 
in a disability NGO. See Whittle supra note 238 at 319
291 Scrutinising the legitimacy o f the employer’s requirements could give rise to difficulties at the 
interpretation stage. Should legitimacy be assessed in relation to the importance o f the requirement or 
its nature? These questions will essentially be left to the judge to decide. The concept o f what may be 
determinant and essential requirements is relative and therefore subject to changes in ideas and society. 
For further discussion see Marie-Ange Moreau, “Justifications o f Discrimination” at 159. Report 
submitted to the regional congress held in Stockholm 4-6 September 2002 under the auspices o f the 
International Society for Labour Law and Social Security. Available in English at: 
http://www.juridicum.su.se/stockholmcongress2002/
292 EU Network of Independent Experts on Disability Discrimination, Baseline study, supra note 253 at
20.
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non-discrimination principle. It goes beyond traditional negative anti-discrimination 
provisions to actively promote equality by supporting measures which discriminate in 
favour o f a  particular group that has consistently suffered discrimination and 
disadvantage. As it does not ignore differences between individuals or treat everyone 
neutrally, it could be regarded as the antithesis to formal equality. Despite the 
dramatic potential of the concept o f positive action, the wording o f Article 7(1) is 
formulated in negative terms. Positive action is presented as an exception from the 
principle of equal treatment. It is a measure which is allowed but not required by the 
Directive, thus depriving it o f hard-hitting effect An equivalent provision exists in 
relation to gender discrimination and has been interpreted quite strictly by the courts. 
The jurisprudence o f the ECJ indicates that positive action measures will be allowed 
prior to the point of employment selection but the use o f positive schemes that 
produce an equal result through the use o f mechanisms at the selection stage will not 
be endorsed293. Therefore if  we are to infer guidance from these decisions and 
presume that positive action measures in favour o f  people with disabilities will be 
interpreted in a similar way, Article 7(1) may not be so effective in the disability 
context. Many people with disabilities rely on sustainable measures to ensure their 
equal status in the workplace, therefore if  positive action stops prior to the point of 
selection, it may not be of much use in terms o f a long-term equality strategy for 
people with disabilities.
Article 7(2) goes on to deal specifically with positive action in the context of 
disability. It stipulates that “With regard to disabled persons, the principle o f  equal 
treatment shall be without prejudice to the right o f Member States to maintain or 
adopt provisions on the protection of health and safety at work or to measures aimed 
at creating or maintaining provisions or facilities for safeguarding or promoting their 
integration into the working environment”. This provision is an effort to reconcile the 
previous welfare approach to disability with the new non-discrimination approach in 
the Framework Directive. The second part o f the provision is clearly referring to the 
use o f  employment quotas and similar schemes which have been used consistently by 
many Member States as a means o f integrating people with disabilities into the
293Whittle supra note 238 at 319. See Case C-450/93, Kalanke v Freie und Hansestadt Bremen [1995] 
ECR 1-3069 and Case C-409/97, Marshall v Land Nordrhein Westfalen [1997] ECR 1-6363 where it 
was held that positive action measures aimed at results are inadmissible. For discussion see Fredman, S 
“After Kalanke and Marshall: Affirming Affirmative Action” (1998) 1 CYELS, 200.
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workforce294-. The rationale for the inclusion o f the exception related to the protection 
o f  health and safety at work, however, has given rise to confusion. Officially the 
Commission maintains that the intention o f  this provision was positive and health and 
safety measures were seen as an added way o f  creating space in the workplace for 
people with disabilities295 *. It should be noted however that this type o f provision is 
open to abuse. Critics have claimed that it could be relied upon by employers to 
exclude people with disabilities from the workforce by pleading health and safety 
concerns . In any case it follows that this provision should be carefully scrutinised in 
the  case of a negative interpretation.
Despite the lack of legally binding force in Article 7, the Directive clearly 
acknowledges that positive action measures for people with disabilities are crucial. By 
singling out the ground o f disability, there is evidence o f  a clear recognition o f the 
gross disadvantages people with disabilities face in the labour market. In addition, 
m any people with disabilities are often unable to take advantage of the non­
discrimination norm and are therefore dependent on positive rights. Therefore, if 
positive action is effectively utilised by Member States and broadly interpreted by the 
Courts, it has the potential to be an essential tool to combat the under representation 
o f  people with disabilities in the labour market297.
3 .3  Limitations and Ambiguities o f  the Directive in the context o f  Disability
3.31 ‘Definitional Ambiguity
The Directive expressly prohibits discrimination ‘on the grounds o f  disability’298 yet 
there is no specific definition o f what amounts to a ‘disability’. This means that 
Member States have a wide margin o f appreciation in this regard. It would appear that 
the intention o f the legislators was to keep the focus on the phenomenon of 
discrimination as opposed to the concept o f disability299. Reasons for this may include
294 Whittle supra note 238 at 320
295 EU Network of Independent Experts on Disability Discrimination, Baseline study, supra note 253 at 
19.
2961 See Waddington and Bell supra note 226,603-604
297 An example o f a Member State which has introduced new positive action measures for people with 
disabilities is the UK. The UK Disability Discrimination Act 2005, due to come into effect in 
December 2006, will introduce a duty on all public authorities to give due regard to the need to 
promote disability equality. For discussion see Colm O’ Cinneide *A New Generation of Equality 
Legislation? Positive Duties and Disability Rights’ supra note 153,219.
294 See Articles 1 and 2 o f Council Directive 2000/78/EC
299 See EU Network of Independent Experts on Disability Discrimination. Baseline Study, supra note 
253 at 11.
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the expansive and complex nature o f disability. The term ‘disability’ covers a huge 
range o f  impairments ranging from the physical and intellectual to emotional 
capacities. These specific impairments then differ further in relation to the nature, 
duration and type. Therefore the task of creating a definition of disability to 
encompass all categories and degrees o f disability and then attempting to reach 
agreement among the Member States would have been a very onerous one indeed . 
Another reason for the absence of a definition may be that it was considered that a 
definition of disability could limit the benefits o f anti-discrimination law by 
restricting it to certain kinds o f  disability or to disabilities reaching a certain degree30 01. 
In any case, the lack of a definition leaves open very wide interpretative possibilities 
as to who is actually covered by the Directive. As noted above, discrimination is 
prohibited on the ‘grounds o f  disability’ not against ‘persons with disabilities’. This 
means that it may be possible that people who do not have a disability can claim that 
they were discriminated against on the ‘grounds o f disability’. This could be the case 
where a person is treated in a discriminatory manner because o f an assumption that 
they have a disability (e.g. persons with a facial disfigurement), or as a result o f a 
susceptibility to a  disability (employers could access this information through medical 
or genetic testing and discriminate on this basis), or through association with those 
who have a disability (e.g. parents and carers)302. It is not yet clear whether all these 
categories are covered by the Directive but due to the lack o f a definition there is no 
reason why it cannot be argued. It has been recommended that it would be in keeping * 
with the spirit o f  the Directive to interpret ‘discrimination on the grounds of 
disability’ as also covering these categories303 *.
The absence o f a definition o f the ground protected from discrimination is a 
characteristic common to all Community equality directives^04. There is also no 
definition provided for the other grounds cited in the Directive; age, religion or belief
300 Waddington rationalises that a definition o f  disability was excluded for this very reason. She claims 
that it may have been necessary to exclude a definition as otherwise it would have been impossible to 
secure agreement among Member States to include the ground of disability in the Directive, See 
Waddington L, “Implementing the Disability Provisions o f the Framework Employment Directive: 
Room for Exercising National Discretion” in Anna Lawson and Caroline Gooding (Eds.) ‘Disability 
Rights in Europe; From Theory to Practice’ Hart Publishing 2005, 118.
301 See EU Network o f Independent Experts on Disability Discrimination. Baseline Study, supra note 
253 at 11.
302 Ibid at 12.
303 Ibid at 85.
jW Waddington, L supra note 300, 117.
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and sexual orientation. Similarly the 1976 Equal Treatment Directive305 306prohibits 
discrimination on the “grounds o f sex” without defining what is meant by ‘sex’. 
D espite the fact that the concept o f sex may seem relatively straightforward compared 
to the concept o f disability, it has nevertheless been the subject of case law before the 
ECJ. For example, in P  v S and Cornwall County C o u n c i l  the Court was called 
upon to consider the definition o f ‘sex’ in determining whether discrimination on the 
grounds o f having undergone transgender surgery amounted to discrimination on the 
grounds o f sex. Therefore it can reasonably be predicted that the Court will also be 
required to develop in a piecemeal fashion a definition of disability and the other 
undefined grounds in the Framework Directive307 3089. In particular disability appears to 
be ripe for conflicting interpretations. Each Member State currently has differing 
definitions of disability ranging from no definition to a strictly medical definition 
to  a  definition which incorporates the social model o f disability310. The Directive 
allow s this freedom o f interpretation to continue and does not set any common criteria 
o r standards. This discretion cannot remain unlimited since the emergence of different 
definitions throughout Europe could undermine the aims and purpose of the Directive 
and hinder its effective implementation. How disability is defined also has significant 
implications for the way rights are enforced. If some people with disabilities are 
unable to enforce their rights as set out in the Directive because they do not fit under 
the national legislative definition o f disability, then this will defeat the purpose o f the
305 See Article 2( 1) of Council Directive 76/2G7/EEC on the implementation o f the principle of equal 
treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion and 
working conditions.
306 Case C-13/94 [1996] EC R 1-2143
j07 Waddington L supra note 300, 117
308 For the purposes of non-discrimination law some Member States have opted not to define disability, 
for example Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, Greece and Italy. There are good reasons for 
adopting this policy as it circumvents many technical problems related to who fits under the definition 
o f  disability. In this way a choice of no definition may avoid exclusion and instead attempt to protect 
everyone against disability based discrimination.
309 See Section 1 of the UK Disability Discrimination Act 1995 and in Germany, § 2 SGB IX. Both 
definitions perpetuate the individual and medical model of disability and are veiy narrowly construed. 
The UK definition in particular has proven to be a barrier to litigation. See EU Network of Independent 
Experts on Disability Discrimination. “Definition o f Disability” by Theresia Degener at 9.
310 See Section 2 o f the Irish Employment Equality Act 1998. Disability is broadly defined within a 
medical context and has been successful in practice. It has not yet resulted in a person being denied the 
chance to litigate a case for a failure to prove their disability. In the case o f A Complainant v. Cafe 
Kylemore DEC-S2002-024 where the definition o f  disability was challenged, it was agreed that an 
alcoholic was disabled for the purposes o f the legislation. This displays a tendency towards a wide 
interpretation of disability in Irish law. It has been held that the Irish definition comes closest to truly 
endorsing the social model of disability. This is due to the fact that it makes no assumptions about the 
effects of a given impairment, thus it does not portray people with disabilities as helpless or needy. See 
EU Network o f Independent Experts on Disability Discrimination, “Definition of Discrimination” 
supra note 309 at 10.
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Directive. For example in the UK, one o f the most common reasons for disability 
discrimination claims to be lost is that the complainant has not proved they are a 
person with a disability for the purposes of the legislation311. The UK is the sole 
example o f a restrictive definition o f  disability in Europe312 3145, however in the U.S, the 
ADA has also been severely limited by restrictive judicial interpretations o f the 
concept o f disability . Based on these experiences there is a  legitimate argument for 
the creation o f a European wide definition o f disability, grounded on a social 
perception o f  disability, to serve as a  model for Member States when implementing
<31 j
disability discrimination legislation .
3.32 (Not so) Minor Limitations
One o f the most immediate limitations o f the Directive is its formulation as a 
“framework” Directive. A framework Directive by its nature lays down minimum 
requirements and in theory paves the way for Member States to expand and develop 
on these core requirements to adopt more favourable provisions' . This is confirmed 
by Article 8(1)316 which clearly encourages Member States to take the initiative and to 
actively pursue a policy o f equal treatment beyond that which is outlined by the 
Directive. In order to prevent Member States from negatively interpreting the minimal 
requirements approach there is a non-regression clause contained in Article 8(2) 
which forbids reliance on the directive for a reduction in the level o f  protection 
against discrimination already afforded by Member States in the field o f disability and
311 Gooding, Caroline, “British Anti-Discrimination Law and Disability; Overview and Legal History”. 
Paper delivered at the Disability Discrimination Summer School 2005, National University o f Ireland, 
Galway, 5. This definition will be broadened slightly with the introduction of the UK Disability 
Discrimination Act 2005.
312 The motivation for the use o f a restrictive definition was the potential cost involved for employers 
complying with the Disability Discrimination Act 1995; therefore it was decided to curb this cost by 
limiting the size o f the protected group. See Brunei University, “Definitions o f Disability in Europe: A 
Comparative Analysis” supra note 143 at 74.
313 See Bickenbach, Jerome, “Disability and Equality” (2003) 2:1 Journal o f Law and Equality, 7-15 
See also the following cases: Sutton v United Airlines 527 US 471 (1999) and Murphy v United Parcel 
Service 527 US 516 (1999).
314 See further EU Network of Independent Experts on Disability Discrimination. “Definition of
Disability” by Theresia Degener. Available at:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/emplovment social/fundamental rights/public/pubsg en.htm#Disabilitv
315 This has happened in Belgium and the Netherlands. See the Belgian Act to Combat Discrimination 
and to Amend the Act o f 15 February 1993 to Establish a Centre for Equal Opportunity and to Combat 
Racism and the Dutch Act of 3 April 2003 to Establish the Act on the Equal Treatment on Grounds of 
Disability or Chronic Illness.
316 Article 8(1) o f Council Directive 2000/78/EC states “Member States may introduce or maintain 
provisions which are more favourable to the protection o f the principle o f equal treatment than those 
laid down in this Directive”.
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the other grounds covered by the Directive317 3189. Therefore in relation to the ground of 
disability, it can be argued that the intention of the legislator was to establish a 
minim um  level o f protection against employment-related disability discrimination 
w ith the anticipation that many Member States would utilise this opportunity to go 
beyond this level and provide higher degrees of protection against discrimination
I A
generally . This was certainly a very optimistic stance taken by the legislators. 
Currently many Member States are being investigated by the Commission for having 
failed to transpose the Directive correctly or failing to meet implementation 
deadlines . There is a danger that some Member States, due to a lack o f previous 
disability discrimination legislation, will only implement the bare provisions required 
by the Directive. The Commission has expressed disappointment that Member States 
did not make a greater effort to transpose the Directive on time and did not live up to 
obligations made in 2000320 321.
Another practical limitation of the Directive in relation to disability is that it is a 
multi-ground statute. Disability is protected from discrimination along with age, 
religion or belief and sexual orientation. The rationale for the insertion o f these 
grounds of discrimination in a multi-ground statute as opposed to a single ground 
statute has been attributed to social and political factors. Differing levels of political 
pressure to combat discrimination against respective grounds was a major factor in 
determining the type and level of protection eventually prescribed. Among the groups 
lobbying for Article 13 and the subsequent Directives , certain campaigns were 
m ore organised and sustained than others. In particular the race campaign was the 
strongest322 and this resulted in a specific single ground statute prohibiting race
317 Article 8(2) o f Council Directive 2000/78/EC. See also Recital 28 which states “This Directive lays 
down minimum requirements, thus giving the Member States the option of introducing or maintaining 
more favourable provisions. The implementation of this Directive should not serve to justify any 
regression in relation to the situation which already prevails in each Member State.”
318 Waddington, L supra note 300 at 133.
319 In December 2004, the Commission referred 5 Member States (Austria, Finland, Germany, Greece 
and Luxembourg) to the European Court of Justice for not communicating transposition o f the 
Framework Directive.
■>20 Fiona Kinsman, DG Employment & Social Affairs, “General Overview, Scope of the Directives and 
Current State o f Transposition” at 8. Paper presented at the conference ‘Fight against Discrimination: 
The Race and Framework Employment Directives’ Academy of European Law, Trier 5-6 March 2004. 
Available at www.era.int
321 The prime agents lobbying for Article 13 were a variety of NGOs and the European Parliament See 
Section I: 1.33.
322 The Parliament had consistently called for Community legislation against racial discrimination since 
1991 and there was a specific NGO campaign for such a Directive since 1992. See further Lisa
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discrimination in employment, social protection and advantages, education and access 
to and supply o f  goods and services . Therefore in terms o f  equality directives, the 
Framework Directive was preceded by a  race specific directive and a series o f long­
standing gender specific equality directives32 24 3256. One cannot deny that a single statute 
directive on disability discrimination would have been more effective for a number of 
reasons. Firstly it may allow for the development o f  specific measures which are of 
particular relevance to disability. Considering the particular nature of disability and 
the difficulties involved in interpretation this would be extremely useful. Another 
advantage of a single statute directive would be the extension o f the current scope of 
the Framework Directive to protect discrimination on the ground o f disability in areas 
o f life outside o f  the employment sphere . In addition, a multi-ground statute 
inevitably results in an equality hierarchy with some grounds o f discrimination 
receiving more attention than others. With regard to the Framework Directive, 
commentators have noted that disability and age tend to be at the bottom o f  the 
equality hierarchy .
3.4 Concluding Remarks
As a result o f the ‘framework’ nature o f  the Directive, the responsibility for 
implementing an anti-discrimination policy that will achieve the goals o f  the 
Directive, reduce instances o f discrimination against people with disabilities and 
improve their employment opportunities will rest principally with the Member States. 
They have a wide discretion to implement the goals o f the Directive and it is hoped 
that this freedom will not be abused. The goals o f the Directive are admirable and it 
arguably opens up new opportunity structures for people w ith disabilities in Europe. 
However, legislation alone is not enough and it needs to be complemented with
Waddington and Mark Bell, ‘Reflecting on Inequalities in European Equality Law’ 28 E.L.R (2003) 
349 at 367.
323 Council Directive 2000/43/EC implementing the principle of Equal Treatment between persons 
irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, O.J. 200, L 180/22.
324 See Section I: The Emergence o f Disability Rights in the EU, note 53.
325 It should be noted that there is nothing cited in the Directive which prevents Member States from 
extending the scope o f the Directive to cover fields outside o f employment.
326 See generally Waddington and Bell “More Equal than Others: Distinguishing the European Union 
Equality Directives” (2001) C.M.L. Rev. 587 and Bell and Waddington, “Reflecting on Inequalities in 
European Equality Law”, (2003) 28 European Law Review 349-369 for a detailed discussion o f the 
existing equality hierarchy in European Equality law after the adoption o f  the 2000 Equality Directives.
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supportive policies from national authorities and civil society*: . The potcr.tial of the 
Directive will also depend to a great degree on the self-activity and mobilisation of 
European citizens with disabilities themselves. Of importance here will be the amour.: 
o f  information and awareness-raising campaigns, practical and financial support from 
self-organised groups, as well as the initiatives of individuals who sec themselves as 
discriminated against, for example through individual law suits or collective 
actions327 28 *. .
The next section will deal with the most promising element of the Directive with 
regard to disability discrimination: the obligation to provide reasonable 
accommodation in Article 5. The Commission in its proposal for the Framework 
Directive noted that a core element of the elimination of disability discrimination is 
‘the reasonable accommodation o f the needs and abilities of disabled people.’1:9
327 A European Community Action Programme (2001-2006) was also adopted in November 2000 in 
support the effective implementation of the 2000 Equal Treatment Directives. The Action lYogramnc 
has three main objectives. These are 1) To improve the understanding of issues related tn 
discrimination 2) To develop the capacity to tackle discrimination effectively 3) To promote the \abei 
underlying the fight against discrimination. The six year programme aims to target all stakeholders who
can help shape in the development of appropriate anti-discrimination legislation and policies acrow 
Europe. It is an indication of the Commission’s acknowledgement that legislation alone is not crotch 
to combat discrimination and that other measures such as awareness raising and education arc csvctttu! 
See http://europa.eu.int/comm/emplovment social/fundamemal rtghts index cn htm 
j28 Hvinden B (2003) “The Uncertain Convergence of Disability Policies in Western Furopc". 
note 1 at 619.
j29 See Proposal for a Council Directive establishing a general framework for equal treatment m 
employment and occupation, COM (1999) 565 at 4.
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IV. ARTICLE 5 OF THE FRAMEWORK DIRECTIVE: THE CONCEPT OF 
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION
“ft is the failure to make reasonable accommodation, to fin e  tune society so that its 
structures and assumptions do not result in the relegation and banishment o f  disabled 
persons from  participation, which results in discrimination against them. 1,3 30
Reasonable accommodation is a concept that was previously unrecognised by 
European anti-discrimination law. It has been introduced for the first time by Article 5 
of the Framework Employment Directive which regards the obligation as necessary 
“in order to guarantee compliance with the principle o f  equal treatment”* 331. It is 
considered to be the most innovative part o f the Directive with regard to the ground of 
disability332. Internationally it is now recognised as a fundamental instrument to 
combat discrimination on the ground o f disability. It is recognised for example by the 
UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. According to their 
interpretation o f  the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
the term “disability based discrimination” includes “any distinction, exclusion, or 
denial o f  reasonable accommodation based on disability...”333 Also the European 
Social Charter334 recognises that law prohibiting discrimination on the ground of 
disability in employment should require an obligation o f ‘reasonable 
accommodation’335.
The purpose o f  the obligation to provide reasonable accommodation is to allow 
otherwise unqualified people to take full part in employment opportunities by
3j0 La Forest J in Eldridge v British Colombia (Attorney General) [1997] 3 SCR 624 at 681.
331 Article 5 Council Directive 2000/78/EC.
332 See EU Network o f Independent Experts on Disability Discrimination. Baseline Study-Disability 
Discrimination Law in the EU Member States. November, 2004,86; Whittle, Richard “The Framework 
Directive for Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation: an Analysis from a Disability Rights 
Perspective” (2002) 27 European Law Review 303,312; Wells, Katie “The Impact o f the Framework 
Employment Directive on UK Disability Discrimination Law” 32 Industrial Law Journal 2003,253.
333 General Comment No. 5 (1994), Persons with disabilities, UN Doc. E/C. 12/1994/13.
334 Turin, 18.X. 1961, Article 15 o f the Charter deals with the right o f  persons with disabilities to 
vocational training, rehabilitation and resettlement, whatever the origin and nature o f their disability. 
The Revised Social Charter, Strasbourg, 3.V.1996 and Article 15 proclaim the right of persons with 
disabilities to independence, social integration and participation in the life of the community. The 
Charter is a legally binding Treaty covering economic, social and cultural rights adopted under the 
aegis o f the Council o f Europe, which many EU Member States have ratified.
3j5 See European Committee o f Social Rights Conclusions XVI-2, Voi. 1 & 2 (covering Article 15 of 
the Charter)
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modifying the work environment to a  reasonable extent336 37. The essence of the 
requirement is that employers must make modifications and adjustments to the 
workplace and to policies, practices, and rules by which work is done or workers are 
regulated to enable a  particular qualified individual with a disability to perform a 
particular job . Thus far the concept has usually been utilised in anti-discrimination 
law as a means o f  increasing the participation of people with disabilities in 
employment and is widely regarded by experts in the field as the key to achieving this 
aim338. As has been demonstrated in previous sections o f this thesis, the prohibition of 
discrimination against people with disabilities has proven to be of a slightly more 
complex nature compared to other non-discrimination laws, on the grounds of race or 
sex for example. While these laws all have a similar aim in common in the promotion 
o f  equal treatment, the process o f  achieving this aim differs on the ground of 
disability. The reality is that there are many more barriers to employment for people 
w ith disabilities, ranging from the physical and attitudinal to the systemic. 
Misinformed social representations o f people with disabilities and negative 
perceptions about their employment potential can be just as great a barrier to 
employment as the lack of physical access to the workplace. In addition, systemic 
barriers such as those that prevent people with disabilities from acquiring a proper 
education and attaining critical skills are major obstacles to participation in the 
workforce. The combination of these barriers often renders it close to impossible for a 
person with a disability to enter into the labour market. The rationale behind 
reasonable accommodation is the removal of these barriers in order to create a 
situation where people with disabilities will have equal access (in the sense that they 
will be on an equal footing with people who do not face such barriers) to employment 
opportunities.
Accommodations may involve physical modifications to the workplace such as a 
ramp for a wheelchair bound employee; assistive technologies such as the provision 
o f instructions or documents in Braille for a blind person or a sign-language 
interpreter for a deaf person. Other more inexpensive accommodations could involve 
flexible working hours or the adaptation of duties. It should be underlined that
336 Burgdorf, Robert L., UU.S. Anti-discrimination Law and Disability- Focus on Title 1 of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act” supra note 35 at 37.
337 Ibid.
3j® See for example, Gerard Quinn and Shivaun Quinlivan, “Disability Discrimination: the need to 
amend the Employment Equality Act 1998 in light o f the EU Framework Directive on Employment” 
supra note 241 at 213.
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reasonable accommodation is not a new phenomenon in society339. It has long been 
provided for non-disabled people in the form o f escalators, seating, public toilets, 
artificial lighting and so on in various public spaces to accommodate their needs and 
generally make life more comfortable. In the workplace, employers have long catered 
to the needs o f  employees by providing office furnishings, equipment, accessories, 
services and other benefits all o f which are based upon assumptions o f the ‘standard’ 
worker340 341. Therefore, Burgdorf argues that reasonable accommodation for workers 
with disabilities is essentially the same as the kind o f  accommodation provided 
generally but is tailored to the individual needs o f the particular worker concerned . 
Consequently, the provision of accommodations for people with disabilities should 
not be regarded as a burden on employers, but rather as an essential device to achieve 
equality which does not require anything beyond that which has already been 
provided to other members o f society342.
The concept o f reasonable accommodation has long been criticised as being 
incompatible with formal anti-discrimination law in the sense that it promotes 
differential treatment rather than the traditional form o f  equal treatment. Many 
commentators have even claimed that it should be correctly regarded as a form of 
positive action343. Certainly the avoidance of unnecessary differential treatment is an
339 See Jolis, Christine, “Accommodation Mandates”, 53 Stanford Law Review 223 (2000). See also 
Lisa Waddington and Aart Hendriks, “The Expanding Concept o f Employment Discrimination in 
Europe: From Direct and Indirect Discrimination to Reasonable Accommodation Discrimination” The 
International Journal o f Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, Vol. 18, 2002, 403-427 at 
pp.416-420 where the authors maintain that the reasonable accommodation requirement is part of a 
long-standing wider body of labour law in Europe which requires employers to make adaptations to the 
workplace thus guaranteeing access to the labour market for certain groups. They discuss examples in 
the areas o f child labour, health and safety law, pregnancy and elderly workers.
340 Furthermore in the EU employers are obliged to accommodate workers who wish to take parental 
leave. See Directive 96/34/EC on the Framework Agreement on Parental Leave, [1996] O.J. L I45/9, as 
amended and extended to the United Kingdom by Directive 96/75/EC [1998] O.J. L I0/24. It has been 
claimed that this could be regarded as a type o f reasonable accommodation. See further Lisa 
Waddington and Aart Hendriks supra note 338,419-420.
341 See generally Robert J. Burgdorf Jr., “ ‘Substantially Limited’ Protection From Disability 
Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions o f the Definition o f  Disability”, 42 
Villanova Law Review 409, 529-32 (1997)
342 Employers are already under an obligation to accommodate people with disabilities under the Health 
and Safety Directive 89/391/EEC (Council Directive 89/391 of 12 June 1989 on the introduction of 
measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health o f workers at work, OJ LI 83 29.06.1989, 
p.l). In the original proposal for the Framework Directive, the Commission remarked that a reasonable 
accommodation provision would reinforce and supplement this obligation. See Proposal for a Council 
Directive establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation, COM 
(1999) 565 at 9. It is important to note however that the reasonable accommodation obligation is not 
the same as general accessibility and health and safety standards required by employers and they may 
not rely on these standards to escape the duty to reasonably accommodate.
343 This debate has been most polemic in the U.S. See for example Samuel R. Bagenstos, “‘Rational 
Discrimination’, Accommodation and the Politics of (disability) Civil Rights”, 89 Virginia Law
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important element o f non-discrimination but in many cases treating a person with a 
disability and a non-disabled person equally could result in the erection of 
insurmountable barriers for people with disabilities. Where a person’s disability does 
situate them differently regarding equal opportunities, identical treatment may be a 
source o f discrimination and different treatment may be required to eliminate it344. 
Reasonable accommodation has therefore been introduced to provide a solution to this 
“dilemma o f difference”345.
In the final part o f this thesis, I will firstly trace the origins o f the concept o f 
reasonable accommodation and explain how it came to be included in the Framework 
Directive. I will then analyse the terms o f Article 5, considering whether the provision 
is sufficient to achieve its desired effect: the increased participation of people with 
disabilities in the labour market. Thirdly, I will consider the position of reasonable 
accommodation in the existing EU anti-discrimination framework and what the 
implications are for the direction of EU anti-discrimination law in general. Finally I 
will consider what notion of equality is inherent in the concept of reasonable 
accommodation and whether it is an effective means o f  achieving equality in practice 
for people with disabilities.
4.1 The Emergence o f the Concept o f Reasonable Accommodation
Even though the concept o f reasonable accommodation is now commonly utilised as a 
tool to combat disability discrimination, it is interesting to note that it first emerged 
with regard to religious discrimination in many countries. In the United States, the 
phrase ‘reasonable accommodation’ first appeared in guidelines published by the US 
Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC) implementing Section 703(a)
Review 825 (2003); Sharon Rabin-Margalioth, “Anti-Discrimination, Accommodation and Universal 
Mandates-Aren’t they all the same?” 24 Berkeley Journal of Employment & Labor Law 111 (2003); 
Christine Jolls, “Anti-Discrimination and Accommodation”, 115 Harvard Law Review 642 (2001); 
Samuel IssacharofF & Justin Nelson, “Discrimination with a Difference: Can Employment 
Discrimination Law Accommodate the Americans with Disabilities Act?” 79 N.C.L. Rev. 307 (2001); 
Karlan & Rutherglen, “Disabilities, Discrimination and Reasonable Accommodation” 46 Duke Law 
Journal 1 (1996). See further section 4.31 for a more detailed discussion.
j44 Burgdorf Jr, Robert L, Paper delivered at the conference “Equality and Disability: Exploring the 
Challenge and Potential o f the Framework Directive 2000/78/EC” 29-30 April 2004 at Louvain-la- 
Neuve, Belgium. See also Thusing, Gregor “Following the U.S Example: European Employment 
Discrimination Law and the Impact of Council Directives 2000/43/EC and 2000/78/EC” The 
International Journal o f Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, Volume 19/2, 187-218, 
2003 at 196, who claims that people with disabilities “require not equal treatment but advancement in 
the sense o f an appropriate degree of assistance”.
j45 See Minow, M, “Making all the difference, Inclusion, Exclusion and American Law.” (1990) 
Cornell University Press, Ithaca.
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of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which sought to define an employer’s obligation not to 
discriminate on the grounds of religion346. It was later decided that the EEOC did not 
have the statutory authority to establish such a duty to reasonably accommodate347 
and this resulted in an amendment to the Civil Rights Act which defined religion to 
include religious practices ‘unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to 
reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious 
observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct o f the employer’s 
business’348. This definition has been interpreted strictly by the US Supreme Court 
and it has held that anything more than a ‘de minimis1 cost amounts to an undue 
hardship349. This has resulted in a  very slight legal obligation for employers to 
accommodate their employee’s religious needs. We shall see further on that 
reasonable accommodation has been given a much broader meaning in the context of 
disability discrimination legislation in the US.
In Canada the duty also developed out o f  case law dealing with discrimination on the 
grounds o f religion. The promulgation of the Canadian Charter o f  Rights and 
Freedoms resulted in the development o f a significant body of case law o f the 
Supreme Court o f Canada seeking to develop a policy on fighting discrimination 
while simultaneously integrating minority groups350. This in turn led to the 
development o f the obligation to provide reasonable accommodation351. The duty has 
now been extended to apply to other grounds o f discrimination in Canada352. The 
Canadian Human Rights Act 199 7353 covers discrimination on the grounds o f race, 
national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, 
family status, disability or conviction for an offence for which a pardon has been
34€ 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1995). According to these guidelines, an employer was required to ‘make 
reasonable accommodations to the religious needs o f employees and prospective employees where 
such accommodations can be made without undue hardship on the conduct o f the employer’s business’.
347 Dewey v. Reynolds Metals C o 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir, 1971)
344 Title VII § 7010), 42 U.S.C § 2000(e)j.
349 See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v Hardison 432 U.S. 63 (1977) at 84. The rationale behind this strict 
test is that it was considered that a legal regime which accommodates religious practices would be 
contrary to the prohibition in the American constitution against the establishment of religion. See 
Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 234, 7.
350 Moreau, Marie-Ange, “Justifications of Discrimination” supra note 291 at 166.
351 Ibid. See the following cases for examples of reasonable accommodation in circumstances of 
religious discrimination: Sehdevc v. Bayview Glen Junior School (1988) 9 CHRR D/4881 (Ontario) 
where an employer rescheduled courses for an orthodox Jewish mechanic to a time that did not conflict 
with his beliefs; Pandori v. Peel Board o f Education (1990) 12 CHRR D/ 364 (Ontario) where Sikhs 
were exempted from wearing uniform to enable them to wear the kirpan.
352 See British Columbia v. BCGSEU 9 Sept 1999 CSC no. 26274 for a quantitative assessment o f the 
role of reasonable accommodation.
See Section 2 of the Human Rights Act 1997.
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granted. There is an obligation to provide reasonable accommodation with regard to 
all these protected grounds354. Thus far the Canadian courts have applied the principle 
in cases involving religious355, age, sex356 and disability discrimination357 358.
Even though the right to be accommodated only applies to the ground o f disability 
under the European Framework Employment Directive, it is a  tool which can also be 
very relevant to other groups that suffer discrimination. It is worth noting that the 
reasonable accommodation principle had already arisen in relation to religious
i f  a
discrimination within the jurisprudence o f the Court o f Justice during the 1970s . 
Therefore it is not unreasonable to expect that the duty could be extended to other 
grounds o f discrimination protected under EU law359. If the duty to reasonably 
accommodate people with disabilities as provided for in the Framework Directive is 
proven to be successful, it will be interesting to see if  the possibility to extend the 
duty to other grounds will be considered.
4.11 From the Americans with Disabilities Act 1990 to the European Framework 
Directive 2000
The US was one o f the first legal systems to embrace the concept of reasonable 
accommodation in the context of disability. It emerged as an integral part of its 
pioneering disability discrimination legislation. This legislation consists o f the 
Rehabilitation Act o f 1973360 and the Americans with Disabilities Act 1990361. These 
two Acts exist side by side and have a wide ranging scope which between them 
covers federal government and those institutions and firms which have dealings with
354 The duty o f accommodation was included in Section 2 by a 1998 Amendment to the Human Rights 
Act. Bill S-5 (S.C. 1998, c.9).
355 See Ontario Human Rights Commission and O'Malley v. Simpsons-Sears Ltd., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536, 
where conditions o f employment requiring the appellant to work Friday and Saturday were in conflict 
with her religious creed. The appellant was then subsequently dismissed as she could not work 
Saturdays. The Court o f Appeal held that there was not sufficient evidence o f undue hardship on the 
business and reasonable accommodation had not been adequately considered. See also Alberta Human 
Rights Commission v. Central Alberty Dairy Pool, [1990] S.C.R. 489.
356 See Waplington v. Maloney Steel Ltd, [1983] 4 CHRR D/1262 (Alb.).
357 See Crismer v. The British Columbia Council o f Human Rights, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 868, where it was 
held that a failure to consider an individual assessment for a person with a visual impairment when 
refusing to issue a driving licence amounted to discrimination.
358 Case 130/75, Frais v. Council [1976] E.C.R. 1589; [1976] 2 C.L.M.R. 708. The complainant was 
unsuccessful but the principle running through the judgement clearly reflects the duty to accommodate. 
Cited by Richard Whittle supra note 238 at 313.
359 It is arguable that reasonable accommodation is already provided to pregnant workers under the 
Parental Leave Directive 96/34/EC. See supra note 340.
360 Pub.L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 357 (1973)
361 Pub.L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990)
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it, all employers with 15 or more employees, providers o f  public transport and the 
occupiers o f premises to which the public is given access such as shops, restaurants 
etc.
The term ‘reasonable accommodation’ was first used in the disability rights context in 
interpreting the Rehabilitation Act 1973. In 1977 the Office of Federal Contract 
Compliance Programs (OFCCP) o f the U.S Department o f Labor issued regulations to 
implement section 503 o f the Rehabilitation Act . These regulations required federal 
contractors* 363 to “make a reasonable accommodation to the physical and mental 
limitations o f an employee or applicant unless the contractor can demonstrate that 
such an accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the conduct o f the 
contractor’s business”364 365. In the years that followed, this led to a series o f regulations 
requiring reasonable accommodation in other fields such as education, health, welfare 
and housing . However it was not until the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 
1990 that the first explicit statutory reasonable accommodation requirement in the 
employment context was established. Title I o f the ADA describes the failure o f an 
employer to make a reasonable accommodation as amounting to discrimination. 
Accordingly it defines discrimination as including:
“(A) not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental 
limitations o f  an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or 
employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would 
impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business o f  such covered entity; or 
(B) denying employment opportunities to a job  applicant or employee who is an 
otherwise qualified individual with a disability, i f  such denial is based on the need of 
such covered entity to make reasonable accommodation to the physical or mental 
impairments o f the employee or applicant
The Act defines the term “reasonable accommodation” by listing examples. It states 
that reasonable accommodation may include “(A) making existing facilities used by
]“ 29U .S.C .§793.
363 Having contracts or subcontracts of $2,500 or more. The minimum contractual amount was 
increased to $10,000 in 1992. See E.U Network o f  Experts on Disability Discrimination: 
“Implementing and Interpreting the Reasonable Accommodation Provision o f the Framework 
Directive: Learning from Experience and Achieving Best Practice” by Lisa Waddington at 15. See: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/emplovmentsocial/fiindamental rights/public/Dubsg en.htm#Disabilitv
364 41 Fed. Reg. 16,148 (1976) (codified at 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(d) (1993)).
365 For more detail, see further E.U Network o f Experts on Disability Discrimination, Lisa Waddington 
supra note 363 at 15.
366 42 U.S.C. § 12112(bX5)(A)
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employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and (B) 
jo b  restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant 
position, acquisition or modification o f  equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment 
or modifications o f  examinations, training materials or policies, the provision o f 
qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals 
w ith disabilities367.” This definition was intended to be merely illustrative and is 
therefore not exhaustive. The definition is supplemented by regulations issued by the 
U .S Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) which set forth a more 
detailed, concise and proper definition o f the concept368. The EEOC’s Inteipretative 
Guidance to the ADA also goes further than mere definition to explain the rationale 
behind the concept o f  reasonable accommodation. It states that “'the reasonable 
accommodation requirement is best understood as a means by which barriers to the 
equal employment opportunity o f an individual with a disability are removed or 
alleviated”369. The additional elaboration and explanation o f  key definitions in the 
ADA by the EEOC has naturally aided significantly the development and 
interpretation of reasonable accommodation in the U.S.
It was to the ADA that many other Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions turned to for guidance 
in the development o f statutory concepts that would form their domestic disability 
discrimination legislation. This influence has resulted in the adoption of reasonable 
accommodation provisions world-wide370 and was also instrumental in the adoption of 
Article 5 o f the Framework Employment Directive at EU level.
36742U.S.C. § 12111(9)
368 According to the EEOC regulations the term “reasonable accommodation” means:
(i) Modifications or adjustments to a job application process that enable a qualified applicant with a 
disability to be considered for the position such qualified applicant desires; or
(ii) Modifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner or circumstances under 
which the position held or desired is customarily performed, that enable a qualified individual with a 
disability to perform the essential functions o f that position; or
(iii) Modifications or adjustments that enable a covered entity’s employee with a disability to enjoy 
equal benefits and privileges of employment as are enjoyed by its other similarly situated employees 
without disabilities. 29 C.F.R- § 1630.2(o)(l) (1993).
369 29 C.F.R. 414-15(app, to pt. 1630) (commentary on § 1630.9) (1993). Cited in E.U Network o f 
Experts on Disability Discrimination, Waddington, L supra note 363 at 18.
370 See for example Article 5(2) of the Australian Disability Discrimination Act 1992, Article 29 of the 
New Zealand Human Rights Act and Article 9 of the South African Promotion of Equality and 
Prevention o f Unfair Discrimination Act 2000.
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4.2 Article 5 o f  the Framework Employment Directive 2000/78/EC: Interpretation 
and Analysis
It is widely accepted that the Americans with Disabilities Act directly influenced the 
drafting o f Article 5 of the Framework Directive371. In particular, the term “reasonable 
accommodation” was determinant o f the terminology used in the Directive. As a 
result o f the success o f the ADA, there was a high level o f familiarity o f the concept 
among Commission staff and disability non-governmental organisations. In addition, 
some Member States already had the duty in their national legislation since the mid- 
90s, specifically, Ireland, the UK and Sweden372 37. The combination o f these factors 
was influential in the final decision to include the reasonable accommodation duty in 
the Directive. The rationale for inserting Article 5 is explained explicitly by the 
European Commission in the explanatory memorandum to the proposal for the 
Framework Directive in which it explains the newly transformed approach to 
disability discrimination : “the new approach focuses on both prevention and 
removal o f barriers that deny equality o f access to people with disabilities in the 
labour market. A core element o f  the new approach is the elimination o f such 
discrimination primarily through the reasonable accommodation o f the needs and 
abilities o f disabled people”374. Recital 16 of the Preamble375 376also throws some light 
on the nature o f  Article 5 and how it should be interpreted. It clarifies from the outset 
that the duty to accommodate is part of the non-discrimination provisions and 
underlines its importance in fighting discrimination against people with disabilities . 
From this starting point let us begin an examination of the exact terms and conditions 
contained in Article 5 itself.
371 Waddington, Lisa “Implementing the Disability Provisions o f the Framework Employment 
Directive: Room for Exercising National Discretion” supra note 300, 125.
372 See Section 16 o f the Irish Employment Equality Act 1998 as amended by the Equality Act 2004; 
Section 6 of the British Disability Discrimination Act 1995, last amended by Disability Discrimination 
Regulations 2003; and Section 6 of the Swedish Act 1999:132 on the Prohibition of Discrimination in 
Working Life o f Persons with Disabilities, amended by Act 2003:309. (Official Title: Lag (1999:132) 
om forbüd mot diskriminering i arbetslivet av personer med funktionshinder.) The reasonable 
accommodation provisions of the ADA were also influential in the drafting of these laws.
373 See Section I: 1.3 for a detailed examination of the transformation of European disability policy that 
eventually led to the inclusion o f disability in the Framework Directive and the insertion of Article 5.
374 Section 2 COM (1999) 0565 final
375 When attempting to understand a provision of the Directive, the relevant provisions of the Preamble 
often act as a useful interpretative guide. While not legally binding, they provide some useful 
explanations and insights.
376 Directive 2000/78/EC Recital 16 “The provision o f measures to accommodate the needs o f disabled 
people at the workplace plays an important role in combating discrimination on grounds of disability”.
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Article 5 reads as follows: “In order to guarantee compliance with the principle of 
equal treatment in relation to persons with disabilities, reasonable accommodation 
shall be provided. This means that employers shall take appropriate measures, where 
needed in a  particular case, to enable a person with a disability to have access to, 
participate in, or advance in employment, or to undergo training, unless such 
measures would impose a disproportionate burden on the employer. This burden shall 
not be disproportionate when it is sufficiently remedied by measures existing within 
the framework o f the disability policy o f the Member State concerned.” (Emphasis 
added by author)
It is important to stress from the beginning the individual nature of the duty of 
reasonable accommodation. This is apparent on a literal first reading. The Article 
refers to an accommodation needed in a “particular case” to facilitate a “person with a 
disability”. An individual analysis is necessary in order to find the most appropriate 
accommodation as each person with a disability has different needs and requirements 
depending on the nature of their impairment. Also the extent o f the accommodation or 
adaptation required will depend on the nature o f  the employment concerned. 
Therefore it is important to remember that reasonable accommodation will always 
involve an individual assessment and a tailored individual solution , It is also 
apparent from a literal first reading that there are a number o f  significant terms which 
will be determinant in deciding what amounts to a reasonable accommodation. These 
terms are unfortunately only given limited elaboration in the Directive. This lack o f  
guidance could give rise to a number o f  difficulties when interpreting Article 5.
4.21 Who is entitled to a reasonable accommodation?
A  contentious issue which may arise from the outset is the deceptively simple 
question o f who is entitled to a reasonable accommodation. It is clear from the 
wording o f  Article 5 that it is only “persons with disabilities” that are covered by the 
Directive. However, in order to avoid a situation where the obligation to provide 
reasonable accommodation could be used as a tool to require the employment o f 
individuals who are not qualified for the job, Recital 17 o f the Preamble permits that 
an employer is not obliged to employ someone who is not capable o f performing the 
essential functions o f the job. It states specifically that the Directive “does not require 37
377 See E.U Network o f Experts on Disability Discrimination, Lisa Waddington, supra note 363,8.
73
the recruitment, promotion, maintenance in employment or training o f  an individual 
who is not competent, capable and available to perform the essential functions of the 
post concerned or to undergo the relevant training, without prejudice to the obligation 
to provide reasonable accommodation for people with disabilities.” (Emphasis added 
by author) Therefore the obligation o f  reasonable accommodation is clearly connected 
to what constitutes the ‘essential functions’ o f the job. If  a person with a disability is 
capable of performing the essential functions o f the job, with or without reasonable 
accommodation, then he or she stands to benefit from the protection offered by 
Article 5.
To sum up, the Directive only prohibits discrimination against those individuals 
‘qualified’ i.e. ‘competent and capable’ to perform the essential functions o f the post 
Those ‘qualified’ individuals will be made up from two categories; people with 
disabilities who can perform the job  in its current form and those persons with 
disabilities whose impairment prevents them from performing the job  in its current 
form, but who could perform the jo b  i f  it were adapted appropriately through the 
making o f a ‘reasonable accommodation’378. Therefore the identification o f what 
constitutes the ‘essential functions’ o f  the job will be o f great importance in deciding 
whether it is possible to make an accommodation in the first place and secondly what 
kind o f accommodation is required. I f  the essential components o f the job have to be 
identified then it will be easier to determine if  it is possible to adapt duties in such a 
way that an individual with a disability can do the job. However, there are no 
guidelines provided in the Directive as to the meaning o f ‘essential functions’ or any 
assistance as to how it should be interpreted. Research has shown that many Member 
States do not distinguish between the essential functions o f the job and other more 
marginal functions379. This gap is worrying. It may allow too broad a discretion on the 
part o f the employer and discourage effective attempts to find appropriate reasonable 
accommodations.
4.22 What is implied by the term “reasonable accommodation ”?
In order to provide a suitable reasonable accommodation it is first necessary to 
examine what is required by the Directive. What is considered to be “reasonable” and
378 See E.U Network of Experts on Disability Discrimination, Lisa Waddington, supra note 363,45
379 See EU Network of Independent Experts on Disability Discrimination. Baseline Study-Disability 
Discrimination Law in the EU Member States. November, 2004, Part 3, supra note 253.
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what are the limits o f  a “reasonable” accommodation as intended by the Directive? As 
we have noted above, Article 5 was strongly influenced by the Americans with 
Disabilities Act 1990. Therefore, it may be useful to examine the meaning of 
“reasonable accommodation” in the context of this statute. Under the ADA, a 
“reasonable accommodation” was originally regarded as any modification or 
adjustment that was effective in enabling an individual with a disability to perform the 
essential functions o f a  particular job380 381. The reasonableness did not refer to its cost or 
inconvenience to the employer but rather to its potential to provide equal opportunity, 
reliability and efficiency . If one were to interpret Article 5 in this light, it would 
appear that the limits o f what is “reasonable” should be construed as the most 
effective way to allow a person with a disability to have access to the workplace, 
taking into account the particular characteristics of the individual concerned and the 
optimum way to achieve equality of opportunity. In this regard, some commentators 
have suggested that the term “effective accommodations” is more appropriate than 
“reasonable accommodation”382. Therefore, it would appear that the question o f what 
is reasonable should be considered separately to the question of whether an 
accommodation amounts to a disproportionate burden on the employer. 
Disproportionate burden refers to the upper limits o f what is reasonable for the 
employer. If  the accommodation results in such excessive cost and disruption to 
business as to outweigh the benefits o f the accommodation, then it may be said to be 
disproportionately burdensome on the employer to make such an accommodation. For 
example, if  a small employer is requested to make massive physical alterations to the 
workplace, which would result in huge costs and disruption to business, to 
accommodate one wheelchair-bound individual, it could reasonably be argued that 
this would be a disproportionate burden on the employer. However, physical access to 
the workplace is a reasonable demand for a wheelchair bound employee. Hence, it is 
apparent that the question o f  the reasonableness o f  the accommodation will not
j8° See E.U Network o f Experts on Disability Discrimination, Lisa Waddington supra note 363,63.
381 Ibid.
See Waddington L and Hendriks A, “The Expanding Concept of Employment Discrimination in 
Europe: From Direct and Indirect Discrimination to Reasonable Accommodation Discrimination” 
supra note 339 at 410. However, it is worth keeping in mind that a recent US Supreme Court decision 
US Airways v Barnett, 122 S.Ct, 1516 (2002) addressed the issue of reasonable accommodation under 
the ADA and held that the word “reasonable” does not mean “effective” in ordinary English and that it 
is the word “accommodation” and not “reasonable” that conveys the need for effectiveness. The Court 
declared that “an accommodation could be unreasonable in its impact even though it might be effective 
in facilitating performance of essential job functions”. This case marks a break away from the original 
meaning of the term ‘‘reasonable accommodation” in the ADA’s legislative history.
always be compatible with the cost o f  the accommodation. However, if  these issues 
are first considered separately, it may then be possible to broker a compromise 
between the employer and the individual with a disability. The most effective 
approach would be to firstly consider whether an accommodation is suitable, effective 
and workable in the particular circumstances o f a case and then consider whether it is 
feasible and financially viable for the employer. Unfortunately the Directive does not 
enunciate on this distinction or provide further interpretative guidance.
According to the express wording o f  Article 5, a  “reasonable” accommodation will 
involve “appropriate measures” on behalf o f the employer to “enable a person with a 
disability to have access to, participate in, or advance in employment, or to undergo 
training” . Unfortunately the Directive only provides limited elaboration of what an 
appropriate measure entails. In Recital 20 o f the Preamble, it describes appropriate 
measures as “effective and practical measures to adapt the workplace to the disability, 
for example adapting premises and equipment, patterns of working time, the 
distribution o f  tasks or the provision o f training or integration resources.” As a result 
o f the individual nature o f reasonable accommodation and the need for an individual 
analysis in each case it is difficult for legislation to provide a definitive list o f suitable 
accommodations. However as noted previously, the ADA defines reasonable 
accommodation by examples and is accompanied by comprehensive guidelines issued 
by the U.S Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. As a result o f the absence of 
such detailed guidance in the Framework Directive, it will be left to the Courts to 
clarify what types o f accommodations would and would not be suitable in certain 
circumstances. Based on experiences in the US and other jurisdictions,383 it may be 
predicted that determining what amounts to a “reasonable” accommodation and the 
interpretation o f what is deemed to  be an “appropriate” measure in each particular 
case will be contentious issues for the judiciary.
4.23 Limitations to a Reasonable Accommodation
The extent to which one can demand or make a reasonable accommodation is of 
course not unlimited. According to Article 5, a refusal by an employer to make a
383 In both the British Disability Discrimination Act 1995 and the Swedish Act 1999:132 on Prohibition 
o f Discrimination in Working Life of Persons with Disabilities, the question of reasonableness has 
proved to be one o f the most important and challenging parts o f the legislation. See Andreas 
Inghammar, “Discrimination of People with Disabilities. Normative aspects of Disability and Work in 
a Swedish, English and EC Context” in Ann Nurmhauser-Henning (Ed.) ‘Legal Perspectives on Equal 
Treatment and Non-discrimination’ Kluwer Law International 2001 at 338.
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reasonable accommodation for an individual with a disability will not amount to 
discrimination if the employer can show that such an accommodation would result in 
a  “disproportionate burden” on its operations. The Directive does not elaborately 
define what is meant by a “disproportionate burden” but some limited guidance is 
provided in the Preamble. Recital 21 stipulates that in order to determine whether a 
measure will give rise to a disproportionate burden, “account should be taken in 
particular o f the financial and other costs entailed, the scale and financial resources of 
the organisation or undertaking and the possibility o f obtaining public funding or any 
other assistance.” On the basis o f this explanation, it is certain that the economics o f 
the accommodation will be the primary factor taken into consideration by employers 
in determining whether a duty to make a reasonable accommodation should in fact be 
imposed. Wells384 notes that it is unfortunate that the Directive does not attempt to 
point out to employers the potential benefits385 involved in adapting the workplace to 
facilitate the employment o f people with disabilities rather than focusing solely on the 
cost involved. For example certain accommodations also improve the productivity o f 
other employees without disabilities. Ramps assist older workers, pregnant employees 
or employees with children and accommodations involving technology often improve 
job  efficiency for all workers. I f  reasonable accommodation is construed as a negative 
obligation, this will naturally result in employers viewing it in a  pessimistic light. This 
could preserve the traditional view that people with disabilities are costly to employ 
and thus result in increased instances o f discrimination against people with disabilities 
rather than a reduction which is the aim of the Directive. However, Article 5 does 
provide that the burden “shall not be disproportionate when it is sufficiently remedied 
by measures existing within the framework of the disability policy of the Member 
State concerned.” Recital 21, above, also refers to possibility of obtaining public 
funding or any other assistance. Therefore, financial involvement by the State may 
serve to facilitate acceptance o f  the duty to provide reasonable accommodation and
384 Wells, K, supra note 332.
385 Recent research has shown that reasonable accommodation can be positive for economic efficiency. 
For example the European Commission published independent research in November 2003 concerning 
the emerging business case for diversity. Benefits identified include corporate reputation, human 
capital and avoidance of costs related to workplace discrimination and harassment. See 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/emplovment_social/flindamental rights/prog/studies en.htm. For a recent 
review of the relationship between reasonable accommodation for people with disabilities and 
efficiency requirements see MA Stein, “The Law and Economics o f Disability Accommodations” 
(2003) 53 Duke Law Journal 79.
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anti-discrimination legislation in general386. It would ease the burden on employers 
thereby making it more difficult for them to argue that an accommodation amounts to 
a disproportionate burden and possibly act as an incentive to comply with the 
reasonable accommodation duty. I f  States were to get involved financially this would 
also assuage critics who question the appropriateness o f  imposing the cost of 
achieving a societal goal on private entities387.
In contrast to other terms in Article 5 which were directly influenced by the ADA, this 
is not the case with the limit o f “disproportionate burden” . In the ADA the obligation 
o f reasonable accommodation can only be revoked when the employer can show that 
such an accommodation would impose an “undue hardship” on the business388. The 
limit o f “undue hardship” would appear to have a  wider remit than the 
“disproportionate burden” limit in the Directive. The ADA defines “undue hardship” 
as “an action requiring significant difficulty or expense” when considered in light of 
an expanded list of factors389. Obviously, the presence o f  a  broad statutory standard 
defining “undue hardship” offers a  higher degree of protection. Unfortunately the 
Framework Directive is limited by the absence of such a comprehensive set of 
guidelines as those set out by the ADA. As no definitive rule has been set,
386 Brunei University, “Definitions o f Disability in Europe: A Comparative Analysis”, supra note 143 
at 76.
387 This issue arose in Ireland in relation to the Employment Equality Bill 1996 which contained an 
obligation o f  reasonable accommodation on employers with a limit o f “undue hardship”. The Irish 
Supreme Court subsequently held the provision to be repugnant to the right to property enshrined in the 
Irish Constitution in Re the Employment Equality Bill 1996 [1997] 2 I.R. 321. The reasoning given by 
the Court was as follows: “the difficulty with the section...is that it attempts to transfer the cost of 
solving one o f  society’s problems onto a particular group. The difficulty the Court finds with the 
section is not that it requires an employer to employ disabled people, but that it requires him to bear the 
cost o f  all special treatment or facilities which the disabled person may require to cany out the work 
unless the cost o f  the provision o f such treatment or facilities would give rise to ‘undue hardship* on 
the employer.” This decision resulted in the inclusion of a very restrictive provision on reasonable 
accommodation in the Employment Equality Act 1998 which provided for a significantly reduced cap 
o f ‘nominal cost* on the employer. This has now been changed to a ‘disproportionate burden’ in order 
to implement the Framework Employment Directive.
388 ADA § 102(b)(5)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 12,11 l(b)5(A)
j89 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(10) A. Subparagraph B elaborates on the factors to be considered:
(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this Act;
(ii) the overall financial resources o f the facility or facilities involved in the provision o f the 
reasonable accommodation; the number o f persons employed at such facility; the effect on 
expenses and resources, or the impact otherwise of such accommodation upon the operation of 
the facility;
(iii) the overall financial resources o f the covered entity; the overall size of the business of a 
covered entity with respect to the number o f  its employees; the number, type, and location of its 
facilities; and
(iv) the type o f  operation or operations of the covered entity, including the composition, 
structure, and functions o f the workforce o f such entity; the geographic separateness, 
administrative, or fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities in question to the covered 
entity.
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“disproportionate burden” remains an open-ended concept which will be left to the 
judiciary to assess. What amounts to a disproportionate burden will depend on the 
facts o f each particular case. The judiciary will have the difficult task to arbitrate and 
establish a fair balance between the economic imperatives o f the employer and his 
business and the protection o f the individual rights of people with disabilities. 
Unfortunately, economic justifications are systematically accepted at the European 
level by reason o f the fact that economic development and competitiveness is 
supposed to be the prime objective of the European Union390.
The most manifest limitation to Article 5 is that its terms are ambiguous and 
unspecified. Its effectiveness will depend greatly on the interpretation of national 
judges as it is up to them to assess the standards and limits o f what is ‘reasonable’, 
‘appropriate’ and ‘disproportionate’391. Leaving the assessment of these essential 
term s to the national judge could be perilous due to their considerable freedom of 
interpretation in deciding disability discrimination cases. This is due to the fact that 
disability discrimination law is a fairly new concept in Europe; consequently there is 
not yet an established body o f case-law or established guidelines. This freedom o f 
interpretation could result in unpredictability in the assessment o f  what amounts to a  
reasonable accommodation and in widening gaps between the national approaches o f 
the various EU Member States.
In conclusion, having examined the terms of Article 5 one may presume that there is a 
particular process required by the Directive in the provision o f a reasonable 
accommodation. Firstly the person with a disability must be qualified to do the job. 
This process will involve identifying the ‘essential functions’ o f the job. This must be 
followed by an analysis o f whether the person with a disability can perform these 
‘essential functions’ with or without an accommodation. Secondly, if  an 
accommodation is required, then an appropriate accommodation must be identified. I f  
no effective accommodation is found, then the employer can justify a refusal to 
accommodate. The identification of a suitable accommodation will normally require
390 Moreau, Marie-Ange, “Justifications of Discrimination”, supra note 291, 156. See Section I: 1.3 o f 
this thesis for further elaboration on the economic aims of the EU.
391 This ambiguity can be a typical feature o f anti-discrimination law. Moreau aptly describes the law 
of discrimination ‘as a law of eminently relative adjectives’. See ‘Justifications of Discrimination’ 
supra note 2 9 1 ,161.
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negotiation and co-operation between the employer and the individual with a 
disability in order to determine firstly what amounts to a ‘reasonable* accommodation 
and secondly whether this amounts to a disproportionate burden on the employer. In 
calculating a disproportionate burden, the employer may take into account the cost 
involved, the size and resources of the business and the possibility of public funding. 
An open dialogue between the two parties is essential as the individual with a 
disability is in a better position to identify a suitable accommodation and the 
employer is more informed as the evaluation o f what is an excessive cost or disruption 
to the business392. It is also important that the employer is made aware o f the needs of 
the worker or job  applicant. Otherwise he can rely on the fact that he was not 
informed as a defence. It can therefore be assumed that there is a burden of proof on 
the employee with a disability to show that a reasonable accommodation is possible 
and once such an accommodation is identified, the employer should bear the burden 
of proof o f  showing that it would result in a disproportionate burden393.
4.3 Conceptual ambiguities
As a result o f the brevity of the reasonable accommodation provision in the Directive, 
there are many ambiguities about its conceptual framework. There has been little 
specific guidance provided as to how it should be interpreted, which has led to 
confusion about its position in the existing structure of European anti-discrimination 
law. In this section I propose to examine the conceptual intricacies o f Article 5 and 
hope to provide some clarification as to its functions and purpose within the current 
framework.
j92 Employers are already under an obligation to inform and consult with employees, who in addition 
have a right to express their views on company policies under the Council Directive 2002/14/EC of 11 
March 2002 establishing a general framework for informing and consulting employees in the European 
Community. Open consultation and negotiation between the employer and the employee on reaching a 
decision about a reasonable accommodation will be mutually beneficial. It improves both the quality of 
life o f the worker and the workplace in general, making it more open and accessible for all.
393 The burden of proof is allocated in this way in relation to the reasonable accommodation provision 
in the ADA, therefore it can be reasonably presumed that it will be interpreted in a similar way at EU 
level. Furthermore, if the employer does not engage in an interactive process with the employee, the 
burden of proof shifts from die employee to the employer concerning the availability o f an 
accommodation. See Blanck, Hill, Siegal & Waterstone, “Disability Civil Rights Law and Policy" 
(Hornbook Series: Hornbook 2004) at § 8.4 p8-26.
80
4.31 Reasonable Accommodation and the concept o f  Positive Action 
A s I mentioned at the outset, the concept o f reasonable accommodation has often been 
considered as a component of positive action. Within the meaning of the Framework 
Directive, however, reasonable accommodation is not considered a form of positive 
action. The Directive does not expressly refer to the relationship between reasonable 
accommodation and positive action but it is implicit that they should be regarded as 
tw o separate and distinct instruments. This implicit separation is illustrated by the fact 
that reasonable accommodation is construed as an obligation whereas positive action 
is left to the discretion o f the Member States394. It is endorsed by the Directive as a 
potential tool to combat discrimination but it is not mandatory and this considerably 
reduces its impact. This important distinction clearly sets the two instruments apart. 
However as a result o f considerable confusion in some jurisdictions as to the 
relationship between reasonable accommodation and positive action395 it is worth 
addressing the issue o f  whether the concepts are in some way interconnected or exist 
as two wholly separate instruments. One must first look at the theory and motivation 
behind each mechanism in order to understand whether there is a link between them. 
It must be conceded that they are both similar in approach: both involve the employer 
actively providing and supporting measures to promote the equality of people with 
disabilities. However there are also important differences. Positive action involves the 
introduction o f measures which go beyond the negative prohibition o f discrimination 
and seek to alter the composition of the workplace or institution in favour of a 
particular group396. In essence it positively discriminates in favour of a particular 
group. A commonly used positive action measure in the case o f disability has been 
strict employment quotas397. Reasonable accommodation on the other hand involves 
the imposition of a  positive duty on the employer to facilitate a person with a 
disability into the workplace in order to avoid less favourable treatment, not in the
394 Article 7(1) Directive 2000/78/EC dealing with positive action states “With a view to ensuring full 
equality in practice, the principle of equal treatment shall not prevent any Member States from 
maintaining or adopting specific measures to prevent or compensate for disadvantages linked to any o f 
the grounds referred to in Article 1”. The grounds referred to in Article 1 are disability, age, religion or 
belief and sexual orientation.
395 For a review of the literature see supra note 343.
396 This definition is partly adopted from C. Bell, A. Hegarty, S. Livingstone, ‘The Enduring 
Controversy: Developments on Affirmative Action Law in North America’ (1996) International 
Journal o f Discrimination and the Law, 233, 234. See also Cathryn Costello, ‘Positive Action’ in 
Costello C and Barry E (Eds.) “Equality in Diversity-the new Equality Directives”. Irish Centre for 
European Law 2003 at 177 for a critical appraisal of positive action measures in EU law.
397 See Section I: 1.11 o f this thesis for a discussion of the use of employment quotas in the case o f 
disability.
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sense that more favourable treatment or positive discrimination is required39*, it is 
important to underline that reasonable accommodation does not aim to create an 
artificial opportunity where none might otherwise exist398 99, rather the aim is to open up 
access to opportunities which have thus far remained closed to people with disabilities 
as a result o f  discrimination. This highlights the distinct and necessary function of 
reasonable accommodation within the non-discrimination framework and furthermore 
its dissimilarity from positive action. It is important that Member States also make 
this distinction in their implementation legislation and that the judiciary will interpret 
it correctly in order to avoid the confusion that has emerged in other jurisdictions.
4.32 Reasonable Accommodation and the existing anti-discrimination framework 
One uncertain and unspecified aspect o f the duty to provide reasonable 
accommodation is whether a failure by employers to abide by this obligation amounts 
to discrimination. The wording o f Article 5 does not explicitly provide that an 
unjustified failure to comply with this duty should amount to discrimination. 
Therefore the ambiguity arises as to where does the concept o f reasonable 
accommodation fit in the anti-discrimination framework outlined in the Directive? 
Firstly, can it be inferred that a failure to make a  reasonable accommodation amounts 
to discrimination? If  so, then what type o f discrimination? As previously discussed, 
the Directive expressly prohibits direct and indirect discrimination on the grounds of 
disability400. Can a failure to provide reasonable accommodation come under either of 
these two categories of discrimination? Or would it be less problematic and more 
effective to construe it as a third and separate form o f discrimination?
4.321 Does a failure to provide reasonable accommodation amount to 
discrimination ?
As I have mentioned previously, the wording o f Article 5 is largely based on the 
concept o f reasonable accommodation in  the Americans with Disabilities Act 1990. In 
the ADA, it is expressly stated that a failure on the part o f the employer to make a
398 Wells, supra note 332. This argument is supported by Recital 17 o f the Preamble which emphasises 
that employers are not under an obligation to employ someone who is not capable of performing the 
essential functions o f the job without prejudice to the obligation to provide reasonable accommodation.
399 See Hendricks, Aart, “The Concepts o f  Non-Discrimination and Reasonable Accommodation” in 
the 1995 Report of the European Day o f the Disabled, ‘Disabled Persons’ Status in the European 
Treaties-Invisible Citizens. (1995), 53 at 58
400 Article 2 (2) (a) and (b) of Council Directive 2000/78/EC
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reasonable accommodation for an otherwise qualified person with a disability 
am ounts to discrimination401. On the contrary, this is not explicitly stated in the 
Framework Directive. The Commission's original proposal for the Framework 
D irective also classified an unjustified refusal to make such an accommodation as a 
fo rm  o f  discrimination, however the adopted text simply provides for an obligation to 
m ake such an accommodation with no reference to discrimination402. Nevertheless 
m any  Member States have made this link in their legislation403. It is submitted that on 
a  purposive reading of the Directive, the failure to provide reasonable accommodation 
does amount to discrimination. It is clearly in keeping with the intention and spirit o f 
th e  Directive, which is to combat discrimination. The concept o f discrimination in the 
Directive is described in Article 2(1) which states “For the purposes of the Directive 
th e  ‘principle o f equal treatment’ shall mean that there shall be no direct or indirect 
discrimination whatsoever on any o f the grounds referred to in Article 1”. If we look 
simultaneously at the opening sentence of Article 5, which states “In order to
guarantee compliance with the principle o f equal treatment.... reasonable
accommodation shall be provided”, it is obvious that these two provisions share the 
sam e aim, which is to achieve equal treatment on the ground o f  disability. Whittle404 
a lso  acknowledges that while the duty to accommodate is located outside the concept 
o f  discrimination as defined in Article 2, it is clear that the two are inextricably linked 
and  Article 5 should be cross-referenced with the concept of discrimination in Article 
2(1). Despite these interpretative possibilities, it would clearly have been more 
effective if  the definition o f discrimination was expressly extended to include 
employer refusals o f reasonable accommodation. Having argued that a failure to 
provide reasonable accommodation can be interpreted as amounting to discrimination, 
le t us examine if it fits within the existing dual framework o f direct and indirect 
discrimination outlined by the Directive.
401 ADA § 102(bX5)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 12,11 l(b)5(A).
402 It has been claimed that the reason for the separation of the reasonable accommodation provision 
from the non-discrimination provisions in the final text was not as a result of objections to the link 
between reasonable accommodation and discrimination but rather because it was felt out of place to 
over burden Article 2 on the general prohibition against discrimination with detailed rules related only 
to  one ground among the many. See EU Network o f Independent Experts on Disability Discrimination. 
Baseline Study supra note 253,12
403 See for example Sweden, § 6 of the Prohibition of Discrimination in Working Life of Persons with 
Disabilities (1999:132); Belgium, Article 2 § 3 of the Federal Law of 25 February 2003; the UK, Part II 
3A(2) o f the Disability Discrimination Act 1995.
404 Whittle, Richard, supra note 238,312
4.322 Direct Discrimination?
In order to prove direct discrimination it may often be necessary to demonstrate intent 
on behalf o f  the perpetrator405 and to identify a “comparable situation”. Therefore, in 
order to establish that a failure to make a reasonable accommodation is a form of 
direct discrimination, one could establish that the employer knew about the need for a 
reasonable accommodation to be made, which could have been done without 
excessive cost and refused to make that adaptation406. In order to fit this approach into 
the European Community framework, Waddington407 claims that it would be 
necessary to explicitly provide for the “disproportionate burden” defence with regard 
to a  directly discriminatory act involving a denial o f reasonable accommodation. This 
is presently not provided for in the Directive, therefore it is not a likely possibility. 
With regard to the express definition o f  direct discrimination in the Directive, the 
identification o f  a “comparable situation” is necessary in order to prove 
discrimination took place408. Therefore, in order to bring a failure to make a 
reasonable accommodation within the definition as laid down in the Directive one 
must establish that an individual requiring an accommodation is in a “comparable 
situation” to  those who do not require such an accommodation. This is difficult to 
demonstrate given that the reason for a reasonable accommodation in the first place is 
to remove the barriers, which obstruct an individual with a disability from being in a 
“comparable situation” with other workers.
From the outset the concept o f reasonable accommodation is at odds with the notion 
o f direct discrimination, which is expressed in formal equality terms. This means that 
it is based on the idea that an individual’s personal inherent characteristics are rarely 
relevant and only in exceptional cases allow for different treatment. However as has 
been underlined throughout this thesis, failing to accommodate individual 
characteristics in the case o f disability would result in denying a person with a 
disability equal employment opportunities. Despite these apparent difficulties, it is 
noteworthy that certain Member States have interpreted a failure to provide 
reasonable accommodation as amounting to direct discrimination409. In one sense
405 E.U Network o f Experts on Disability Discrimination, Lisa Waddington supra note 363, 80.
406 Ibid.
407 Ibid.
408 See further Section III: 3.11
409 Sweden, § 6 o f the Prohibition of Discrimination in Working Life of Persons 
Disabilities(1999:132); In Ireland the Labour Court held that a failure to provide reasonable 
accommodation amounted to direct discrimination in the case o f A Motor Company v. A Worker
with
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conceptualising a failure to provide reasonable accommodation as amounting to direct 
discrimination lends a powerful force to the reasonable accommodation duty. There 
are no justifiable defences provided for direct discrimination in the Framework 
Directive, hence it would raise the bar for employers and make it more difficult for 
them  to escape liability.
4.323 Indirect Discrimination?
N ow , let us now consider if  the concept o f indirect discrimination, as laid down in the 
Directive, could be invoked to redress a failure to accommodate. There are close links 
between the concepts o f indirect discrimination and reasonable accommodation. Both 
are strongly influenced by the notion o f substantive equality and aim to combat more 
subtle and systemic forms of discrimination. Despite these similarities in ideology, 
they are quite different in nature. The concept of reasonable accommodation is o f a  
very  individualised nature. Each individual case is treated differently depending on 
the particular characteristics o f the individual concerned and specific environmental 
factors. Indirect discrimination, on the other hand, aims to combat disadvantage 
experienced by a particular group o f persons as a result o f  an apparently neutral 
provision, criterion or practice.
There is an express link drawn between the two concepts in Article 2(2)(b)(ii) o f the 
Directive which provides that certain provisions or practices will not amount to 
indirect discrimination if  the employer is obliged to make a reasonable 
accommodation. It is uncertain what this provision implies for the relationship 
between reasonable accommodation and indirect discrimination. It would appear to 
suggest that if  the employer fails to make a reasonable accommodation then this will 
amount to indirect discrimination. Does this suggest that a failure to make a 
reasonable accommodation is a form of indirect discrimination? Or is it just 
recognition of the fact that reasonable accommodation is a method of combating 
indirect discrimination? Article 2(2)(b)(ii) has been interpreted as allowing a choice at 
national level between legislative provisions defining and prohibiting indirect 
discrimination and legislative provisions creating the duty to provide reasonable
ED/01/40. In Finland it has been claimed that it is possible to interpret a failure to provide reasonable 
accommodation as amounting to direct discrimination- see E.U Network o f Experts on Disability 
Discrimination, Lisa Waddington supra note 363,85.
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accommodation410. In fact, the provision was only inserted at the request of the British 
government who wished to preserve their existing legislative framework411. Other 
Member States have also chosen to interpret a failure to provide reasonable 
accommodation as amounting to indirect discrimination412 413. This conceptualisation has 
been identified by experts as the weakest approach as it fails to fully grasp the current 
meaning o f indirect discrimination in EU law .
As to the question of whether a failure to provide a reasonable accommodation could 
be construed as indirect discrimination under the definition provided in Article 2 
(2)(b) o f the Directive, it must be kept in mind that this is a new definition o f indirect 
discrimination414. The definition focuses on a comparison between persons with 
disabilities and other persons, to identify if the former have been placed at a particular 
disadvantage. Member States have at their discretion the possibility o f using statistical 
data as evidence. Therefore in order to claim that a failure to provide reasonable 
accommodation is a form o f  indirect discrimination, one must satisfy this test. Due to 
the individual nature o f reasonable accommodation, it will prove difficult to form a 
homogeneous group o f people with disabilities for the purposes o f the definition. 
Each reasonable accommodation case is different depending on the nature and type of 
disability involved and external environmental factors. It may also be difficult to find 
data to support a claim due to the novelty o f reasonable accommodation in EU law. 
Therefore, finding a suitable comparator in this scenario will not prove an easy task. 
Consequently, the determination o f whether* a failure to provide reasonable 
accommodation amounts to indirect discrimination under the Directive will depend 
firstly on how this new test for indirect discrimination will be interpreted by the 
Courts, at national and then European level. Then it may be possible to ascertain for 
certain to what extent the failure to provide a reasonable accommodation can be 
covered by the test and eventually whether it amounts to indirect discrimination.
4.0 Wells, K, supra note 332.
4.1 Ibid. See also Section III: 3.121.
412 Spain: Article 37.3 of the Law 13/1982 refers to'reasonable accommodation as a way to avoid 
indirect discrimination; Austria: the draft law of January 2004 to implement the Framework Directive 
makes it clear that a failure to provide reasonable accommodation is a form of indirect discrimination.; 
France: The Assemblée Nationale wishes to insert the duty to accommodate in the Labour Code which 
addresses discrimination and has stated that a refusal to accommodate would constitute indirect 
discrimination. Information provided by E.U Network o f  Experts on Disability Discrimination, Lisa 
Waddington supra note 363.
413 E.U Network of Experts on Disability Discrimination, Lisa Waddington supra note 363,90.
414 See Section III: 3.12
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4.324 Reasonable Accommodation Discrimination?
In  light of these conclusions, it is clear that a failure to provide reasonable 
accommodation does not fit easily into the category o f either direct or indirect 
discrimination as defined within the Directive. There are numerous reasons for this 
incompatibility. Firstly, it is conceptually a different type o f provision. Article 5 does 
not express a negative prohibition on discrimination as do the provisions on direct and 
indirect discrimination; rather it imposes a positive duty on employers to provide a 
reasonable solution to the barriers and discrimination faced by people with 
disabilities. While direct discrimination encompasses a  formal principle and thus has a 
consistent nature, reasonable accommodation is dependent on many variables, thus 
rendering it difficult to fulfil requirements, such as the identification of a ‘comparable 
situation’, as demanded by the prohibition on direct discrimination. Secondly, the 
failure to provide a reasonable accommodation is a disadvantage which is experienced 
on  a very individual level; therefore it is particularly problematic to fit it under 
indirect discrimination which is a group based measure. As a result of this unique 
nature of reasonable accommodation, a different approach is required to achieve 
justice for the individual affected by a failure to provide reasonable accommodation. 
Therefore, it has been suggested that reasonable accommodation discrimination 
should be conceptualised as a form o f discrimination sui generis with its own rules 
and defences415. This would be advantageous in the sense that it would provide for all 
the peculiarities associated with reasonable accommodation. "For example if Article 5 
had its own distinct rules with respect to the burden o f proof and justifiable defences, 
it would certainly strengthen and reinforce the protection offered to individuals with 
disabilities. However, this would entail considerable expansion of the reasonable 
accommodation provision and inevitably involve creating a separate and special 
category of disability discrimination. This would not appear to be very feasible under 
the Framework Directive due to the fact that it is a multi-ground statute and confined 
to the employment field. As reasonable accommodation only covers people with
415 Commentators that have argued for the separate conceptualisation'of “Reasonable Accommodation 
Discrimination” include Catherine Casserley, “Reasonable Accommodation ”. Paper given at the 
conference, “The fight against discrimination: the Equal Treatment Directives o f 2000”. Academy o f 
European Law. Trier 1-2 Oct 2004 and Lisa Waddington and Aart Hendriks “The Expanding Concept 
o f Employment Discrimination in Europe: From Direct and Indirect Discrimination to Reasonable 
Accommodation Discrimination” supra note 339. It has been suggested that the law relating to 
reasonable accommodation in the Netherlands can be purposively interpreted as having a distinct sui 
generis nature. See E.U Network of Experts on Disability Discrimination, Lisa Waddington supra note 
363,85.
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disabilities, it would be difficult to argue such expansion within the framework of the 
Directive. For these reasons and others it has already been proposed at the European 
level to adopt a disability specific directive to deal more comprehensively and 
effectively with issues associated with the particular nature o f  disability416.
4.4 Reasonable Accommodation as a method o f  achieving Equality fo r People with 
Disabilities.
It has been demonstrated that reasonable accommodation is now an established 
concept in the fight against inequality and exclusion in many jurisdictions 
internationally. However, it is still only an emerging concept in Europe, having been 
introduced by the Framework Directive in 2000 solely in the context of disability. 
Therefore it is timely to examine how effective it is as a mode o f achieving equality 
for people with disabilities.
Firstly it must be determined where it is situated in the existing European equality 
framework, which is broadly composed o f formal and substantive equality. As 
discussed in Section II, formal equality requires all people to be treated equally and 
does not tolerate differential treatment with only very rare exceptions. It normally 
involves neutral policies which do not take into account ‘irrelevant* considerations 
such as sex, race or disability. This type o f policy would appear to be incompatible 
with the concept o f reasonable accommodation which at its core involves allowing for 
and accommodating ‘difference*. On the other hand, substantive equality recognises" 
that inequality can be systemic and indirect, thus creating unfair conditions for 
already disadvantaged groups. This recognition means that substantive equality tends 
to advocate policies that seek to eliminate the structural factors that cause inequality, 
which may involve altering the systems that neutrally treat everyone the same417. 
People with disabilities have posed a challenge to the formal model o f equality as 
facially neutral policies which have been designed with the needs of the dominant 
group in mind are inadequate to achieve integration and equality for all418. As I have 
emphasised throughout the thesis, the characteristic o f disability cannot be ignored in 
order to achieve equal treatment for people with disabilities, rather it must absolutely
416 A draft disability specific directive was published by the European Disability Forum in Spring 2003. 
See www.edf-feph.org to view the draft directive.




be taken into account. Therefore reasonable accommodation would appear to be the 
solution to this conundrum. It recognises that equality cannot always be achieved by 
identical treatment and therefore aims to accomplish equality by instead 
acknowledging diversity and accommodating difference. Understood in this way it 
would appear to be clearly rooted in the substantive equality ideal.
However, critics have identified problems with the concept of reasonable 
accommodation which appear to be contrary to substantive equality ideology.
Reasonable accommodation has been criticised as being assimilationist419 and as 
failing to guarantee equal employment opportunities for all in the broader perspective 
o f equality by reason o f its individual nature 420. A major conceptual difficulty is that 
the recognition o f  difference which is inherent in the notion of reasonable 
accommodation is constructed as a ‘problem’ that accommodation is seeking to fix. It 
reinforces the idea that ‘normal’ people are dominant in society and that adjustments
j
will be made in order to fit people who are ‘different’ into this paradigm. While the
notion o f reasonable accommodation is without doubt a positive development within I
the traditional structure of equality, there is a danger that it may not confront “the
imbalances in power, or the discourses o f  dominance, such as racism, able-bodyism | ;
and sexism, which result in a society being designed well for some and not for
others.421” In order to really challenge these deep rooted mechanisms and attempt to
achieve real equality in the process, transformation o f the institutions and
relationships which make up society must be the goal. Accommodation, as a result o f i
its individual nature, does not require structural or societal change which would
inevitably affect groups of persons but rather it requires adaptations to an existing
structure or entity (subject to a limit that it is not overly burdensome) in order to fit
‘different’ individuals into the existing system in society. However, the complexity in
the disability context is that as a result o f the huge variety of disabilities, covering a
broad spectrum o f  physical, intellectual and emotional impairments, both group and
individual accommodations are necessary. Group-based adaptations such as
accessible buildings, transportation and communication are essential for an inclusive
society while individual measures are required where there are many variables to be
taken into consideration, for example in the workplace where the relationship between
4,9 See McLachlin J. of the Canadian Supreme Court in British Columbia v. BCGSEU 9 Sept 1999 CSC 
no. 26.274 at paragraph 41.
420 Lisa Waddington and Aart Hendriks, supra note 339,414.
421 Day and Brodsky, supra note 417, 30
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factors such as the essential functions o f the job, the particular type o f disability and 
the environment must be determined.
Therefore it is apparent that the current form o f individualised reasonable 
accommodation, as embodied by the Framework Directive, is insufficient to achieve 
full equality in practice for all people with disabilities. It needs to be supported by 
group-based measures in order to make institutions, services and society more open to 
a diverse range o f people and abilities. Unfortunately, individual measures alone will 
not tackle deep seated prejudices and stereotypes about people with disabilities. In 
fact it has been noted that more often than not they may actually leave unchallenged 
and unaffected the underlying discriminatory policy which resulted in the initial 
exclusion422.
4.5 Concluding Remarks
Article 5 has turned out to be one o f the most challenging provisions o f the Directive 
for Member States to implement. For most Member States it is a completely new 
legislative concept. Thus far implementation has been varying and inconsistent. 
Research has shown that many aspects o f the obligation have not been well-catered 
for. For example, the various kinds o f reasonable accommodations possible have not 
been clearly differentiated in legislation and issues such as the importance of 
individualising the search for an accommodation and the necessity of an interactive 
dialogue between employer and employee have also been poorly provided for under 
much statute law . There is also no uniform approach as to whether a failure to 
provide a reasonable accommodation amounts to discrimination. These gaps are 
crucial as reasonable accommodation is regarded as the core provision in the 
Directive to combat disability discrimination and the way in which it will be handled 
will probably determine whether the Directive and consequently national legislation 
will be effective in combating discrimination on the ground o f  disability.
The concept o f reasonable accommodation now underpins the heart of modem 
disability discrimination legislation. It is a legal concept, which if properly enforced, 
will finally give people with disabilities the opportunity to participate in economic 
and social structures, which have, until now, through their design and operation
42̂  Lisa Waddington and Aart Hendriks, supra note 339,415
4Zi See EU Network o f Independent Experts on Disability Discrimination. Baseline Study, supra note 
253, 86.
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locked such individuals out424. The introduction of reasonable accommodation to EU 
anti-discrimination law has significant implications for the future and it has been 
described as evidence o f a different and more sophisticated approach to combating 
discrimination425 426. As I have discussed previously, due to the specific nature of 
disability, the application of the conventional equality ideal is problematic. The 
traditional anti-discrimination model does not fit and as I have demonstrated, genuine 
equality even involves going beyond the norms o f a prohibition o f direct and indirect 
discrimination. This is where the concept o f reasonable accommodation becomes so 
important It recognises the importance o f respecting diversity in order to achieve 
equality. Not only does it respect difference, but it requires the would-be 
discriminator to accommodate this difference, therefore forcing him to reflect on 
barriers that inhibit equal opportunity . This innovation signals a new direction for 
European anti-discrimination law in a more substantive direction. It is hoped that this 
focus will continue and that individualised reasonable accommodations will be 
supported by additional substantive group measures in order to tackle more structural 
forms of discrimination.
424 See Olivia Smith “Disability Discrimination and Employment: A never-ending legal story?” (2001 ) 
23 DULJ148 at 153.
425 Barbera, Marzia, “Not the same? The Judicial Role in the New Community Anti-Discrimination 
Law Context”, 31 Industrial Law Journal 1 (2002), 82
426 See Gerard Quinn and Shivaun Quinlivan, “Disability Discrimination: the Need to Amend the 




“I f  the objective o f  elim inating disability discrimination is taken seriously, it is 
obvious that we are talking about social change on a very large and ambitious 
scale."427
Disability has already experienced quite a substantial shift in social paradigms. It 
moved from being viewed as a medical ‘problem* o f the person, which was dealt with 
by charity and welfare measures to an issue o f rights whereby the ‘problem’ is not 
located with the individual but in the way society is constructed to the disadvantage of 
the individual. Despite this change in thinking and the subsequent adoption o f anti- 
discrimination legislation, discrimination continues to be a daily occurrence for 
people with disabilities in all aspects o f  life. Without doubt, the rights-based approach 
has achieved major advances in the last 20 years. However, a difficulty in its approach 
lies in that it depends on viewing people with disabilities as a “discrete and insular 
group”428. The reality is that people with disabilities do not form a homogenous group 
at all, as evidenced by the major difficulties in forming definitions o f  disability in 
anti-discrimination laws world-wide. Disabilities are numerous in type, vast in 
number and are spread throughout a large proportion o f the world population. No 
person is exempt from becoming disabled and disability has the power to affect 
anybody at any stage in life.
Recently, there has been a strong body o f thought which argues that disability 
discrimination legislation needs to move away from the minority rights approach 
towards a more universalist view429. This view proposes universal design for all 
aspects o f human activity including buildings, transportation, housing and workplaces 
so that environments and tools are suitable for as many people as possible430. This 
approach is based on the assumption that disability is a universal human condition 
which all people share to one extent or another and in this sense it moves away from
427 Gubbels, André, Former Principal Administrator in the Disability Unit o f the Directorate General 
for Employment and Social Affairs o f the European Commission (1997 *2002) in “The Evolution o f 
EU Disability Policy: from Charity to Rights”, supra note 60.
428 Bickenbach, JE, “Disability and Equality” (2003) 2:1 Journal of Law and Equality, 7-15 at 10.
429 Fredman, S., “Disability Equality: A Challenge to the existing Anti-Discrimination Paradigm?” 
supra note 117 at 207.
43° Ibid.
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categorising people with disabilities as a separate group or class o f people431. The 
universalist view can be observed in the World Health Organisation’s International 
Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health432 and it has recently been 
endorsed by the UN Ad Hoc Committee on the Rights o f Persons with Disabilities433.
The current disability strategy o f the EU, with its emphasis on anti-discrimination 
legislation and particularly the concept o f  reasonable accommodation, focuses on 
special laws to ‘fit’ people with disabilities into society. This approach is certainly an 
improvement on previous welfare measures which often actively excluded people 
with disabilities from the community. However, a universalist approach would go 
even further as it aims to make society open and accessible to all. In this sense people 
with disabilities would have the same rights and advantages as non-disabled people, 
rather than be perceived as a minority group which receives ‘special treatment’. 
Examples o f this approach in practice could be comprehensive equality or non­
discrimination laws which outlaw discrimination on all grounds. Currently at the EU 
level there are varying levels o f protection for the different grounds covered by anti- 
discrimination legislation434. To even reach a point where the introduction o f 
comprehensive legislation could be introduced, it is first essential that the EU extends 
its protection against disability discrimination to areas outside the employment field 
such as education, housing, transport and goods and services.
431 See Bickenbach JE, supra note 428 at 11.
4j2 WHO, “International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health” (Geneva: WHO, 2001)
433 See UN Ad Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive and Integral International Convention on 
Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities (New York, 2003), 
‘Issues and Emerging Trends Related to Advancement of Persons with Disabilities’ 
DocA/AC.265/2003/1, paras. 9-10. Cited in Fredman, supra note 117 at 207.
434 For more detailed discussion, see Waddington, L. and M. Bell “Reflecting on Inequalities in 
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